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Empirical research into jihadi terrorism is extremely scarce. Although signifi-
cant scientific research into jihadi terrorism has been conducted, and many
publications on this subject have appeared in the last few years, the lack of
empirical data in this area remains critical. As a result, various theories have
been formulated on the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism at different levels,
but these have provided very little insight into their explanatory power. As
Van der Pligt and Koomen (2009) state in a recent publication: ‘This lack of
significant research allows a large freedom of conjecture. Unhindered by
stubborn empiricism, many approaches and theories can be constructed,
which are consequently less convincing.’
The purpose of this report is not to explain the phenomenon of jihadi terror-
ism. The major purpose of this project is to describe how this phenomenon
manifested itself in the Netherlands, during the period between 2001 and
2005, by analysing actual cases that were investigated by the police during
this period. To this end, the researchers systematically analysed twelve inves-
tigations into jihadi activities carried out during the period studied.
These methods not only produce new insights, but also raise new methodo-
logical questions. Is it possible to describe this phenomenon adequately if
researchers can only focus on the groups, activities, and persons investigated
by the police in the period studied? What are the consequences for the
description of this phenomenon if researchers use information that was col-
lected by the police for the purpose of prosecution? In short, how does the
perspective of the police influence the picture outlined in this report?
For the time being, we cannot provide the answers to these questions
because there is too little other empirical material available with which the
findings from this report could be compared. This fact emphasises the addi-
tional significance of the description presented here. The systematic analysis
of information from police files provides a unique view of the world of jihad-
ism and makes a valuable contribution to the development of our empirical
knowledge in this area. This empirical knowledge is of crucial importance:
not only to formulate and test scientific theories, but also to address the phe-
nomenon concerned.
This report is an integral translation of the report Jihadistisch terrorisme in
Nederland which was published in the WODC-series Onderzoek en beleid
(no. 281) in 2009.
Prof. dr. Frans Leeuw
Director, Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)
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Summary
What is the nature of jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands at the beginning of
the 21st century, if we base our analysis on information about this phenom-
enon that has been collected by the police? That is the core question of this
study. In order to increase the understanding of jihadi terrorism, the knowl-
edge collected by the police during criminal investigations into jihadi activi-
ties has been analysed systematically. When we refer to jihadi activities, we
mean activities which are aimed at making a contribution to the armed strug-
gle being conducted by radical islamists against the West and against other
perceived enemies of Islam. For the purpose of this project, we analysed a
total of twelve (large-scale) criminal investigations conducted in the Nether-
lands between July 2001 and July 2005. In doing so, we have sketched the por-
trait of an era. The most recent criminal investigation we analysed was con-
ducted in the spring of 2005. We cannot make any projection about how the
phenomenon of jihadism may have since changed under the influence of
national or international developments.
We have based our research on police files. This entails considerable restric-
tions. Firstly, the police are not aware of all jihadi activities nor do they ini-
tiate criminal investigations into all jihadi activities of which they are aware.
Secondly, we only selected a portion of the cases investigated during the
period studied. This selection may have influenced our findings. Thirdly, we
have based our research on the information collected by investigation teams
who focused on reconstructing terrorist crimes and submitting these to the
court, substantiated by evidence. This focus of the investigation teams, their
investigation hypotheses and the related selection and interpretation of
information have also influenced our perception. The findings presented
below must be seen in this light.
In order to obtain an objective analysis of the available investigation mate-
rial, but also because different criminal investigations into jihadi activities are
often interrelated, we considered the selected investigation material in its
entirety, and chose to rely less on the structures of the separate criminal
investigations. The raw empirical material was subsequently restructured, so
that groups of cooperating persons and joint activities could be examined
together. In analysing this material, we focused on three dimensions:
(1) jihadi cooperations;1 (2) the activities carried out within these coopera-
tions, and (3) the jihadi actors.
This summary provides a brief overview of the most important research find-
ings. In the final chapter of this report, the findings are discussed together
from a more theoretical perspective.
1 We use the term cooperation to refer to cooperating actors or cooperating groups of actors.
Jihadi cooperations
The jihadi cooperations, as they emerge from the aggregate of investigation
data that we analysed, may be characterised on the basis of largely similar
features. Persons who are the driving force behind these cooperations are
inspired by a Salafist-jihadi body of thought aimed at violence with world-
wide pretensions. They propagate this body of thought and implement it
through extremely diverse activities. In spite of differences in priority, they
generally perform these activities both at home and abroad.
Although there are also persons involved in these cooperations who only
make indirect contributions or do so with less ideological enthusiasm, in this
report we refer to all persons involved as jihadi actors. Without the opportun-
ist or less conscious participation of some of these actors, the cooperations
would – after all – function differently. The composition of these groups is
mixed, partly because persons with previous criminal convictions, converts,
and sympathisers become involved in jihadi cooperations, in addition to per-
sons with very diverse jihadi or other backgrounds. Such heterogeneity also
applies to the social and cultural features of these groups. Within all the
jihadi cooperations examined, the participating actors have different
national and geographical roots. They speak different languages and have
different cultural backgrounds. In addition to this, we found that in all coop-
erations, persons from different age categories participate together in the
activities, and in some groups both men and women are active. The coopera-
tions only appear to be homogeneous in terms of religion: nearly all of the
actors base their religious convictions on the Sunni movement within Islam.
The common religion is just one binding factor that explains why specific
people are attracted to jihadi cooperations. In particular, the ideology as
propagated by the vanguard is an important binding factor. The majority of
actors, however, seem to be attracted mainly by one or more aspects of this
ideology, such as the theme of worldwide injustice against Muslims, rebellion
against existing social systems, or rigid guidelines for a pure existence. Some
actors also join the jihadi cooperations primarily because these groups
include people who may provide essential daily necessities. Other binding
factors are joint activities, social advantages, but also role models. After all,
role models and other people who give direction to the actors can guarantee
social and ideological stability and cohesion within jihadi groups. In this
respect, they possess ‘binding qualities’ as well. The qualities that give these
persons a form of power and authority often include religious and ideological
expertise, life experience or experience in combat, and the fact that they have
the power to both reward and punish other people.
Several structural characteristics of jihadi cooperations ensure solid connec-
tions among the actors individually and the groups or clusters of actors as a
whole. Because they share long-lasting social foundations (relationships
based on mutual trust), real and virtual meeting places, and key figures, these
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cooperations not only exhibit solid internal cohesion, but are also dynami-
cally interrelated. As a result of this, they – as groups or clusters – are part of a
broader international jihadi movement.
Our analysis reveals that the presence of persons who possess an ideological
or militant frame of reference based on experiences in the Islamic world is
– or was – crucial to the formation or consolidation of all jihadi cooperations
we studied. These ‘heartland-oriented’ actors mobilise and/or attract people.
In a Western context, they have a relatively strong ability to ‘sell’ a coherent
jihadi narrative. Due to their specific qualities, contacts and experiences
– which are beneficial to their credibility and social status – they often serve
as examples or role models to others. Complex interactions between these
persons on the one hand and receptive persons on the other hand – in partic-
ular illegal foreigners and converts, and Muslims who grew up or were educa-
ted locally – give crucial momentum to radicalisation processes.
Interactions of this kind ensure that jihadi groups can function, in spite of the
absence of any formal hierarchical structures. Although one cooperation may
have a greater degree of organisational substance than the other, the rela-
tionships are always informal, fluid and strongly decentralised, whereby
group members enjoy a relatively large degree of freedom to improvise when
conducting various tasks. The cooperations are never strictly organised in a
vertical, hierarchical manner. We found linked series of social connections
created by informal dependence-receptivity relationships. Actors who are
dependent on the commitment and capacities of others often give direction
to persons who are receptive to them. Such relationships have a relative
nature, for guiding actors often appear to be receptive themselves to the
direction of other actors at home and abroad who take advantage of their
commitment.
Activities
The criminal investigations we analysed show that actors in the Netherlands
develop extremely various activities. Almost without exception, these activi-
ties show how strongly the jihadi cooperations we studied were interwoven
with international jihadi networks. In this context, it was revealed again and
again that the actors – both at home and abroad – are very mobile, and
appear to prefer face-to-face contacts for coordination and exchange of
information rather than communication at a distance (Internet and tele-
phone). We can classify their activities by type.
With respect to activities aimed at converting, moulding, teaching and train-
ing people, there generally is an interaction between mobilisation and self-
selection. In other words: jihadi role models seek receptive persons, but they
are also often sought out at the same time.
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In the groups and networks we studied, the actors who actually intend to
commit attacks, and who perform preparatory acts, are often inspired by role
models and Al Qaedan views, but they usually act relatively independently
and with much improvisation. In this context, they frequently seem to act in
an opportunity-based manner, and seem to make no fundamental distinc-
tion between national or international targets. If actors we studied utter
threats to persons or organisations, these threats are very seldom made in the
public domain, and their main objective seems to be to incite provocation
and agitation among members of the jihadi clusters.
Many of the numerous acts with which actors support jihadi core activities
are criminal in nature: forgery of documents, document fraud, burglary and
robbery and – to a lesser degree – drugs trafficking and production, and
credit card fraud. They also facilitate activities by raising funds or by provid-
ing accommodation to extremist brothers. Money and goods (such as stolen
passports) are often exchanged personally or using couriers. To be able to
travel, actors frequently use stolen public transport passes and passports.
This particularly applies to illegal actors. The facilitation of travel movements
appears to be a business in itself within the jihadi movement.
Meanwhile, jihadis are aware that they may be under surveillance. Their
activities in the area of shielding and protecting themselves vary. According
to the police, these actors are also often well informed of the way in which the
investigation services operate. This may complicate police work. As most
contacts and appointments between jihadis occur face-to-face, it is difficult
for investigation and security services to monitor the activities of these actors
at a distance.
Finally, the investigation material can teach us something about the way in
which jihadi activities are embedded in the daily lives of the actors. In partic-
ular, this material provides an insight into the places where jihadi actors usu-
ally manifest themselves and where they meet others. The most characteris-
tic meeting places include call shops, Internet cafes, asylum seekers centres,
prisons, and Islamic centres.
Actors
In the twelve criminal investigations we examined, a total of 113 different
actors emerge who had been active on Dutch soil during the period studied.
In this population of actors we found people with various life stories and sig-
nificantly different backgrounds and motives. Although it is not possible to
identify clear terrorist profiles, four conspicuous groups of persons emerged,
to which similar circumstances and related motivations may be applicable.
Firstly, illegal immigrants are amply represented in all jihadi cooperations.
Jihadi groups may provide illegal immigrants with essential necessities of life
or other needs, such as accommodation, forged or genuine documents,
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employment, social assistance, respect, social status and a purpose in life.
Secondly, many of the actors participating in the population we analysed
were former or current addicts, and people with criminal records, who have
given their lives a new direction by embracing jihadism and the strong and
clear Salafist doctrine which is regarded as pure. Thirdly, the jihadi groups
are attractive to the category of individuals who are ‘seekers’ with existential
or identity questions, because these jihadi groups meet their personal desires
to find meaning in life, or provide them with social ties, a sense of structure
in daily life, and a positive self-image. And, fourthly, we distinguish idealists
and political activists, for whom social discontent is the most important
motivation for their involvement in the international jihadi movement.
In conclusion
All in all, our findings show the complexity and ambiguity, in particular, in
which the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism presented itself in the Nether-
lands in the period studied. We are dealing with extremely fluid and informal
cooperations, which are part of a broader movement by virtue of their
mutual and transnational interrelatedness as decentralised groups. In addi-
tion, the jihadi cooperations often develop a large variety of activities that are
spread over a large area, whereby the target of such activities – and thus the
related threat – is sometimes only identified in retrospect. Where direct pre-
paratory acts for attacks may set alarm bells ringing, the broad jihadi move-
ment can be supported and preserved by more subtle activities, such as rais-
ing funds, document fraud or other forms of facilitating crimes. Jihadi activi-
ties aimed at providing cover are often as varied as the other activities, and
are performed systematically.
At an individual level, as well, the situation appears to be complex. The jihadi
cooperations we examined derive their capacities from people with
extremely divergent backgrounds, origins, ages and motives. Because of their
rather mixed and variable socio-cultural compositions, the jihadi communi-
ties are hard to characterise. Likewise, it is not possible to provide clear risk
profiles of jihadi individuals.
Jihadi terrorism is a complex phenomenon. Researchers who have the rela-
tive luxury of analysing this phenomenon in detail and in retrospect have an
easier job than authorities and organisations who have to combat terrorism
as it takes place. This situation, however, makes the findings described in this
report even more valuable. Knowledge and understanding of the nature of
jihadi terrorism are, after all, necessary for developing and testing scientific





In the period between September 2001 and December 2005, more than a
hundred people were arrested in the Netherlands because they were sus-
pected of activities related to jihadi terrorism. All these persons were – for a
shorter or longer period – the subjects of criminal investigations. So far, our
knowledge about who these people are, what they did, and what purpose
they wanted to achieve with their activities has mainly been based on reports
in the media. Although journalists often have access to valuable information
– and in exceptional cases even have access to parts of police files – so far no
systematic analysis has been published regarding these suspects and their
activities based on the information that was collected during criminal investi-
gations. The purpose of this research is to increase our understanding of the
nature of jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands by analysing this information
systematically.
Terrorism is a phenomenon that has always existed (see also Duyvesteyn &
De Graaf, 2007). It is a tool that has been used by a wide variety of groups to
achieve political or social aims. Through the use of violent actions that create
chaos, confusion, and fear, these groups have tried to disrupt the existing
social life and the existing political stability of societies, and to force the
desired change to occur. Since the nineteen seventies, on average ten terro-
rist or violent political incidents have taken place in the Netherlands in each
decade.2 The politics-driven taking of hostages, hijackings, bomb attacks,
assassinations, and threats that occurred in the seventies and at the end of
the previous century were claimed by Moluccans, Kurds, the IRA, the ETA,
the PLO, the Japanese Red Army, the Red Youth, RaRa, and the Animal Liber-
ation Front, among other groups.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a form of terrorism appeared
that was typified primarily by its international character, and the related
shock wave brought about by the terrorist threats and attacks throughout the
world. According to Rapoport (2001, 2004), the previous century saw several
waves of international terrorism, in more or less distinct periods of time.
Rapoport distinguished an anarchistic wave that appeared in 1880 and con-
tinued until 1920; an anti-colonial wave that began around 1920 and contin-
ued until 1960; a new-left wing wave that started at the end of the sixties and
continued into the nineties; and a religious wave that began in 1979, and with
which we are currently also dealing in the Netherlands.
According to various researchers, this last terrorist wave has the following
distinguishing features: (1) the groups involved do not serve any national
interests; (2) they are linked with one another across national borders in a
network that operates throughout the world; (3) they justify their terrorist
acts from a collective revolutionary ideology that exceeds specific and con-
2 According to definitions used by the AIVD, terrorism is distinguished from violent political activism by the fact
that it is striving for the loss of human life – or viewing such loss of life as a calculated probability (BVD,
2001a).
crete domestic requirements; and (4) their acts bring about a shock wave
throughout the international community, which consequently feels confront-
ed with an elusive and almost impalpable worldwide conspiracy. These
researchers argue that this international jihadi terrorism is more concerned
with a religiously inspired ideology than with pure religion, and that the main
purpose of the people involved is to ‘change the system’ (Coolsaet, 2004,
2005; Nesser, 2004).
Many jihadi terrorists claim that they are fighting for a new caliphate. In any
case, many of them are fighting against the Muslim regimes that are said to
prevent its establishment, against Western protectionist interests that influ-
ence these regimes, and, more generally, against the global dominance of the
West. The utopian goal of many of these terrorists is to overthrow the demo-
cratic constitutional order and to replace it with a radical-Islamic concept: an
ideal state in which pure Islam will be in force, in which all existing power
structures will be broken, in which only the power of God is accepted, and in
which everyone lives in accordance with God’s laws.
This is, however, not the whole story. As was the case with anarchistic terror-
ism at the beginning of the twentieth century, various jihadi terrorist groups
appear not to be directly linked with one another, not to co-operate directly
with one another, and not always to act with the same motives. They only
have indirect contact with one another, or no contact at all. They sometimes
draw inspiration from one another, but the different groups and individuals
appear to act relatively autonomously. According to Bakker (2006), not every
jihadi is actually fighting to establish a caliphate. An individual’s frustration
with regard to his or her personal social position, fury about international
politics, anger about domestic policy and domestic topics, a thirst for sensa-
tion, and the need for self-expression may drive these jihadis to perform ter-
rorist activities.
It therefore appears that, at the individual level as well, jihadi activities
involve different types of persons with different motives, different back-
grounds, and different goals. The fight they are waging is partly the result of
religiously inspired ideology. A number of these terrorists, however, appear
to use that ideology to legitimise acts which are performed with different
motives and in the context of different backgrounds (see also De Graaff,
2007). But whether the ideology is used as a source of inspiration or to legiti-
mise activities, the mutual conviction that a fight must be waged has caused
the different groups and individuals to experience one anothers’ activities as
a joint struggle, and has caused the outside world to categorise their activities
under the same heading. The factors that bind these actors, which have
caused them to seek and receive support from one another, and which have
caused different groups and individuals to experience their fight as a collec-
tive worldwide struggle, are mainly their shared hatred of the West and their
shared feelings of powerlessness, humiliation, and anger (compare: AIVD,
2004a; Berger, 2001; and Coolsaet, 2004, 2005).
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This introductory chapter begins with a description of the purpose of our
research. Subsequently, a brief definition of the subject of the research is
given, followed by an overview of the research questions, the setup of the
research, and the research method. Next, we give a description of how the
findings in this report are presented in anonymous form. The chapter ends
with a short overview of the structure of this report.
1.1 Purpose of the research
During the past few years, a large number of scientific publications on the
phenomenon of jihadi terrorism have appeared (see for overviews of the lit-
erature in this area, for instance, Bouhana & Wikström, 2008; Ranstorp, 2006;
Silke, 2008; Taylor & Horgan, 2006; and Victoroff, 2005). The phenomenon
was studied from different angles and perspectives, but until now all this
research has not resulted in any comprehensive theories.3 This may be due to
a number of reasons. In the first place, jihadi terrorism is a complex phenom-
enon that includes historical, religious, cultural, political, social, and behav-
ioural aspects, with the individual, the group and the environment influenc-
ing one another. In the second place, the purpose of the researchers deter-
mines which aspects of this phenomenon will be elucidated. Researchers
who focus on the formulation of a theory direct their attention on aspects
that are different from those studied by researchers who focus on the devel-
opment or evaluation of counterterrorism policy. In the third place, a part of
the scientific world is of the opinion that terrorism must be regarded as a
general phenomenon, whereas another part emphasises that various types
and forms should be distinguished and studied as separate phenomena. In
the fourth place, researchers in this area experience a significant lack of
sound empirical data. All this has resulted in the fact that explanations were
sought and found for the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism at different levels
and from different angles, while – until now – there has been very little
insight into the value of these theories.
The purpose of this research is not to explain the phenomenon of jihadi ter-
rorism, or to find a connection between the different theories on this subject.
The primary purpose is to provide an insight into the way in which jihadi
activities manifested themselves in the Netherlands in the period studied,
namely between 2001 and 2005. This knowledge may subsequently be used
in investigation practices and in the development of counterterrorism policy,
but also in the formulation and testing of scientific theories in this area. We
based our research on empirical cases. On the basis of data from actual crim-
inal investigations, we focused on the central question: ‘What is the nature of
jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands?’ In order to answer this question, we
focused on the following research questions:
3 For more information on this subject, see also Bakker, 2004; Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009.
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What are the characteristics of jihadi cooperations?4
– What is the elementary orientation of jihadi cooperations?
– How is jihadi terrorism embedded internationally?
– Is there evidence of international cooperation?
– How are jihadi cooperations established?
– What is it that binds actors to these groups?
– Which influencing factors play a role in this process?
– Do formal or informal power relationships exist?
– In which ways do these actors work together?
– Is there a clear allocation of roles and tasks?
– How can the organisational structures of the existing cooperations and
networks be characterised?
Which activities are performed within jihadi cooperations?
– Which activities are actually performed by the actors?
– What goals do the actors want to achieve with these activities?
– How do they operate?
– How do they cover their activities, and how do they protect themselves
against risks?
– How are jihadi activities embedded in the daily lives of the actors?
Who are the jihadi actors?
– What background characteristics do the actors have (including age, gen-
der, country of origin, residence status, educational level, civil status, and
criminal records)?
– Is it possible to distinguish different types of actors on the basis of com-
mon backgrounds and motives?
– What is the role of women in these cooperations?
By analysing – on the basis of these questions – the information on the phe-
nomenon of jihadi terrorism collected by the investigation teams, we hope to
gain insights that may contribute to tackling this phenomenon. In answering
the research questions, we will not, however, ignore or avoid discussing any
explanations of the phenomena that we may encounter. We will describe
these phenomena and link our findings to existing theories. In this way, we
hope to make a contribution to the formulation of theories in this area as
well.
1.2 Jihadi terrorism and jihadi activities
Before we discuss the way in which this research was conducted, it is helpful
to define the term ‘jihadi terrorism’ – the subject of the research – in further
4 We use the term cooperation to refer to cooperating actors or cooperating groups of actors.
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detail. The term ‘jihad’ originally means striving for the good and fighting evil
in a general sense.5 In the West, this term is currently often used by Muslims
as well as non-Muslims to refer to the ‘holy war’: the fight against the ene-
mies of Islam, in order to defend and propagate the faith. The AIVD also uses
the term ‘jihad’ to refer to ‘the armed fight on behalf of Islam’. In line with
this, the term ‘jihadism’ is used to refer to the movement that considers the
armed fight a duty of all Muslims (AIVD, 2008). According to the AIVD, this
movement is pre-eminently prepared to use terrorism as a tool to wage the
fight against the West. This agency defines the term ‘terrorism’ as ‘actual or
threatened violence against human lives, property or the fabric of society,
with the aim of bringing about social change or influencing the political deci-
sion-making process’ (BVD, 2001a).
We use this definition in this report because it clearly distinguishes between
terrorism – aimed at human lives – and activism. This distinction also
appears to be a leading principle in the Dutch investigation procedures.6 By
jihadi terrorism we therefore refer to the preparedness to make a contribu-
tion to the armed fight against the West and against other perceived enemies
of Islam, by threatening to use or by using violence aimed at human lives, or
by committing attacks in which human victims are seen as a calculated prob-
ability (compare AIVD, 2008).
In practice, it is not always possible to use this definition to characterise the
individuals and activities contained in the files we analysed. With regard to
some of the individuals or clusters who play an active role in jihadi coopera-
tions, it is not clear whether they are actually prepared to use violence, to
threaten to use violence, or to incite people to do this. It may be established
that these individuals performed activities in support of a jihadi network. But
does this mean that these activities are terrorist acts? And are these individu-
als consequently terrorists? It is not always possible to answer this question.
This mainly applies to facilitating and ideological activities which are per-
formed in jihadi clusters, and to individuals who are actually involved in such
activities, but who are not directly involved in committing or inciting others
to commit violent acts and other criminal acts. In this report, we will also pay
attention to these individuals, who are often on the periphery of jihadi coop-
erations, and to their actions. They are after all part of the phenomenon we
5 Islamic scholars distinguish between the ‘greater jihad’ and the ‘lesser jihad’. The greater jihad is the inner
struggle of human beings against the evil in oneself. The lesser jihad is the fight against unbelievers and the
enemies of Islam.
6 Until now, the Netherlands has not had a statutory definition of terrorism. The Crimes of Terrorism Act (Section
83a of the Dutch Criminal Code) does, however, include a description of the concept of ‘terrorist purposes’.
This definition is as follows: ‘the purpose to seriously intimidate the population or part of the population of a
country or to compel a government or international organisation unlawfully to perform or abstain from per-
forming an act or to tolerate something, or to seriously disable or destroy the fundamental political, constitu-
tional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation. The Netherlands further-
more endorsed the EU Framework Decision on combating terrorism of 13 June 2002, summing up terrorist
acts, and at the time of our research, the AIVD and the NCTb used the definition cited in the text in the per-
formance of their duties, which was recorded in a public publication of the AIVD in April 2001 (BVD, 2001a).
In the meantime, however, this definition was revised (AIVD, 2008; www.nctb.nl).
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are describing in this report. We will therefore use the term ‘terrorism’ care-
fully.
1.3 Research method and data collection
This research aims to increase the insight into the nature of jihadi terrorism
in the Netherlands by systematically analysing the information collected by
the police during small- and large-scale criminal investigations into manifes-
tations of jihadi terrorism. For this purpose, we used an adapted version of
the method that was developed by the WODC at the end of the nineties to
investigate the nature of and the developments in organised crime in the
Netherlands (see Kleemans, Van den Berg & Van de Bunt, 1998; Kleemans,
Brienen & Van de Bunt, 2002; Van de Bunt & Kleemans, 2007).7 In this sec-
tion, we will describe the way in which we selected the closed criminal inves-
tigations – which are the basis of this research – and how we proceeded to
analyse this source material.
1.3.1 Selection of cases
For the purpose of this research, we selected a total of twelve closed criminal
investigations that were conducted in the Netherlands in the period between
July 2001 and July 2005. For the selection of the cases, we called in the help of
several terrorism experts of the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) and the
National Police Services Agency (KLPD). On the basis of an overview of all
criminal investigations into jihadi terrorism that were conducted in the Neth-
erlands in the abovementioned period, these experts selected the most inter-
esting cases for us. This was done on the basis of the following two criteria.
In the first place, we wanted to collect data about as many different aspects of
the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism as possible, as it manifested itself in the
Netherlands in the period between 2001 and 2005. For this purpose, we asked
the investigation experts to select cases that would have the most added
value from that perspective.
In the second place, we wanted to obtain as much concrete data about this
phenomenon as possible. For this purpose, we asked the experts to take into
account the ‘richness’ and the ‘concreteness’ of the investigation material
collected. Large-scale criminal investigations, deploying considerable man-
power and involving many suspects and other persons, will usually generate
richer data than smaller investigations into the activities of only a few indi-
viduals. In addition, the nature of the investigation methods used is relevant.
In some cases, the investigation teams obtained a more detailed picture of
7 For the purpose of this research, the questionnaire and the list of items to be addressed, developed by Klee-
mans and colleagues, was revised and supplemented. The most important research questions are represented
in Section 1.1.
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the doings and dealings of specific individuals by using special investigative
powers (such as observation, telephone and computer communication tap-
ping, and recording confidential communication). In other cases, the sus-
pects were arrested relatively quickly and the investigation teams mainly col-
lected data by searching houses and questioning people. Factors such as the
intensity with which the investigation teams are able to conduct an investiga-
tion, the extent to which they are permitted to use intrusive investigative
powers, and the extent to which they search for additional witnesses all influ-
ence the richness and concreteness of the investigation material collected by
them. Thus, in general, more value may be attached to information from con-
versations that were listened in to, reports of observation teams, results of
forensic technical investigation, and statements from independent or other
witnesses than to statements the suspects themselves made about their own
actions to the police.8 Proceeding from this set of criteria, the experts gave us
a list of cases which, in their opinion, provide a good picture of the way in
which the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism manifested itself in the Nether-
lands in the period between 2001 and 2005. The experts consulted appeared
to agree surprisingly well with one another about the cases that meet the cri-
teria, and were convinced that the twelve cases selected would together form
an accurate reflection of the criminal investigations into jihadi terrorism con-
ducted by the police and the judicial authorities in the abovementioned
period.
1.3.2 Data collection
For the purpose of studying the criminal investigations and describing the
underlying material, we contacted the investigation teams and the public
prosecutors who had been responsible for the selected cases. These key fig-
ures were interviewed, by means of a questionnaire, about one or more crim-
inal investigations. On the basis of this questionnaire, all research questions
were discussed as systematically as possible. During the interviews, there
were always two or three researchers present. After an interview, the related
police file was analysed and described – again using the questionnaire. In
most cases, this was done by one of the researchers. Only the most volumi-
nous files9 were analysed and described by several researchers.
While studying the investigation files, we focused our attention mainly on
activities that had been performed on Dutch territory and on the actors who
had been involved in jihadi activities here in the Netherlands. In order to be
able to place the phenomena that manifested themselves in our country in
their broader contexts, we also included parts of foreign investigation files
– which were added to the Dutch files following requests for assistance – in
8 See on this subject, for instance, Van Koppen (1998) and De Poot, Bokhorst, Van Koppen & Muller (2004) (in
particular pp. 301 up to and including 323).
9 This applied to two files, one of which consisted of approximately fifty filled clip files, the other of more than a
hundred clip files.
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the analyses. The fact is that jihadi activities are often developed within net-
works of people who are linked with one another across national borders.
The twelve criminal investigations revealed a total of 113 different actors who
had been active on Dutch territory during the period studied. In this report,
we refer to the individuals to whom an investigation team had been directed,
and about whom the police had collected information during a criminal
investigation, as ‘actors’ if it became evident from the files that they had been
involved in a jihadi cooperation. In this study, as we explained in Section 1.2,
we also paid attention to individuals on the periphery of the jihadi coopera-
tions, because they unmistakably form a part of the phenomenon that we
sought to analyse and describe.
During the criminal investigations, there were, of course, also individuals or
groups who were indirectly involved and who were further ignored by the
police. Examples of these individuals are recruits or adherents of jihadis
about whom the police did not collect more detailed information. In the
chapters dealing with cooperations and activities, we will describe the roles
of such groups and individuals – when this is necessary to be able to describe
specific phenomena, such as recruitment activities – insofar as the informa-
tion from the files permits this. In the chapter on the actors, we will only
focus on the 113 individuals about whom sufficient background information
was included in the police files studied.
1.3.3 Police files as source material
Where criminal investigations into jihadi terrorism are concerned, distin-
guishing between different investigations or ‘cases’ is academic, for it often
turns out that different criminal investigations into this phenomenon, that
were conducted at different places and moments in time by different investi-
gation teams, are interrelated.
In police practice, this interrelatedness is not always dealt with in the same
manner. Criminal investigations that progress from one another are some-
times bundled. In that case, one case may sometimes comprise different
clusters of individuals who were engaged in entirely different activities, but
who were otherwise linked with one another. Conversely, an investigation
into a single network may also be broken up into different cases, with sepa-
rate teams focussing on different individuals and different aspects of the
same phenomenon. In addition, it turned out that some individual suspects
or persons involved turn up again in different criminal investigations.
Partly due to this interrelatedness between cases, we decided to consider the
rough investigation material we had selected by means of the questionnaires
in its entirety, and to attach less value to the narrative structures of the sepa-
rate criminal investigations. This empirical source material was subsequently
restructured to make it possible to analyse clusters of cooperating individuals
and joint activities together.
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A second reason to disregard the structures of the separate criminal investi-
gations that were conducted in the period between 2001 and 2005 is the fact
that the prevailing views on jihadi terrorism changed in this period. Immedi-
ately after the turn of the millennium, jihadi terrorism was, for instance, still
an unknown phenomenon to the police and the judicial authorities in the
Netherlands. The perception of this phenomenon was strongly influenced by
the historical context in which it took place.10 Immediately after 11 Septem-
ber 2001, the police more readily referred to ‘Al Qaeda cells’ that were cen-
trally directed than later on, when the shock effect of the attacks had some-
what ebbed away and the nuances of the organisational reach of Al Qaeda
had returned in the social debate (Bakker & Boer, 2006). Such perceptions
may have influenced the interpretation of investigative findings, and with
that they may also have influenced the way in which a police file was created.
For this reason, too, it was advisable to ignore the structures of the rulings on
the evidence, and to utilise the rough source material in making the analyses.
In this way, we were able to analyse the data investigated as neutrally as pos-
sible.
Finally, there is a third reason to disregard the separate criminal investiga-
tions and to reanalyse the selected source material with respect to its mutual
coherence. The fact is that the narrative structure of a criminal investigation
is strongly determined by the legislative framework in which the police and
the judicial authorities arrive at a criminal charge. This legislative framework,
however, changed in the course of the period studied – and also after this
period. Our research is based on files that were built up in a period in which
new legislation on terrorism was being implemented.11
With the entry into force of the Crimes of Terrorism Act (10 August 2004), sev-
eral types of behaviour that were formerly not punishable – such as recruit-
ment for the armed fight, and conspiracy with the intention to commit seri-
ous terrorist crimes – were made punishable. In addition, the sentences for
crimes that were committed with a terrorist purpose were increased. This
widening of criminal liability also has an effect on criminal procedure: it
makes it possible to deploy powers under criminal law at an early stage, and
– as a result of this mandate – to intervene at an earlier stage as well. In the
months and years following the period studied, new legislation was imple-
mented that was specifically aimed at investigation and prosecution of terro-
rist crimes. Examples of this are the Witness Identity Protection Act,12
increasing the possibilities to use AIVD information in criminal proceedings,
10 Kleemans and colleagues (1998, 2002) described this same problem in the context of networks in organised
crime. At the start of the nineties, the perception of organised crime was strongly influenced by our knowl-
edge of Italian and American Mafia organisations. Since then, systematic scientific research has been
changed this perception significantly.
11 Act of 24 June 2004, Dutch Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2004, 290, entry into force on 10 August 2004. See
also: Borgers (2007); and De Poot, Bokhorst, Smeenk & Kouwenberg (2008, p. 11 et seq).
12 Act of 29 September 2006, Dutch Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 460, entry into force on 1 November
2006.
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and the Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorism (Extended Powers) Act.13
The options available to the police and the judicial authorities, the facts they
use to furnish proof, as well as the judgment that the court may deliver within
the existing legislative framework on the evidence collected, have conse-
quently changed during the past few years.
All this not only implies that it was advisable, in this study, to disregard the
structure of rulings on the evidence and to reanalyse the selected source
material in its entirety, but also that we could not base our opinion – about
the value of the investigation data collected – on the courts’ judgments.
Within the current legislative framework, these judgments may, after all, be
different from the judgements within the legislative framework that was in
force during the criminal investigations.14
1.4 Restrictions and scope of the research
This study has a number of significant restrictions. On the basis of the inves-
tigation material analysed, we can describe the nature of jihadi cooperations
that were active in the Netherlands in the period between 2001 and 2005; the
activities that were performed within these cooperations; and the actors that
were involved, insofar as this is revealed by the closed criminal investigations.
The last part of this sentence reveals a number of restrictions with respect to
our research.
Firstly, not all jihadi activities come to the attention of the police, nor do the
police conduct investigations into all jihadi activities that come to their atten-
tion. Secondly, we based this research on a selection of cases into which a
criminal investigation was conducted in the period studied. This selection
may have influenced our perception of the phenomenon. Thirdly, we based
our research on the information which was collected by investigation teams
whose aim was to reconstruct terrorist crimes and submit these reconstruc-
tions to the court – substantiated by evidence. This focus of the investigation
teams, their investigation hypotheses and the associated selection and inter-
pretation of information also influenced our perception. The findings from
our research must be seen in this light.
A fourth restriction is that this investigation gives a picture of jihadi terrorism
as it manifested itself in the Netherlands in the period between 2001 and
2005. The last criminal investigation we analysed was conducted in the
spring of 2005. We cannot make any projection about how the phenomenon
13 Act of 20 November 2006, Dutch Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2006, 580, entry into force on op 1 February
2007. For more information on this subject, see also: De Poot et al. (2008).
14 In this respect, our research differs from other studies in which police files served as the source of informa-
tion, such as the research on organised crime (for more information on this subject, see also Parliamentary
Committee of Inquiry into Investigation Methods, 1996; Kleemans et al., 1998, 2002; and Van de Bunt & Klee-
mans, 2007).
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of jihadism has changed under the influence of developments – throughout
the world and in our own country – since that time.
On the basis of the source material, we can indicate whether specific jihadi
phenomena occurred in the period studied and whether they occurred more
than occasionally or, to the contrary, that we were not able to find any exam-
ples of specific jihadi phenomena in the source material selected. In addi-
tion, we can give an opinion about the relationships that exist between phe-
nomena and about the mechanisms that played a role. We can also discuss
the similarities and differences between jihadi cooperations, activities, and
actors. In short, on the basis of this research we can provide insight into the
way in which jihadi terrorism manifested itself in the Netherlands. We can,
however, not provide any insight into the frequency in which specific jihadi
phenomena manifested themselves, nor can we provide insight into the
scope of the phenomena.
1.5 Anonymous form
Empirical research into jihadi terrorism is scarce. Information about this
phenomenon is generally not presented to researchers on a silver platter.
Although the investigation and security services collect much valuable infor-
mation about jihadi terrorism, it is not the custom to analyse such empirical
knowledge systematically, let alone to describe this knowledge in public
reports. Still, it is essential to report about the phenomenon in public, for
such accessible publications make it possible to use the empirical knowledge
gained in a debate on this problem and how to tackle it.
In a public report on empirical research about a subject like this, however,
the question arises as to the way in which the findings can be described with-
out risking damage to individuals whose identity might be traceable through
certain passages in the report, and without risking damage to investigative
interests. One way to realise this aim is to abstract the knowledge gained in
such a way that the information cannot be traced back to particular individu-
als. We are, however, of the opinion that details, too, may be illustrative. They
can elucidate the context in which the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism
occurred, provide insight into the way in which it manifested itself, and pro-
vide a basis for tackling it. Details increase the insight into the phenomenon
we seek to describe. Details undeniably also make it easier to recognise cases.
Investigations into jihadi terrorism often receive a good deal of media cover-
age. This makes it difficult to describe them without revealing specifics.
Within the circles of insiders, specific details will irrevocably result in recog-
nition. In this report, we seek to overcome this problem of recognition in
three ways.
In the first place, we will use several cases in which similar phenomena mani-
fested themselves. The more frequently specific phenomena and mecha-
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nisms occurred, the smaller the chance of a phenomenon being traceable to
concrete cases or individuals. A phenomenon may then be described in a rel-
atively general manner, and we will use details from the case material by way
of illustration.
In the second place, we will choose isolated details from different cases, as a
result of which it will be difficult to trace back these details to complete cases.
We will, consequently, never describe a complete case or the complete life
history of a person involved in full detail.15 We will only describe parts and
elements thereof when this is necessary for our argument or to illustrate the
mechanism or phenomenon we are describing. Where reference is made to
groups, individuals, activities or mechanisms, this will always be one exam-
ple from a larger number of groups, individual, activities or mechanisms with
similar elements or characteristics. In most instances, we could also have
used information from another case by way of illustration. If the case con-
cerns an exceptional or atypical phenomenon, we will indicate this explicitly.
In the third place, we will not include an annex with case descriptions in this
report, nor will we refer to the cases we analysed. In this way, we may prevent
people from being able to link any information they think they recognise to
other information – that is less familiar – about the relevant case.
1.6 Structure of the report
The next chapter (Chapter 2) serves as a frame of reference for the empirical
findings we will present in the three subsequent chapters. In this second
chapter, the international and ideological context of jihadi terrorism is cen-
tral, and we outline the rise, development, and worldwide propagation of
current jihadism. The last three chapters will deal with the investigation
material studied. We will describe and analyse successively the following
three dimensions of the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands:
jihadi cooperations (Chapter 3), the activities performed within these cooper-
ations (Chapter 4), and the actors who play a role in these cooperations and
activities (Chapter 5).
Separating the cooperations, activities, and actors is a somewhat artificial
action. In practice, these three dimensions of the phenomenon cannot be
considered separately. It is, for instance, impossible to elucidate the charac-
teristics of cooperations, and to describe the processes that take place in
them, without paying attention to the activities that are performed within
these cooperations and the individuals who are active in them. Still, we will
– each time – endeavour to shift the attention to another level of analysis
when we describe our findings. In the last chapter (Chapter 6), the interrela-
15 Exceptions to this are the five unique life stories in Section 5.2. In this section, we described the life histories
of actors in such a way that they are difficult to recognise for outsiders.
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2 International and ideological context
This chapter gives an outline of the international and ideological back-
grounds of jihadi terrorism, and discusses the rise, development and spread
of this phenomenon. At the same time, it provides an interpretation frame-
work for our later findings about the way in which the phenomenon manifest-
ed itself in the Netherlands at the start of the twenty-first century.
It will be evident from this chapter that jihadism gradually evolved from a
political into an internal movement. The main aim of the political activists
Muslim Brothers at the beginning of the twentieth century – and also of the
more violent revolutionary Islamists in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury – was still primarily the establishment of states ruled by Islamic princi-
ples. In that period, jihadis fought against existing political systems in the
Islamic world and against Arab governments, and later on – from the seven-
ties onwards – also against officials who, from their point of view, were work-
ing for these governments of their own free will, and were therefore also to
blame for the system. Contemporary jihadis, however, usually no longer pur-
sue the establishment of Islamic states, but increasingly focus on Islamic
identity and the worldwide Islamic community (the umma). Many of them
want to protect this umma, wherever it is in the world. They consider this a
moral and ethical duty (Zemni, 2006). Nowadays, jihadis therefore see the
jihad not so much as a political matter, but above all as a moral matter. For
them, the ideal society – which is ruled by the sharia – has deteriorated into
an abstract idea. In this context, Oliver Roy (2004) referred to a ‘virtual
umma’.
As a result of this development, the image of the enemy as perceived by many
jihadis became more universal in the course of the previous century. The per-
ception of this enemy has shifted from secular and dictatorial political sys-
tems or governments in the Islamic world to all alleged enemies of Islam in
the world, including ‘the West’. The most extremist jihadis even consider
nearly everyone who, according to them, does not truly live in accordance
with God’s laws to be a legitimate target of the armed struggle. Those who are
considered ‘enemies’ are therefore not only unbelievers, but also Muslims
whom they consider disloyal.
2.1 International jihadism
As seen in modern times, the concept of the international armed fight in the
name of Islam is a relatively recent ideological innovation, evolving from a
more traditional jihadi ideology that was almost exclusively aimed at rulers
and governments in Muslim countries. Because of its often explicit anti-
Western nature, and its structural propagation within existing jihadi net-
works, this new form of violent Islamism has in recent years developed into a
serious threat to Western societies at a surprisingly rapid pace. Actors and
groups who have taken up arms or plotted attacks against Western powers,
institutions, and citizens in the context of this new form of violent Islamism
often refer to an ultra-orthodox religious doctrine: Salafism.
With the words and acts of the Prophet Muhammad (the Hadith) and the life-
style of his contemporary sympathisers (the Salaf) as guiding principles, and
with the perception of society from the mythical period of Muhammad and
the first four rightful caliphs (632-661 AD) in mind, the Salafists have turned
their backs on modern and democratic societies. This puritan Salafism is,
however, not intrinsically violent. The movement may be regarded as a con-
temporary social movement, which aims at protecting the identity and integ-
rity of the own group in a world full of temptations and suppression. In this
way, the Salafist movement has tried to form a moral community, with con-
sistent views about good and evil (Price, Nonini & Fox Tree, 2008, p. 128; De
Koning, 2008, 2009). Salafists have tried to purify Islam by cleansing it of the
corruptive influences of, among other things, cultural customs and modern
phenomena (Meijer, 2009; De Koning, 2009).
Nevertheless, there are still individuals active within this broader Salafist
movement who want to purify Islam, or even the whole world, by means of
violence. What makes the issue complicated is the fact that the violent groups
often participate in the same networks as the non-violent groups, whereas
they only partly adhere to the same ideology. Their moral views on good and
evil differ strongly, in particular where condoning the use of violence is con-
cerned. In addition, militant jihadis who are far less inspired by Salafism and
who are fighting the establishment for other reasons often use the symbols,
customs, and practices of the Salafist movement. As we stated in the intro-
duction to this report, international jihadism is mainly an umbrella term for a
broad phenomenon in which individuals participate with different motives,
different backgrounds, different aims, and also different ideologies (see also
Bakker, 2006; De Graaff, 2007).
Although Salafism is consequently not intrinsically violent, the ideological
chemistry between Salafism, Islamism (political Islam), and anti-Western
jihadism has actually resulted in the violent phenomenon that is currently
known among terrorism experts as ‘internationally-oriented Salafist jihad-
ism’ (see among others Sageman, 2004). To many people, Al Qaeda is the
best-known exponent of this form of jihadism. This is not without reason. In
the mid-nineties the phenomenon made a remarkable entrance onto the
world stage – largely by the efforts of Osama bin Laden and his organisation.
That is why the term ‘Al Qaeda’ – in fact the name of a relatively small jihadi
‘network organisation’ – has been used more and more frequently in the last
few years to refer to the considerably broader phenomenon of internation-
ally-oriented Salafist jihadism.
In an age that – in the mindset of many – was marked by the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it has more than once appeared to be
rather tempting to allege that a more or less related branch or ‘cell’ of the Al
Qaeda network has gained a foothold on Dutch territory (Zembla, 2003; ANP,
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2007). Such emotionally charged presumptions often do no justice to the
complexity of the transnational network of individuals and groups who allow
themselves to be inspired by a more or less coordinating and pan-ideological
doctrine: an offensive jihad against the wicked West in order to realise a puri-
fied worldwide umma. In order to be able to properly understand and value
the subsequent descriptions in this report that concern possible interactions
between jihadis in the Netherlands and the international jihadi movement, it
is important to first look at the historical and ideological developments in
this international network, including the importance of the core group of Al
Qaeda in these developments.
2.1.1 From political Salafism to Salafist jihadism
The breeding ground of many contemporary jihadi ideologies and groups
was established in Egypt in 1928 with the formation of the – then still – anti-
imperialist Muslim Brotherhood. The aim of this fundamentalist political
movement is to establish an Islamic state using political means, and in the
process it is not unconditionally negative towards modern influences and
concepts. In the first decades of its existence, however, more militant and
puritan views appeared to take root within its ranks. In 1964, Sayyid Qutb,
one of the best-known leaders and ideologists of the Muslim Brotherhood,
implemented new criteria for takfir: a practice whereby Muslims denounce
other Muslims, Muslim communities or Muslim institutions as unbelievers
(kafir) (Qutb, 1990). According to Qutb’s takfir principle, anyone who does
not fully submit to the absolute sovereignty and oneness of God (tawhid), as
set out in the religious ethics, is not truly Islamic. In fact, Salafists who adhere
to this line of reasoning consider all modern societies and governments
unsound in the faith. This accusation is becoming additionally charged in
respect of Muslim countries. The fact of the matter is that according to the
most widely accepted interpretation of the sharia (Islamic law), apostasy car-
ries the death penalty, a notion which a limited group of people has used as a
pretext for an armed jihad since Qutb’s execution in 1966 by the Egyptian
nationalist government.
In the period between the sixties and the eighties, intensive persecution of
the radicalising Muslim Brothers in Egypt caused an exodus of both moder-
ate and radical adherents. Initially, these people mainly fled to countries in
the Middle East, such as Syria and Saudi Arabia, where some of them secured
influential positions. The movement of the Muslim Brothers is currently
active all over the world, in secret and in public, in a large, diffuse and
strongly decentralised network with different agendas, which have been
modified to respond to national circumstances. Within its renewed mission
of ‘gradual Islamisation’, takfir adherents and members who want to perform
violent activities are, however, no longer welcome (Leiken & Brooke, 2007).
However, the fact that the Brotherhood continues to idolise Qutb as a martyr
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(shahid) still causes this global movement to be receptive to people with
deviating jihadi views who usually quickly distance themselves from the ‘offi-
cial’ movement to become active within other frameworks.
Salafist groups who have actually entered into armed fights since the seven-
ties were often inspired by Qutb’s views on takfir and jihad.16 From North
Africa to the Middle East, and from Central Asia to South-east Asia, coopera-
tions that are striving – through violent means – for a renaissance of the
Islamic Caliphate have appeared to be viable within the most divergent polit-
ical, cultural, and social constellations. Until the mid-nineties, the targets of
such groups, in practice, remained limited to local enemies in two possible
forms: (1) secular structures and dictatorial regimes in Muslim countries; or
(2) non-Islamic invasion powers in Muslim countries. Well-known groups
from this period were the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) and the
Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah. There were also takfirist jihad groups that
evolved directly from the Muslim Brotherhood, such as the Al Gama’a al
Islamiyya (GAI), in 1973, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) several years
later, which focused their attention – for quite some years – only on local gov-
ernments.
2.1.2 Internationalisation of the jihad
A trigger event, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, pro-
vided the momentum for the then fragmented jihadi movement to create a
more coherent international profile for itself. Within the Islamic world as well
as far beyond, extensive logistic, financial, and other forms of supportive net-
works evolved, which enabled the initiation of the purely ‘defensive jihad’
against the Russians.17 An influential and pragmatic key figure in this net-
work was Bin Laden. As a rich and charismatic business man from Wahhabi
Saudi Arabia,18 he was capable – through his own organisation, the so-called
Jihad Service Bureau – of mobilising mujaheddin (holy fighters), funds, and
other resources throughout the world. Initially, these activities were only
intended to benefit the defensive jihad.
Although many mujaheddin simply fought in Afghanistan to drive away the
occupation force, Salafist-jihadi groups who had gone into exile also found a
new calling, and a refuge, in that struggle. They often fought together with
the local mujaheddin against the Russian troops. In the meantime, they
16 According to Zemni (2006), however, Qutb was one of the most coherent thinkers of modern Islamism and
one of the few who formulated a theory on how Islamic awareness should, in practice, result in an Islamic
system. According to Zemni, restrictive and selective interpretations of Qutb’s views have impoverished his
work, and present-day Islamism in the form of mass movements and/or secret organisations have restricted
and simplified his ideology.
17 The term ‘defensive jihad’ means the fight that is waged to protect the faith, for instance, if an Islamic country
is attacked by unbelievers. The term ‘offensive jihad’ is used for the jihad that is aimed at propagating the
faith.
18 In essence, there is no distinction between Wahhabism and Salafism. According to Salafists, however, the
term ‘Wahhabism’ puts too much emphasis on the secular role of the eighteenth-century ideologist Moham-
med ibn Abd al-Wahhab. In addition, the official Wahhabist movement in Saudi Arabia propagates the support
of the royal house, which is not in accordance with the tawhid principle, according to Salafists.
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forged alliances among these groups for their respective national purposes
(Bergen, 2006). At the end of the eighties, a number of these groups, includ-
ing the EIJ of Ayman al-Zawahiri, could also count on the sympathy, active
fighting spirit, and substantial support of Bin Laden. His views had become
more extremist during the war. More and more frequently, he placed his
organisation in the service of Salafist militants, as a result of which they
gained access to and could profit from parts of the transnational system of
resources that were drawn upon by the Jihad Service Bureau. This develop-
ment led to the establishment of Al Qaeda (‘the basis’).
The umbrella organisation, in which Bin Laden, the EIJ, and other Afghani-
stan-veterans of different backgrounds joined forces, was created with the
goal of keeping together and using the broader worldwide network providing
general and technical services after the Afghan-Russian war was over, how-
ever no longer for the sole purpose of the defensive jihad, but also for the
purpose of violent takfir activities against Islamic authorities and fellow-
Muslims who did not comply with the Salafist idea of utopia.
Although they often disagree on countless points, there is consensus among
most terrorism experts about the unique share that this ‘network-organisa-
tion’ has had in the internationalisation of jihadism (see, among others,
Sageman, 2004; Gunaratna, 2003; Hoffman, 2008; and Zemni, 2006). With an
ideology that was originally based on not much more than ‘being helpful to
the armed fight in the name of puritan Islam’, Al Qaeda started – after the
Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan – to give military training to several
hundreds of recruits. Benefiting from existing safe houses and training camps
in the country, the core group around Bin Laden was able – on the one hand
– to strengthen its own ranks in this way. On the other hand, this small, but
hierarchic and even somewhat bureaucratically structured network-organi-
sation soon managed to secure a strategic position in a broader worldwide
network of loyalists and sympathisers, including former brothers-in-arms
and former camp mates.
Even more so than in those earlier times in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda – from
within its stronghold in Sudan in the period between 1992 and 1996 – devel-
oped into a source of jihadi expertise, and as a catalyst for the growing ideo-
logical and social cohesion among militant Islamic groups operating in dif-
ferent countries. Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri brought approximately twenty
groups into contact with one another, created a formal medium (shura) for
international cooperation, raised and donated funds, and distributed
detailed tactical and technical instructions. As an outsourcing and training
institute of at least a thousand jihadis for the conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya,
Kashmir, and the Philippines, the Al Qaeda core group also wielded its influ-
ence on the way of thinking within the broader Salafist-jihadi movement as a
whole (Katzman, 2005).
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2.1.3 The West as a new target of an internationally-oriented movement
As often happens when new ‘grand narratives’19 arise and attract adherents,
the perfection of Qutb’s conventional doctrine into the dogma of interna-
tional Salafist jihadism went hand in hand with worldwide geopolitical devel-
opments and trigger events.20 The end of the Cold War after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the continued occupation of Palestine territory by Israel,
the interventions in Iraq and Somalia led by the US, and the stationing of
American troops in Saudi Arabia – homeland of Islam – caused the only sur-
viving superpower and its allies to become the target of the evolving ideology
of Salafist jihadism. Bin Laden, in other words, had a story to tell, and the
only thing he had to do was to sell it. He proved to have the ambition and the
means to press home his words with acts.
With a few typically extremist notions – an enemy image, a group of chosen
people, a utopia, and the legitimation for purifying violence (Buijs, Demant &
Hamdy, 2006) – he used his network-organisation primarily to stir up the fire
of the anti-Western jihad. In 1996, based once again in Afghanistan, Bin
Laden incited Muslims all over the world to take up arms against the US. By
publishing fatwas,21 forming alliances, and – until 2001 – ensuring that
between ten to twenty thousand22 jihadis in training camps were fed the idea
that it was particularly the ‘far enemy’ that was sabotaging a Caliphate in the
Islamic world, the core group of Al Qaeda effectively propagated its message
through its international jihadi network. The series of large-scale and sym-
bolic attacks that the core group has managed to orchestrate since then, with
the help of loyalists and ‘alumni’ who have fanned out over the world, had
– in the first place – an inspirational goal.
It is noteworthy that it was precisely the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 – which turned out to be
extremely effective in this respect – that marked the end – or at least the pro-
visional end – of Al Qaeda’s capacity to orchestrate such actions itself. But
since then, the idea propagated by Bin Laden and others that an interna-
tional umma could only be realised if all individual Muslims did their bit
19 In this context, the concept of ‘grand narrative’ (Lyotard, 1984) refers to a comprehensive and unambiguous
explanation or structure of history, knowledge, and experience. Grand narratives, such as that of Karl Marx
(capitalism results in class struggle; class struggle results in socialism and communism) and that of Francis
Fukuyama (the ultimate hegemony of Western liberal democracy), are modernistic. They often claim an
authentic status, substantiate ideologies, and legitimise human actions.
20 According to De Graaff (2008), these are also circumstances that, in combination with other factors and
actors, may increase the probability of political violence, and in particular of terrorism.
21 Officially, a fatwa is an opinion of an Islamic scholar on the basis of Islamic law, issued at the request of a
believer or a group of believers. This scholar must have sufficient authority to issue a fatwa. In the West, how-
ever, people often think that a fatwa is a death sentence. This is the result of the call from Ayatollah Khomeini
in 1989 to kill Salman Rushdie – and everyone else who had been engaged in publishing his book The Satanic
Verses – because the story was said to run counter to Islam, the Prophet, and the Qur’an. This call from Kho-
meini is an example of the way in which fatwas are used by radical and militant movements. Such fatwas are
also published by Al Qaeda.
22 These figures were mainly based on the findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (2004).
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– preferably by taking up arms – has taken root in various jihadi groups and
actors. Because they have started to think increasingly more universally,
many contemporary jihadis hold the view that anyone who does not fulfil this
duty is obstructing the revival of the umma. More and more frequently, they
also blame ordinary citizens. This point of view, in turn, results in the fact
that jihadis have, to an increasing degree, been using violence that is less ‘tar-
geted’ than before (Zemni, 2006).
Parallel to this development is the fact that martyrdom has become the ulti-
mate means for jihadis to prove that they are actually fulfilling their personal
duty. As a result of this, death is currently a pronounced and fervent wish of
many of them (Khosrokhaver, 2003). Whereas jihadis had – up to several dec-
ades ago – still regarded death primarily as a risk of the armed fight, they cur-
rently often appear to consider this the highest attainable goal: a goal in itself.
With that, the urge to make sacrifices appears to have become more impor-
tant than the goal attained by them.
2.1.4 The internationally-oriented jihadi movement as it stands today
Although the core group of Al Qaeda no longer exists as a well-financed and
tightly organised cooperation, anti-Western jihadism is now generally accep-
ted by an inspired, growing, and strongly decentralised militant movement.
The underlying social networks have also attracted followers of organisations
that formerly only pursued domestic goals, but which have been, over the
course of years, influenced by actors from the Sudanese, Pakistani, and
Afghan breeding grounds. Such groups, of which the North African groups, in
particular, are active on European territory, now and again feel called upon
to also contribute to the international Salafist jihad. Relevant groups in this
context are, for example, the Maghreb-based Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédi-
cation et le Combat (GSPC)23, the Moroccan Groupe Islamique Combattant
Marocain (GICM), and the Tunisian Groupe Islamique Combattant Tunesien
(GICT), but – to a much lesser extent – also the notorious Algerian Groupe
Islamique Armé (GIA).24 Nowadays, several of their adherents manoeuvre sys-
tematically and cleverly within their cross-border networks in order to form
ad hoc alliances among themselves for international purposes (Vidino, 2006;
Rabasa, Chalk, Cragin, Daly, Gregg, Karasik et al., 2006).
23 In 1998, the GSPC seceded from the nationalist GIA. The group has a more transnational and partly anti-West-
ern jihadi programme. In 2003, the GSPC officially declared itself to be loyal to Al Qaeda, and since 2006, the
organisation regards itself as a formal franchise of Al Qaeda: ‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’ with Bin Laden
as symbolic commander (Burke, 2004; Global Terror Alert, 2007; Gray & Stockham, 2008).
24 In fact, the GIA performed attacks with national motives as early as 1995, with its attacks on the Paris metro.
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2.2 Rise and development of European and Dutch Salafism
At the European level, as well, the internationally-oriented jihadi movement
did not evolve in the nineties out of an ideological vacuum. Local Salafist
structures, infrastructures, and networks had already been serving as breed-
ing grounds and points of departure for a longer period of time. The fact is
that, parallel to the worldwide developments that had made the West a target
of the jihad, many Western countries had been the target of Salafist activities
that involved preaching and missionary work (dawa) as early as the eighties.
These activities appealed to Islamic immigrants and exiles as well as to sec-
ond-generation converts and Muslims. This made it possible for local Mus-
lims activist and transnational jihadi networks to join forces in the Nether-
lands at a later stage.
Saudi connections
In the eighties, the Saudi authorities and private organisations provided a
strong impetus for the encouragement of preaching and missionary work
aimed at Islamic minorities in the West. In those days, the first contacts
between missionary institutions, which were often supported by Saudi lead-
ers, and Muslims from the Netherlands were made during the pilgrimages to
Mecca. In that period, collections were made in Mecca to build mosques in
the Netherlands. According to Landman (1992), the growing interest of the
Saudis in Dutch Muslims, and the need of Dutch Muslims for funds to build
mosques, coincided with the abolition of various government subsidies to
finance the building of mosques. The contacts between the Saudi benefactors
and Dutch Muslims led to the establishment of centres for the propagation of
the Salafist doctrine. In this way, three Islamic cultural centres were estab-
lished in the Netherlands, and also a number of Islamic schools received
financing (for more information on this subject see also AIVD, 2004b; NCTb,
2008).
These financing activities involved two important Saudi anti-establishment
groups. The first group was a network of takfir adherents with connections to
branches in Spain (Barcelona), Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, the
United States, and the Netherlands (Amsterdam, The Hague, and Tilburg).
The second group was composed of adherents to the Islamic revival move-
ment, which combined the dogmas of Salafism with the political theory of
the Muslim Brothers. This group has branches in Great Britain, Germany,
Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Eindhoven, Helmond, and
Zwolle).
In the early nineties, the establishment of Salafist mosques and centres led to
the development of Salafist networks in the Netherlands, as a result of which
Dutch Salafism could continue to grow and could be strengthened. In this
period, a Saudi foundation, for instance, bought land to build a Salafist cen-
tre which still organises activities that are international in nature. In addition,
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Salafist circles were formed in several cities, and since 1995, influential
preachers from Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Belgium, Germany, and Denmark
have come to the Netherlands for training activities in the context of the
dawa.
Until approximately 1997, this manifestation of Salafism was mainly some-
thing that concerned the first generation of Moroccans, Egyptians, Syrians
and older Dutch native converts. In the subsequent period, however, the
ideology was made more accessible to young people. This is perhaps also due
to the fact that several Dutch young people received scholarships and started
to study at Medina University in Saudi Arabia. These scholarships were often
financed by private Saudi benefactors or by the university itself. Although
only a handful of young Dutch people were educated there, the spread of
Salafist ideology among second-generation Muslim youth and native Dutch
converts seems partly due to this factor.
2.3 Jihadi actors in Europe
Partly due to international developments, and partly through existing local
Salafist infrastructures and networks, the many-branched international
jihadi movement has by now gained a foothold in Europe – and with that –
also in the Netherlands. The actors who have been active in this movement
can be divided into two broad categories: ‘heartland-oriented’ actors and
other actors.
2.3.1 Heartland-oriented actors
The first category concerns a group of radical Salafists and jihadis in a dia-
spora, to whom the Islamic world with its radical stimuli is still the ultimate
frame of reference for intolerant religious beliefs or militant acts for the pur-
pose of the worldwide jihad. With that background, their specific experiences
in and connections with the religious heartland have formed the basis of
their current convictions and acts. These actors, defined here as ‘heartland-
oriented actors’, who are usually immigrants, include people with strongly
various life stories and characteristics.
In general, these actors have fled to Europe from Islamic regions such as
North Africa, the Middle East, East Africa, and Central Asia. Their develop-
ment, schooling or training took shape primarily in these Islamic regions of
origin. Many of them already had some history of Islamic activism, but some-
times also of violent jihadism. We are referring here to radical Islamist clergy-
men, Muslim Brothers, jihadis, jihad veterans and former or current adher-
ents to and members of religious political parties that are forbidden in the
relevant countries.
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Within the European branch of the international Salafist-jihadi movement,
the heartland-oriented actors hardly ever form isolated communities or
clubs. Although they sometimes seek one another’s company, more often, in
this context, they are closely interwoven with a mixed majority of other actors
– our second ‘remaining category’. In this collective environment, in which
each association with ideological originality may yield large social advan-
tages, the heartland-oriented actors distinguish themselves by their specific
backgrounds and related qualities. These features greatly benefit their status
and, in particular, their credibility. Someone who speaks fluent Arabic – the
language of the Islamic ancestors – and who is able – from experience – to
strike the right tone in the radical theological discourse will therefore be able
to win respect in European extremist circles. The same applies to war veter-
ans and jihadis with impressive international connections. As our research
on the basis of Dutch criminal investigations will reveal in more detail, heart-
land-oriented actors remarkably often secure dominant and influential posi-
tions within jihadi cooperations.
2.3.2 Other actors
As stated above, the international jihadi movement in Europe does not only
thrive on heartland-oriented actors. Various other inspired actors who did
not primarily derive their extremism from experiences in and connections
with the Islamic world fulfil a significant function in this movement as well.
In concrete terms, we are referring to locally born and/or trained Muslims,
converts with or without Muslim backgrounds, and other people who mainly
base their conviction on local events, role models, and influences. Although
this ‘remaining category’ was already participating in the European jihadi
network before the attacks of 11 September 2001, it seems to have grown
since then.
In the scientific literature, extensive attention has been paid to the actors we
meet in this mixed category. Roy (2004, 2005) gives a description of, among
others, the ‘uprooted’ Muslims of second-generation immigrants who re-
Islamise in a radical way in the West. According to him, the global variant of
the violent Salafist struggle is appealing to these persons because they have
become alienated from their parents’ religious countries of origin. Sageman
(2008) defines ‘home-grown wannabes’ as locally radicalised young Muslim
people and converts who regard Bin Laden as their inspiring Robin Hood
(see also Bergen, 2008). In addition, Muslims with only a scanty religious
background – whether politically oriented or not – who have emigrated to the
West as adults or young adults and who embrace extremism as reborns may
also be placed in this category. The Islamic world of their youth does not,
after all, form a decisive ideological frame of reference for them.
The stereotypes and labels by which these individual actors are often refer-
red to in this broad category may influence our perception of the jihadi social
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cooperations in which they participate. In this report, we ask ourselves
whether terms such as ‘home-grown networks’ and ‘groups of radicalised
polder boys’ are appropriate, or whether the situation – in reality – is rather a
question of the interwoven and interdependent relationship between the two
categories of actors that we have described above.
With respect to the development of jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands, the
abovementioned international and ideological context, the Salafist infra-
structures that have arisen in the Netherlands, and the receptivity to the
jihadi ideology among the different types of persons residing in the Nether-
lands have all played a role. In the next three chapters we will describe the
way in which violent and non-violent jihadism have taken shape in the Neth-
erlands. All this will, of course, be based on the empirical information we col-
lected from the selected criminal investigations.
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3 Jihadi cooperations
People who are active in jihadi cooperations travel a lot and have many inter-
national contacts (see also AIVD, 2006b). The twelve criminal investigations
into the case groups that had been active in the Netherlands in the period
between 2001 and 2005 frequently mentioned the same names, places, and
actors. All ‘cases’ appear to be directly or indirectly connected with one
another. Actors from different cases visited the same mosques, obtained their
propaganda material and documents from the same providers, met one
another in chat rooms or on MSN sites, visited the same websites, or met one
another during lectures or at people’s homes. In addition, in nearly all cases
there had been international communication and cross-border contacts.
None of the case groups can consequently be regarded as an isolated group.
The different case groups used one anothers’ services and – as a result of this
– they appear to form part of a larger jihadi movement as clusters of actors.
In this chapter we will describe the nature of this jihadi movement in the
Netherlands. In this context, we will focus on a number of aspects of this
movement and of the cooperations that form a part of this movement. After a
short discussion about the way in which we analysed the empirical source
material (Section 3.1), this chapter will first give a description of the elemen-
tary orientation (Section 3.2) and the socio-cultural composition of the coop-
erations identified and studied by us (Section 3.3). Section 3.4 subsequently
shows which factors cause people to feel committed to jihadi groups, to want
to be part of the movement, and to want to participate actively in it. Section
3.5 deals with the question of why specific people are able to hold important
positions and give direction to specific clusters of actors. In short, in this sec-
tion we will describe the factors of power that play a role in jihadi coopera-
tions.
In Section 3.6, the focus shifts to the broader jihadi movement of which the
cooperations form a part. This section provides a description of a number of
structural ‘building stones’ of this social system and it will show how specific
long-lasting foundations, meeting places, and key figures ensure cohesion in
a dynamic network, both at the national and international level.
The last sections of this chapter will provide a more detailed description of
how interactions among individuals contribute to the formation of clusters
and to a consolidation of existing clusters (Section 3.7), and how these inter-
actions ensure a natural organisation and allocation of tasks for various
jihadi activities (Section 3.8). It turns out that these interactions compensate
for the absence of formal hierarchic structures. The chapter concludes with a
recapitulation of the most important findings.
3.1 Characteristics of jihadi cooperations
This chapter provides a description of the characteristics of jihadi coopera-
tions and of the broader jihadi movement. An initial cursory examination of
the twelve selected files gave the impression that a number of fundamentally
different groups had been active in the Netherlands in the period between
2001 and 2005. One part of our case files sketched a picture of a goal-directed
worldwide cooperation with relatively hierarchic foreign control, whereas
another part sketched a more horizontally organised network, that operated
from within the Netherlands and that was engaged in strongly divergent
activities with both international and local dimensions. Yet another series of
files mainly referred to a smaller and more closed community consisting of
young people who incited each other to take action, and who operated rela-
tively autonomously in relation to the outside world.
It often does not take long before such characterisations end up in the public
domain, whether or not this occurs via the regular judicial process. Depend-
ent on the criminal investigation in question, journalists, commentators, and
prosecutors subsequently quite often use recognisable terms, such as ‘Al
Qaeda’, ‘a terrorist organisation’, ‘imported terrorism’, or ‘radicalised polder
boys’. Some people use specific terms to reach a target group with an uncom-
plicated story and simple sound bytes; others do so because their task is to
arrive at a charge within the existing statutory framework that may result in a
conviction. The question remains, however, whether these typifications will
hold if we look at all the data in a different way.
As stated in the introduction, we decided – for the benefit of a systematic
analysis of the selected files – to ignore the structures of the original criminal
investigations and consider the selected rough investigation material in its
entirety. This empirical material was subsequently restructured, so that rela-
ted clusters of individual and joint activities could actually be examined
together. In this way, we essentially elucidated and studied different social
constellations in which relevant jihadi activities were performed: not isolated
cases or groups of cases, but ‘cooperations’, ‘clusters’, or ‘networks’. We ana-
lysed these on the basis of the following characteristics:
– elementary orientation in words and actions;
– socio-cultural composition;
– elementary factors of social binding;
– factors of power;
– structural characteristics and cohesion;
– interaction, formation of clusters, and collective radicalisation;
– organisation and allocation of tasks.
Several of these characteristics have already been used – in a different way –
by scientists to categorise and typify criminal cooperations.25 In the subse-
quent sections, we will describe jihadi cooperations on the basis of these
seven characteristics.
25 These are, for example: orientation and purpose (Schloenhardt, 1999), hierarchy (Fijnaut, Bovenkerk, Bruinsma
& Van de Bunt, 1998), allocation of tasks and coordination (Kleemans et al., 1998), and cohesion among group
members (Robbins & Judge, 2008).
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3.2 Elementary orientation in words and actions
3.2.1 Involvement in international Salafist jihadism
We will start by discussing the essence: the elementary orientation of jihad-
ism in the Netherlands. Involvement in a manifestation of international Sala-
fist jihadism is without doubt the largest common denominator for all rele-
vant actors, both in respect of preaching their ideology and performing their
activities. Time after time, it appears that guiding extremists and many of
their followers support the worldwide jihad, and that they experience this
armed struggle as a collective and more or less pan-Islamic matter. By purify-
ing Islam through the jihad, by returning to traditional values, and by realis-
ing a unity of all Muslims, the glorious past of the Islamic world will revive –
this is at least the ideology that they allow themselves to be guided by. The
majority of actors attach great value to being a part of a worldwide brother-
hood of spiritual friends who are proud to place their lives in the service of
this higher goal. This is also exactly in line with the intention by which this
form of jihadism was launched by its forerunners in the 1990’s. The fact that,
in practice, some groups in our case files give more substance to local activi-
ties or jihadi actions does not affect the observation that their orientation is
international in nature as well.
3.2.2 Information sources as orientation indicators
Communication – for the purpose of propagating an ideology, mobilisation,
incitement to action, and recruitment – is an essential part of jihadism. As a
result of this, the verbal, written, and audiovisual sources collected by the
investigation services are the very first sources that provide a good picture of
the orientation of the cooperations that we analysed. The tapped chat con-
versations, the tapped telephone conversations, the recordings of confiden-
tial communication, the wills and testaments, the fragments from various
propaganda materials, the witness testimonies, and the official reports of
interrogations – in short, multi-faceted primary sources – have provided a
unique understanding of the views of the guiding actors. These sources have
revealed patterns of extremely fundamentalist sympathies, transnational ori-
entations, and terrorism-related intentions and actions. The central themes
are: believers against unbelievers; saviours against suppressers; ‘we’ against
‘them’.
In nearly all groups it is remarkable how easily radical actors utilise Salafist
core concepts to reason, using large and over-simplified jumps: from a politi-
cal-religious starting point to a social context that cannot be reconciled with
it; and from a worldwide image of friends and enemies derived from this to a
legitimisation for acts of violence. A witness who was a member of a group
with a striking representation of locally radicalised young jihadis stated:
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‘They tell about tawhid26 and then they will talk about the different con-
cepts of tawhid […] In their eyes, nearly everyone is a [false] idol: politi-
cians, government leaders, and kings. They will continue to do this until
you are convinced of it. […] Once you believe this, they go on to the next
form: what you are supposed to do with them, the taghut.27’
‘In that period, they will make sure that you start to love the jihad, so that
you reach the moment at which you will be prepared to bomb yourself in
a bus or something like that.’
Books, propaganda material and documents that were found by the police
during searches of premises also usually served to convey a similar ideologi-
cal message. These orientation indicators often turned out to be either identi-
cal or to originate from the same sources. We may roughly divide them into:
(1) writings from radical ideologists from the past; (2) interpretations of and
supplements to these writings by currently active Islamist clergymen and
leading jihadis; and (3) the audiovisual materials used to strengthen the
impact of the message in these sources. Such collections were found to
include – with great regularity – the traditions of the mediaeval Islamic phi-
losopher Ibn Taymiyya, the writings of Sayyid Qutb, and more recent – docu-
mented – statements and speeches by famous figures such as Bin Laden and
Al Zawahiri. The suspects furthermore remarkably often find theological sup-
port in the sermons delivered by Al Qaeda’s indirect spokesmen in Great Brit-
ain, including Abu Qatada and Abu Hamza al-Masri. From his home base in
London, the latter propagated the worldwide fight against the enemies of
Islam even before the beginning of the new millennium (Press Association,
2006):
‘We ask Muslims to do that, to be capable to do that, to be capable to
bleed the enemies of Allah anywhere, by any means.’
‘You can’t do it by nuclear weapon, you do it by the kitchen knife, no
other solution. You cannot do it by chemical weapons, you have to do it
by mice poison. Like you imagine you have one small knife and you have
a big animal in front of you.’
‘The size of the knife – you cannot slaughter him with this. You have to
stab him here and there until he bleeds to death. Then you can cut up the
26 Tawhid – the confession of the oneness of God – is a theological concept, but it is politicised when people
state that everyone is only accountable to God and that governments and courts only have authority if they
perform their duties in accordance with the divine law (the sharia). Governments who fail to do this (demo-
cratic governments such as in the Netherlands) are referred to as taghut by jihadis (something or someone
that is idolised or obeyed by Muslims at the expense of the devotion or obedience that is due to God). Obey-
ing such governments would allegedly be contrary to the requirements of the tawhid and is consequently a
matter of polytheism.
27 The ‘idols’: people who are idolised or obeyed at the expense of the devotion or obedience that is due to God.
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meat as you like to, or leave it to the maggots. This is the first stage of
jihad.’
A prominent part of the material that was seized usually consisted of video
and sound fragments. These fragments regularly appeared to be designed in
the ‘production rooms’ of Al Qaeda and other cooperations that share its
doctrine, whether formally or not.28 Other tapes and files originated from
mainstream media, but their contents were often similar. They were mainly
composed of scenes of gruesome atrocities and messages from the front,
from jihadist missionary regions such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Alge-
ria, and the Palestinian territories. The material offers a more comprehensive
understanding of the polarising and violence-glorifying tendencies within the
clusters studied, for – considered together – such fragments create the
impression that there is a worldwide and existential struggle going on
between Muslims and Islam as victims and their aggressive enemies. These
images may incite a strong longing for revenge among viewers who identify
with the alleged victims (Schmid, Jongman & Stohl, 2005; Silke, 2008). Vari-
ous witnesses made statements about the effect such film fragments had on
them:
‘They will send you a great number of short war films about the Ameri-
cans in Iraq, about Israel, about prisons, about Abu Ghraib, about Bosnia,
and the war in Bosnia. And mainly short films showing children who have
been killed [...]. I noticed that whenever I saw things about Iraq on TV, I
felt an immense hatred against the Americans at those moments […] I
also became annoyed about the Dutch government. I became very angry
and frustrated […].’
At the same time, recordings of marching Muslim militants and of successful
jihadist attacks suggest that an Islamic victory is a realistic prospect, at least
for a community of Muslims that is prepared to take up arms and that allow
themselves to be united by Salafist-jihadi principles. Many actors are
inspired – in particular by the impressive images of the attacks on the WTC
and the Pentagon – to follow this manner of thinking in terms of ‘black and
white’. One of them literally stated the following:
‘Since the turning point in history, better known as 9/11, a David and
Goliath struggle has broken out between the followers of the truth and the
followers of deceit.’
28 Terrorist organisations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia have distributed audiovisual propa-
ganda material through the Internet on a large scale. For the weakened core group of Al Qaeda, in particular,
this has been a way to continue to be relevant, and to continue to fulfil its inspirational function. Investigation
services found many multimedia files that were produced by its propaganda organisation As Sahab with many
actors in the Netherlands.
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During the investigation of another suspect, the police found a text file with a
poem. This poem is also a good illustration of the elementary orientation of
many actors: the struggle of the pure faith against unbelief, against evil, injus-
tice, dishonesty, and suffering. In addition, the recurring theme of an ideo-
logically inspired confidence in final victory is, in our opinion, quite aptly
expressed in this poem. The poem was, in fact, also found during investiga-
tions of several other suspects in the form of a sound file, and it could also be
found on an easily accessible and much-visited public website.
‘We are marching under the black flag
We do not fight for power or for bread
But for the word of Allah, no-one can harm us
Longing to die a martyr’s death
We shall fight them with our tawhid
Martyrdom or victory; it is all the same to us
We shall purify area after area
We shall show them that we love death more than they love life
We shall create terror in their hearts with our takfir
We shall fight them with our guns and swords
As mujaheddin on the path of Allah, honourable and proud
We shall put an end to injustice and suffering
La ilaha illa Allah29 is our weapon
Which we shall use to destroy the Taghut
We shall enlighten the earth with the sharia
Dishonesty shall be utterly subdued by the purity of our faith
We shall oust them from Philisteen30 and Afghanistan
And Iraq and Andalusia31 and the Philippines
And Bilad al-Harmain32, do not doubt this
The world of Allah will cause the Kuffar33 to disappear
The unbelievers make plans against us, attack us, and conspire against us
But don’t they know that Allah is the best in devising plans?
Allah will verily turn their cunning schemes against them
And they may curse and swear to idols
But Allah will give the victory to the believers,
Even though the Kuffar will be disconcerted about it
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Allah will verily only give the victory to a believing people
That will condemn the Taghut and every other thing that is worshipped
He will strengthen them with angels, sakina and His Help
An oath he promised in the Qur’an to the people of perseverance
Live as Muwahid in the service of your Lord
Enlighten your heart with faith in His Oneness
And fight on His path, for you will return to Him
Those who believe and fight will verily be rejoice’
Finally, much visual material is illustrative of the major current jihadist
theme of individual sacrifice. Various police teams have together found a
substantial quantity of film images of jihad fighters sacrificing themselves. A
recruited female actor declared that these films were used to convince people
that the martyr’s death is one of the highest attainable goals for a good Mus-
lim:
‘I also saw a film of a female Muslim in Palestine. She blew herself up. The
next thing you saw in this film was her head lying on the ground. You saw
a smile on her face and even her headscarf was still entirely in place on
her head. They said about this image that she was happy and had died a
martyr’s death. I finally believed it myself as well.’
3.2.3 Activities and actions as orientation indicators
The concrete activities performed within the cooperations also provide infor-
mation about the orientation of jihadism in the Netherlands. Terrorist and
criminal acts, jihadist preparatory acts and supporting activities, specific
trips, conversations, and meetings sketch a picture of clusters of people who
shape a militant ideology with worldwide pretensions. This wide range of
jihadi activities will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. In this section,
we will only briefly mention several activities to the extent that they provide
information about the elementary orientation of the cooperations analysed.
Several actors in our case files joined forces in order to enable sympathisers
at home and abroad to realise jihadi acts of violence. In short, they facili-
tate.34 A group of fundamentalist men, for instance, fulfilled a supporting role
within a cross-border cooperation that made preparations for assassinations
and bomb attacks against American targets and targets that were affiliated to
the West. They mainly supported this ambition from the Netherlands by per-
forming punishable acts, such as house burglaries, forgery of passports, and
34 Earlier literature research of the WODC (Mascini & Verhoeven, 2005) into the support of the violent jihad dis-
tinguished facilitating activities for the purpose of (1) nestling (arranging access and accommodation for jiha-
dis and recruitment), (2) financing (sponsoring and own fund raising), and (3) communication.
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credit card fraud. Now and then, they also acted as important intermediaries
and providers of logistic services. The relevant actors were followers of a
charismatic coordinator, who initiated them into puritan religious beliefs and
into an international network of mujaheddin. They worked together with
both this key figure and with a potential perpetrator of attacks. This opera-
tional duo claimed to act in the name of the core group of Al Qaeda. In any
case, it is certain that this duo maintained close ties with various allies of Al
Qaeda in Europe. Moreover, both individuals have in the recent past been to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, presumably to jihadi training camps, among other
things.
In another cluster, people supported the holy war from the Netherlands by
convincing friends and acquaintances within a trusted circle to follow an
extremely orthodox Islamic doctrine. They subsequently incited them to use
violence against unbelievers and renegades wherever in the world. Some
people joined in by preaching or by distributing or translating extremist writ-
ings. Some people threatened dissenters, planned attacks, or actually carried
them out. And a few people arranged contacts between potential fighters and
foreign actors who organised jihad trips. The following fragment illustrates
their orientation in this context. It is from a chat conversation between the
recruiting actor ‘X’ and the interested sympathiser ‘Y’:
Sympathiser Y:
‘but I want to go to England. Abou hamza35 is there and people from
alqaeda [sic].’
Actor X:
‘I know. But you do not have any freedom there. Come with us to Paki-
stan. You will be trained fully there. Learn how to use weapons. To make
bombs. Just everything. Then you can still come back.’
The driving forces within this cluster displayed their international aspirations
through shadowy connections with operational actors from North African
jihadi groups; by staying in training camps in Pakistan; or by being educated
at schools – or Qur’an schools – in the Middle East. Although these individu-
als now and then tried to put their violent ideology into practice abroad, they
mainly aimed their intolerance – sometimes using violence – at Dutch soci-
ety. The following witness testimony is an illustration of the way in which the
armed fight against alleged enemies of Islam may also be waged in the Neth-
erlands.
‘I asked why he wanted so many weapons. He said that he wanted them
to kill those two persons. He also said that [name] and [name] should not
35 Presumably ‘Abu Hamza al-Masri’.
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be allowed to go on living, because they were making Islam seem ridicu-
lous. They said things about Islam that were offensive.’
Other groups, on the other hand, avoid behaviour that could draw the atten-
tion of investigation services. For instance, a cluster including the most
prominent and steering persons from North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula
manifests itself within the Netherlands in a mainly service-oriented manner
with respect to the international jihadi movement. With this intention, spiri-
tual and physical mentors mobilise, teach and train local Muslim youth. It is
not only their intention to send these people to various war zones or free
ports for militants, they also provide facilities for fighters from elsewhere by
providing them with necessities, such as forged or ‘look-alike’ identity
cards,36 other types of documents, accommodation, or money. They usually
obtain the funds for these actions from criminal activities. This cluster, which
to a significant extent is composed of followers of the Al Qaeda-affiliated
Algerian organisation GSPC now residing outside of Algeria, has produced
and has also kept sound recordings of wills of martyrs and other individuals,
and declarations of intent. Finally, the police have evidence that at least one
of these actors is preparing dozens of men to carry out an innovative terrorist
attack abroad.
3.2.4 Involvement in a movement
All cooperations studied consequently contribute in various degrees and in
various ways to the operationalisation of international Salafist jihadism. Why
all the cooperations studied, and all their actors, contribute to a broader
movement – and therefore in fact are part of this broader movement – may
be explained on the basis of three general factors that are typical of the orien-
tation of these networks.
Ideological flexibility
Firstly, it was found that – within the cooperations studied – contacts were
established among jihadis with different group affiliations and ideologies that
were sometimes difficult to reconcile. In particular, the most purposively
operating extremists appeared to display a certain ideological flexibility if it
concerned the establishment of connections with partners that they could
use for the fight. If they wanted to achieve something in the context of the
highest good – the alleged worldwide struggle between believers and unbe-
lievers – and they had the opportunity to work together with partners who
actually operated on the basis of a different doctrine, they tolerated one
another remarkably well, and they were prepared to work together as the
36 A look-alike identity card is an authentic identity card from someone who looks a bit like the person who uses
the document illegally to prove his identity.
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occasion arose. In doing so, the groups proved to be less fundamentalist than
their rigid and at some points contradictory ideologies prescribed.
An example from one of our files is illustrative of this tendency. In this case, a
North African immigrant presented himself as a representative of the GSPC.
In the capacity of a spiritual leader within a facilitating cooperation, his activ-
ities included dealing in drugs. This is the way in which he raised the funds
that were partly intended for international jihadi objectives. Irrespective of
his loyalty to the GSPC, for this purpose he worked closely together with a
coordinator of drug shipments, who – as an exile with a terrorist background
– still maintained friendly ties with the leaders of the GIA. Although members
of both militant Salafist groups would want to kill one another in Algeria
– mainly because they seriously disagree about the violent use of takfir on fel-
low citizens – these individuals joined forces in the Netherlands for the bene-
fit of a shared programme. While the fact of their working together would be
deemed betrayal or even apostasy in the motherland of these heartland-ori-
ented actors, it appeared to be just taken for granted in the relatively lenient
atmosphere of the jihadi diaspora here in the Netherlands.
This phenomenon of ideological flexibility is fascinating. In many places else-
where in the world, the very slightest ideological differences in emphasis often
result in competition among factions of jihadi terrorists. Historical prece-
dents – such as in Algeria at the end of the nineties or currently in Iraq – fur-
thermore show that militant Salafist cooperations are sometimes abruptly
divided by internally conflicting views. In some cases, such a situation may
even escalate into a violent fratricidal struggle. This picture is, however, not
by definition true here in the Netherlands. It is obvious that dogmatic differ-
ences between individual actors and cooperations that are active in the Neth-
erlands may blur, and that – in certain cases – actors are prepared to work
together for the benefit of common activities that transcend borders and
groups. Superordinate goals consequently appear to be able to unite them.37
As a result of this ideological flexibility (or inconsistency), actors in the ideo-
logical vanguard of jihadi cooperations in practice also involve non-jihadi
outsiders in international Salafist jihadism. These people do not comply in
the least with the superiority myth of their ‘in-group’. Although such relation-
ships are contrary to their isolationist doctrine, guiding actors often legiti-
mise their choices by performing ideological balancing acts. They, for
instance, refer to external contacts – in nearly all cases Sunni Muslims – as a
‘necessary evil’. In this way, jihadi cooperations in the Netherlands fre-
quently used the services of less religiously-minded criminals, including
credit card fraudsters and traffickers in human beings, but also a passport
forger who was addicted to cocaine. These are Muslims who belonged to an
unorthodox and forbidden ‘out-group’ according to the takfir principles that
are preached internally. Jihadi Salafists justify these types of relationships,
37 See also Sherif (1966) on the phenomenon that superordinate goals, which transcend groups, may reduce
intergroup conflict and enable groups that are in conflict to join together.
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among other things, by arguing that in a state of a war between themselves
and the outside world, anything goes.38 This does not alter the fact, however,
that arguments and ideological differences of opinion also regularly arise
within jihadi groups. In other words, flexible attitudes may suddenly change,
and this change is not only associated with the presence or absence of attrac-
tive higher goals, but also with the broader phenomenon of opportunistic
behaviour by actors.
Receptivity
A second factor is that many actors who are active in the cooperations stud-
ied actually do not have any coherent extremist views, but are receptive to
them. This is the reason, to a significant degree, that these cooperations can
grow in the Netherlands, and that they can make such a significant contribu-
tion to the international jihadi movement. It is true that receptive individuals
sometimes already have fragmented knowledge (for instance, from the Inter-
net), experiences, and are critical of society even before entering jihadi cir-
cles, but they subsequently mainly allow themselves to be guided in this by
role models.
Virtually all these receptive actors are converts without Islamic backgrounds,
second generation Muslims – or other people who became Muslims in the
West – but also Muslims who had only just recently immigrated and who had
hardly, if at all, been in contact with radical influences in their – often North
African – countries of origin. On the other hand, various heartland-oriented
actors also proved to be receptive. The mechanisms by which these individu-
als from the broad categories described above (see Section 2.3) enter the
movement, however, do differ to a certain extent.
We found that actors from North African immigrant communities who grew
up here or who derived their perception of the world – to a large extent – from
experiences in the West, were just like converts without Islamic backgrounds:
usually relatively young, vulnerable, and sometimes also without any real
perception of cultural or social roots. The actors concerned include, among
others, criminals or addicts who felt attracted to new opportunities, who
longed for a pure lifestyle, or who wanted to seize clear goals in life. Others,
for instance, longed for a form of re-Islamisation and – from this need – they
looked for a structured ideology which could help them in making choices. In
any case, for these actors the original lack of an internalised ideological frame
of reference repeatedly resulted in their being receptive in specific situations
to stimuli from leading, often heartland-oriented role models. In this way,
their radicalisation processes, which had sometimes already commenced,
received crucial impulses, as a result of which the cooperations acquired new
members.
38 In jihadi jargon there would be a conflict between Dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) and Dar al-Kufr (the house
of disbelief). If a Muslim is threatened by unbelievers, is held prisoner, or if he is at war with them, he may
deviate from his religious rules of life. The terms used to refer to this behaviour are tsafir or takiyya.
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Among the heartland-oriented individuals, there were also those who had
been ideologically irresolute and open to persuasion. But, contrary to the
actors described above, they belonged to various age categories. This group
of individuals mainly consisted of asylum seekers, illegal foreigners, and sin-
ners from traditional Muslim countries. They allowed themselves to be guid-
ed by actors who knew how to turn their expertise and experience from the
Islamic world efficiently into structured notions and controlling activities.
Another fact that was sometimes decisive was that these figures met essential
needs, such as the need for a passport, housing, sustenance, as well as giving
meaning to life and social status.
A ‘grey zone’
A third factor that is of importance and by which the cooperations may be
characterised is the participation of actors who were more or less unfamiliar
with the ideological orientation and with the plans of the jihadi vanguard. In
short, some actors appeared to be less conscious of their contribution to the
international Salafist-jihadi worldwide struggle. Now and then, they were
completely unaware of the plans of their extremist brothers. In other cases,
they – according to their own statements – did not take the information they
received very seriously or they assumed that it was just ‘tough talk’.
As a result of this, the ‘grey zones’ of jihadi cooperations include ‘ordinary’
criminals, quiet sympathisers, acquaintances, relatives, and institutions that,
often without being aware of this, contribute actively to the jihadi movement.
Their contribution is often of a communications, logistic, or financial nature.
In the light of the ideological flexibility in the jihadi practice described above,
this observation is not strange. It is also characteristic of the diffuse and
decentralised character of the jihadi movement in and related to the Nether-
lands (see Section 3.8).
In summary, we may conclude that, within the cooperations studied, the
actors aim at super-ordinate goals that exceed their individual ideologies.
The generalist orientation of these cooperations, focused on the worldwide
struggle between Muslims and enemies of Islam, has made it possible for
actors with different ideological backgrounds to unite. As a result of their – in
this respect – ideological flexibility, the jihadi cooperations attract people
with different ideologies, motives, and goals, who subsequently contribute to
the more or less pan-ideological international Salafist-jihadi movement.
Contributions by actors who are receptive to jihadi notions, and also by out-
siders, have increased the collective capacities of this movement.
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3.3 Socio-cultural composition of cooperations
What about the socio-cultural composition of jihadi cooperations? It is clear
that the Salafist-jihadi movement attaches great value to one religious move-
ment (Islam) and one language (Arabic). This quickly gives the impression
that we are dealing with a homogeneous and closed world. The collective
identity experienced by many individuals as partners of an international
community of pure brothers supports the assumption that jihadi circles con-
sist of people with corresponding socio-cultural backgrounds. But is this
assumption correct? In order to be able to describe the jihadi clusters studied
by us as accurately as possible, in this section we will use the following char-
acteristics: country of origin, history and ethnological relationship, language
and culture, age, gender, and religion.39 Information about these characteris-
tics was recorded in the files we studied.
3.3.1 Origin
First of all, it is notable that within each cooperation the majority of people
had North African backgrounds. Within one cooperation, this majority con-
sisted of people of Algerian origin; in other cooperations this majority mainly
consisted of people with Moroccan roots. To some extent, actors with corre-
sponding national or geographical backgrounds (the Maghreb) apparently
sought one another’s company (clustering). Nevertheless, these groups
always included people from other places in the world: often originating from
the Middle East and Europe; sporadically from the Balkans, the Caucasus, the
Horn of Africa, or Latin America. Actors from Europe, including Dutch and
French converts, often fulfil other roles than, for instance, Arabian heartland-
oriented actors, such as Syrians and Iraqi. But still, the investigation files
revealed that these converts without Muslim backgrounds measure up to
their North African actors when it comes to their jihadi participation or
acceptance by the Salafist in-group. From statements of actors and witnesses
recorded by the police, we concluded that they were full members of a com-
munity of brothers that assisted one another and who were there for one
another.
Although it is true that the cooperations are relatively mixed, the investiga-
tion material did not include any actors from countries in Central Asia and
Southeast Asia, such as Pakistan or Indonesia, whereas it is known that peo-
ple from these countries are definitely represented in the international jihadi
movement (see, for instance, AIVD, 2006a). We cannot, however, say with
39 According to Horowitz (2000), it is true that the socio-cultural identity may be measured against indicators
such as skin colour, language, religion, and country of origin, but in this context it mainly concerns a sense of
relatedness on the basis of a faith in a shared origin. Hooimeijer & Van Vliet (2004) are of the opinion that, in
respect of the socio-cultural composition of groups, the issue concerns more than the characteristics analysed
by us. They also include political views, lifestyles, and living habits. In this study, we have limited ourselves to
the abovementioned aspects, because the files studied by us did not contain sufficient information about
other relevant characteristics.
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certainty whether individuals from these regions were less active on Dutch
soil during the research period, or whether these findings must be attributed
to the fact that we focused on a selection of closed criminal investigations.
3.3.2 History, language, and culture
The actors in the different cooperations definitely do not originate from the
same continents, nor can they simply be characterised on the basis of a com-
mon history, language or culture. The true fanatics within these groups,
intoxicated by fundamentalism, identify with the history, language, and tra-
ditions of the first Islamic generations. In reality, however, it is more an idea
that binds them than a real collective heritage. And in a more general sense,
even the modern Islamic world is not a source of collective socio-cultural
identity.
Firstly, the traditional Islamic world has become strongly fragmented over
the centuries (Baali, 2005), as a result of which it is not, or no longer, able to
provide an unambiguous frame of reference. As a result of this, individuals of
North African origin can hardly identify with societies in the Middle East –
and vice versa.
Secondly, not all persons concerned actually grew up in, or were familiar
with, Muslim countries. In the Dutch jihadi clusters, for instance, there were
not only migrants, illegal foreigners, and asylum seekers, but also converts
without Islamic backgrounds: Muslim migrants who were largely raised in
the Netherlands and children of Islamic migrant workers who were born
here. These people appear to be hardly or only vaguely aware of their socio-
cultural roots. In addition, they often only have a poor knowledge of Arabic
or no knowledge at all. Partly because of this, this status-elevating language
of communication spoken by Salafist-jihadis is, in practice, fairly often
replaced by Berber languages, English, French, or simply Dutch. These lan-
guages are, however, frequently peppered with status-elevating Arabic slo-
gans.
3.3.3 Age and gender
In each of the jihadi cooperations studied, the ages of the people who were
active in them varied widely. In this respect as well, there is clustering of
older people, or the opposite, of young people, but as far as the ages of the
actors are concerned, the cooperations are never homogeneous, not even
approximately so. Groups with relatively many young people or young adults
were invariably mixed with older actors. And in the groups with relatively
many middle-aged people, there were also younger actors who were active.
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Insofar as the ages of the actors were known,40 the investigation files stated
that they varied from 16 to 48 years of age.
In the jihadi clusters, it appeared to be mainly men that were active, but
jihadism turned out to be by no means an exclusively male affair. In a few
cooperations, women hardly played a role – or at least they did not come into
the picture during the criminal investigation. But there were also coopera-
tions in which women fulfilled a supporting role, and in one cooperation cer-
tain women actually performed noticeable jihadi activities. We will discuss
the role of women in jihadi clusters in more detail in Chapter 5.
3.3.4 Religion
The only aspect in which the cooperations studied were really homogeneous
was religion. Apart from some dubious cases, all actors were Sunni Muslims,
or had been converted to Sunni Muslims.41 As far as is known, this also
applied to the criminals and service providers who contributed to the jihadi
fight without being particularly interested in it or even without knowing that
that was what they were doing. With that, the ideological flexibility within the
international Salafist-jihadi movement in the Netherlands seems to have
rather rough boundaries: opportunistic alliances with non-religious crimi-
nals, atheist revolutionaries, and Jewish or Christian militants were not found
in the files. But, of course, our data also does not exclude the possibility that
such contacts are established now and then after all, through the greyer
external zones of jihadi cooperations.
In summary, we conclude that, in the cooperations analysed, there was
always a clear over-representation of men with North African backgrounds.
Within these cooperations, however, there were always clusters of people
with other corresponding socio-cultural backgrounds. Within the coopera-
tions, there were, for instance clusters of actors from the Middle East, young
people, older people, and women – all of whom were active. But also individ-
ual actors with completely different backgrounds were tolerated. All in all, the
cooperations found in our case files revealed a relatively wide range of socio-
cultural diversity and tolerance. They derived their capacities from people
with varied backgrounds and ages, and ‘birds of different feathers’ (more on
this in Chapter 5). He who is a Sunni Muslim, leans to this faith or converts to
it and who – in that capacity – appears to have jihadi sympathies, fundament-
alist zeal, or who – in the eyes of insiders – has something else to offer the
40 It often happens that actors use false identities and false dates of birth. The investigation services were mostly
able to trace the countries of origin of these people, but they were sometimes less certain about their ages.
41 Salafism is a Sunni movement. Shiites attach less value to the uniqueness of the Prophet Muhammad and also
attribute prophetic qualities to his twelve descendants (imams). Sunnis, on the other hand, reject the view that
Muhammad has divine successors. They only follow the tradition of the Prophet and they consider the four
leaders who succeeded him (the rightful caliphs) to be merely earthly guardians of his heritage.
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struggle, may be able to establish connections with a jihadi cooperation, and
may be included in the internationally-oriented Salafist-jihadi movement.
3.4 Elementary factors of social binding
It is thus apparent that a common socio-cultural background can contribute
to a feeling of solidarity with other group members for only some of the
actors in jihadi cooperations. In the cooperations studied, a sense of belong-
ing to a group was largely determined by other factors. In this section, we will
consider several notable factors that cause people to feel attracted to, to be
involved in, or to long to be involved in jihadi clusters, and to be willing to
fulfil an active role in them. People may, for instance, have committed them-
selves to such groups on the basis of shared interests, concerns, needs, con-
victions, qualities, idols and ideals. The combination of factors that played a
part in this commitment varied: by actor, by relationship, and by cluster. The
degree to which an actor felt committed to a jihadi group or cluster was also
different for each person.
3.4.1 Religion and religious activities
As briefly pointed out above, all actors were able to recognise one another in
a shared religion. In general religion is an important binding factor, espe-
cially for immigrants (Hoekstra, 2009). Religion provides a shared system of
key values, a shared religious identity, and – in particular – shared activities.
The actors from our case files were able to identify with one another in the
performance of their religious activities: saying prayers together, visiting
mosques, reading the Qur’an, celebrating religious feasts, fasting, eating, and
professing their beliefs. Such corresponding customs and routines promoted
relationships among people who otherwise had little in common.
In this way, various Muslims, who – mainly with criminal motives – forged
documents or trafficked human beings, seemed to become involved in a net-
work because they – coincidentally – participated in the same religious com-
munity with jihadi actors. This often concerned fellow believers who sought
contact with one another, for example in asylum seekers centres or in the cir-
cle of illegal foreigners. They met one another – sometimes indirectly – at pla-
ces where religious acts were performed, such as mosques or sanctuaries, or
on the routes leading to these places, or at places where people gathered after
mosque visits. In this way, they won one anothers’ confidence and became
aware of one anothers’ abilities. A shared religion consequently not only
formed a strong basis for establishing further contacts and developing rela-
tionships of trust for actors who belonged to the ideological vanguards of
62 Jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands
jihadi cooperations, but also for people who moved in their peripheral
zones.42
To fanatic jihadis who operated in the ‘social centres’ of the cooperations, the
shared religion functioned even more as a dominant binding factor. People
who moved in these circles participated in joint prayer sessions or in meet-
ings for in-depth study and discussion.. They studied Islamic writings, deba-
ted about religious issues, and listened to the same Islamic clergymen. For
some of them, the evening prayer in a Salafist mosque gave enough food for
thought to meet one another afterwards for a political-religious discussion
session. Others avoided regular spiritual authorities altogether, and shaped
an even more radical collective perception of faith in their own way. Many
young people in the hard core of one cluster, for instance, embraced the fun-
damentalist sermons of a heartland-oriented actor who presented himself as
an expert. According to a witness, they saw him as their imam, even though
the man did not have any theological authority in the eyes of an average mos-
que-goer.
3.4.2 Ideology
In jihadi clusters, the binding element was not merely the Islamic faith, but
mainly the ideology that followed from it. As argued above, the cooperations
studied were all focused on the worldwide struggle between Muslims and the
alleged enemies of Islam. This orientation is the binding element between
actors who became involved in the more or less pan-ideological international
Salafist-jihadi movement from different ideological backgrounds, or from an
incoherent (copy-paste) ideology. In most cooperations, only a small minor-
ity of all actors were fully convinced of the ideology in its pure form preached
there. Most actors mainly had affinity with specific aspects of that doctrine.
Given this fact, it would perhaps be better to regard the transcending interna-
tionally-oriented Salafist-jihadi ideology as a source of several binding fac-
tors. Within all the cooperations the members shared the feeling that Mus-
lims were being wronged all over the world. According to experts, this theme
of worldwide injustice to Muslims often resonates with personal experiences
(Sageman, 2008). This is, however, much less evident from the source mate-
rial available to us.43 Most actors did not necessarily feel wronged as individ-
uals, but the idea that the group to which they belonged was being wronged
42 This, of course, makes these religion-related meeting places also suitable for recruitment activities. For more
information on this subject, see also Section 3.6.2.
43 This does not surprise us, though. The literature on protest behaviour and collective actions repeatedly shows
that militant behaviour, taking action, and supporting all sorts of protests are indeed associated with relative
group deprivation, whereas this readiness to take action is not associated with relative individual deprivation.
See, for example Kelly Kelly 1994; Koomen & Fränkel, 1992; and De Weerd, 1999. This relationship between
group deprivation and the intention to take action becomes stronger as people identify more strongly with the
relevant group. See, for example Kelly & Breitlinger, 1995; De Weerd, 1999; and De Weerd & Klandermans,
1999.
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was widely supported and was propogated further within the cooperations.44
It was found that actors also explicitly named the West or Western democracy
as the common enemy, which brought them together and intensified the
feeling of solidarity. In the cooperations, the West was usually seen as the
instigator of the crisis Islam was said to be going through, and as the culprit
causing the suffering of Muslims in all corners of the world.
In addition, the collective aim to overthrow the Establishment was also an
important ideological element that strengthened solidarity among the group
members. The idea that they could actually overthrow ‘the system’ intrigued
many actors from the cooperations studied, and incited them to make great
efforts to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, only a few actors appeared to have
formed concrete ideas about the new order that was to be established. The
Caliphate as a future system continued to be an abstact idea. In that context,
opposition against the existing social organisation appeared to link the actors
much more than shared views of an alternative system. For some of the
actors, the jihadi ideology mainly contained points of departure on the basis
of which they hoped to be able to straighten things out for themselves after a
stage of life in which they were unhappy or which they experienced as sinful.
Others appeared to identify with the rebellious and action-oriented nature of
this ideology during an extreme stage of adolescence.
Although the central ideology in the cooperations studied was consequently
not shared by all actors in all its facets, many of them actually drew a feeling
of solidarity from it, both with acquaintances in shared networks and with
‘brothers’ in the broader jihadi movement. Everyone who was active in this
movement contributed to the holy fight from his own background and with
his own motives. And it was exactly this fight that really counted to many of
them. Actors derived a collective identity from it: the idea of participating in a
grand narrative, sharing a common view, and a common enemy. These ele-
ments created solidarity and strengthened the ties among the actors. This is,
of course, less important in the peripheral zones of jihadi cooperations. In
these zones, other binding factors were important.
3.4.3 Role models and guiding individuals
‘He is great! Don’t you agree?’ Just like football supporters and followers of
political parties, Salafist-jihadis feel drawn to one another in admiration for
or in receptivity to the same role models or guiding actors. Their interna-
tional idols – including for example Osama bin Laden, Abu Qatada, and Abu
Hamza al Masri – as well as key figures in the local groups who have more
actual authority contribute to the collective identity within jihadi coopera-
tions in this way. Besides bringing people together physically, they also link
44 In this context, it is both a matter of indoctrination and of group processes among people who incite one
another to action. We will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.
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them because they set trends and teach mores. Their conduct also encour-
ages imitation in the Netherlands – and creates points of common recogni-
tion within extremist (youth) cultures. If a world-famous football player is
wearing and promoting a new brand of football shoes, other football fanatics
will follow his example. If charismatic jihadis avoid any contact with unbe-
lievers and advise against it, their most fanatic followers will conform to this.
In this way consensus is created on a specific standard. Witness testimonies
pointed out that various customs were created in this way, for example with
regard to clothing and behaviour, and resulted in the fact that the ties among
group members were strengthened and the ties with the outside world
actually became weaker.
3.4.4 Activities
To many actors, joint activities were the reason for and gave sense to the
– jihadi – gatherings. These activities consolidated the existing jihadi ties and
promoted the creation of new contacts and relationships of trust. Some ter-
rorism experts have pointed out that acts of violence are often committed by
young, rash people who are looking for adventure, risk, and physical expedi-
tions (Atran, 2008). We observed a similar orientation towards action in our
case files: as a factor of relationship and – to some actors – as an expression of
a culture glorifying violence.
The activities with the largest and broadests capacity of social binding were,
however, usually more subtle in nature. These activities also attracted indi-
viduals who were less keen on violence or action. Actors carpooled to politi-
cal-religious meetings, visited lectures, mosques, or prayer sessions together
in small groups, and studied the Qur’an or the Arabic language together.
Hardened jihadis as well as radicalising individuals glorified their idols
together – and they taunted their declared enemies in the same way. But an
afternoon of doing odd jobs together also contributed to the sense of belong-
ing to the group. Irrespective of whether the activities were directly, indi-
rectly, or hardly related to the holy war, the various joint activities strength-
ened the jihadi cooperations anyway. Chapter 4 of this report will give an
exclusive and more detailed discussion of the full range of activities within
the jihadi movement in and related to the Netherlands.
3.4.5 Binding needs and motives
The strong ideological connotation of jihadi cooperations attracts individuals
with various binding needs and motives. These actors often do not just join
such groups – or at least not only – because of a preference for the dominant
views and activities of these groups, but sometimes also because of the social
advantages they gain by this choice. Most people seek some degree of solid-
arity, motivated by a need for security, safety, structure (Meertens, Prins &
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Doosje, 2006), status, meaning in life, and identity. Militant religious groups
are able to satisfy such needs. In our case files, younger members especially
appeared to attach importance to these types of advantages. This could be
inferred, among other things, from a fragment from the life story of the
accused ‘X’ that was recorded by the researchers:
X was born in the Netherlands. When he was 4 years old, he moved to
Morocco. He went to school and made a lot of friends. At the time, he
knew nothing of Islam. When he was 17 years of age, X returned to the
Netherlands. His mother remained behind in Morocco with the younger
children. He went to live with his father […]. Many Turks and Moroccans
live in this area. He had a tough time in […]. He was lonely and he did not
know anyone. He had to go to school and he also had to work. He had to
take care of himself: do the shopping, cooking, and washing. And he
hardly spoke any Dutch.
In […], X quit school; on the one hand because it was difficult and on the
other hand because he became increasingly more interested in Islam. Out
of loneliness, he often went to mosque to get to know people and to make
friends. Through another mosque-goer, X became acquainted with other
boys who had already formed a jihadi cluster.
But older people also turned out to be receptive to the social temptations of
jihadi commmunities. In one group, for instance, there were many actors
who were staying in the Netherlands illegally. Many of them were left to their
own devices in a country where they did not know the language and the cus-
toms. Being ‘in the same boat’, in a corresponding social position, they found
relief, a ‘warm blanket’ of welcome, and a new meaning in life.
3.4.6 Material needs and interests
Material gain did not play a central role, but it presumably did play a secun-
dary role as a binding factor. Illegal foreigners especially, with a chronic lack
of financial security, housing, or legally valid documents, were likely to take
their primary neccesities of life into consideration when they sought social
contact with ideologically-driven clusters (see Section 5.3.1). These clusters
regularly include people who can arrange work, housing, contacts, and docu-
ments, and in addition to this, they sometimes also provide specific cultur-
ally-based services. One authoritative jihadi stated during his interrogation:
‘If someone has died, for instance, I help them wash and clean the body
so that the body can be brought back to the country of origin. I do this for
free. One good turn deserves another.’
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As a result of these kinds of binding factors, it may also occur that illegal for-
eigners – following in other people’s tracks – participate in a jihadi network
unintentionally, somewhat ignorantly or reluctantly. It is this dependant
position that contributes to their being receptive to directional influences –
or to requests to do something in return.
It is inevitable that the prospect of financial gain now and then also binds
people from conventional criminal circles to jihadi cooperations. It probably
concerns sporadic ties here, which largely occur behind the scenes of our
case files. By far the majority of terrorism-related criminal activities in the
Netherlands were, however, committed by people who act voluntarily and
who have ideological, social (friendly gestures), or material motives to do so.
3.5 Factors of power
Following on from other agencies (including AIVD, 2004a), we also found that
there were no administrative or institutionalised power relationships within
the jihadi clusters. Some actors were, however, relatively capable of influenc-
ing their social environment. Their power did not so much rest on what
Weber (1947) refers to as the ability to force others to do something against
their will, for example by applying clear rules, but more on the two other
forms of power described by him. The first form of power is charisma, which
is based on sympathy and expertise. The second form of power is legitimisa-
tion. In applying this form of power, the guiding actors mainly emphasised
the advantages of the desired behaviours.
On the basis of the classic division into five forms of power by French and
Raven (1959), in which the forms of power referred to by Weber are divided
even futher, we will outline the most important manifestations of social
power in jihadi cooperations. The five forms of power are expert power, refer-
ent power, legitimate power, reward power, and coercive power.
3.5.1 Expert power
In the studied cooperations, the actors who had most authority derived their
influence – without exception – from their knowledge of Islamic religious
doctrine and the associated actions. In this context, they effectively used
‘expert power’. In a Western context, their expertise was given extra dimen-
sion, because authoritative actors were nearly always heartland oriented.
Their knowledge of classical Arabic was, for instance, found to command
respect from Muslims who had been raised outside the Islamic motherland.
In addition, these guiding ‘teachers’ or ‘spiritual leaders’ sometimes also
relied on a jihadi past, participation in an armed conflict, or other relevant
experiences. Those who attach value to their competence and their message
– and are thus receptive – develop into followers to a greater or lesser extent.
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However, guiding individuals did not have any grip derived from expert
power on others. It was by no means the case that all jihadis with expert
power had theological backgrounds. They invariably compensated for this by
traits such as charisma and persuasiveness. A suspect from our case files
stated the following during an interrogation:
‘Actually, I could not refuse [him] anything, for he had such a charisma
that he had a certain dominance over the people he interacted with.’
And the investigation team recorded the following about a spiritual leader in
another case:
‘He derives his leadership from his knowledge of the Qur’an. […] He was a
spiritual leader. He also preached in the house […] and he approached
people with a message like ‘I am going to tell you something about the
faith’ and he frequently did this in, for instance, asylum seekers centres.
And you should understand that out of a group of 100 people, there will
always be some people of whom he thought: I can use that one, I can
manipulate that one, and I can indoctrinate that one.’
The power of players who had social dominance on the basis of their exper-
tise was consequently by no means absolute, but their message was. The
ideology they preached was based on the Salafist principle that true Muslims
must literally obey the Qur’an and the hadith. As a result of this, they preten-
ded to propagate a message that was coming directly from God, without any
further interpretation.
Power is and will always be a relative concept. In jihadi cooperations, there
were usually several actors with expert power. There was also some kind of
hierarchy noticeable in this power. The advanced pupil of a teacher who was
considered to be a specialist presented himself as a teacher of a cluster of fol-
lowers who were less well informed. These followers regarded the pupil as a
teacher as well. As a reward for their diligence, the people who attended his
lessons were sometimes allowed to also attend the lessons taught by his own,
more expert master. This was presented and experienced as a privilege. In
this way, fanatical, but less authoritative actors from jihadi clusters influ-
enced others in turn, and they were capable of expanding the network even
further. On the other hand, it also occurred that actors were seen as teachers
without them presenting themselves as such.
3.5.2 Referent power
Especially in relationships with young people and young adults, certain older
individuals regularly reaped the fruits of the ‘referent power’ that followed
from their exemplary role or their being an idol within the jihadi (youth) cul-
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ture. Some people identified with them to such an extent that they adopted
their behaviour and beliefs, whether entirely or partly. Receptive people often
considered it a privilege to be allowed to associate with their seniors and,
because of this, they actively attempted to cultivate their favour or continue
to be in their favour. One or two young followers even demonstrated an
almost unlimited admiration for their role models and literally attempted to
become like them in every respect. One of the witnesses stated the following
about such a follower:
‘He wrote in a chat to me ‘this is my teacher, my leader’. He then showed
me a photo of [actor] […] I think he wanted to be famous for being a ter-
rorist and wanted to belong to [the group of that teacher] […].’
This source of power had hardly any effect, if at all, on many other actors who
were either peripherally or fully involved.
3.5.3 Legitimate power
Many individuals in our case files appeared to accept the power relationships
and allocations of roles in their respective clusters as they were, because for
them they were ‘naturally’ consistent with specific internalised values. Actors
from whom they accepted direction on this basis had a form of ‘legitimate
power’. In this context, culturally determined values were found to be impor-
tant factors. Similar to ordinary communities or societies, where it is gener-
ally accepted that older people prescribe how young people must behave,
influential jihadis in the Netherlands are often older than their followers. An
actor from a jihadi groups illustrated this stereotypical picture on the basis of
the following personal experience:
‘[X] has many acquaintances here, whom he looks upon as his children.
These people look upon him as their father. He can simply call someone
to pick him up.’
‘[X] was capable of calling people, for instance, if he wanted to have food
or if he had to go somewhere.’
In addition, guiding persons presumably also often drew legitimate power
from a range of very specific culturally determined characteristics on the
basis of which they derived their status, including the male gender, a rela-
tively high intelligence, and physical or verbal strength. Actors in jihadi cir-
cles were furthermore inclined to assign more authority to people with a
political-religious background or with a jihadi past.
The legitimacy of the power of guiding actors is often emphasised by their
followers, because they address them by the title of sheik or because they
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accept that these individuals perform rituals which – according to the rules of
Islam – may only be performed by Islamic clergymen who really possess this
legitimate power. The following statement of a witness illustrates this:
‘Yes, normally, the marriage should be contracted by an imam, but they
see him as their imam.’
3.5.4 Reward power
‘Paradise, a heavenly garden that is reserved for prophets and martyrs’ (Has-
san, 2001). Various jihadis derived a form of ‘reward power’ from propagating
messages like this. With such messages, they suggested that they could medi-
ate a place in paradise, at least, for those who conform to their criteria of
good jihadism. Trustworthy individuals, who also frequently possessed
expert power, were found to take advantage of this myth. A young man, who
was taken in by an Algerian recruiter for the jihad, spoke about his intention
to die a martyr as follows:
‘Our Lord professed that, if we can show patience, he will bring us to
paradise. For martyrdom is much appreciated by God.’
‘As a martyr, I will have intercession with our Lord for seventy members
of my family. And for you as well. Our Lord will bring all of us to paradise.
Dear dad, dear mom, pray for me. All of you, pray for me so that God will
accept my martyrdom.’
Guiding actors may also provide their followers with countless other advan-
tages and rewards. We already discussed many of these in the section on
social binding factors (3.4). This list of advantages and rewards includes
social needs (such as friendships and membership of a close group), struc-
ture, meaning in life, and concrete necessities of life (such as work, housing,
and documents). But they may also choose to reward their loyal adherents
with privileges or positions that increase their status within a network. Below,
by way of illustration, are two fragments from witness testimonies and one
fragment from an interview with an investigating officer:
‘He said: I have left my family behind in [country]. In the beginning, I
missed them very much, but my brothers are now my new family. And he
loved his brothers very much […]’
‘I think he is in the same boat as [actor X] and that he has let himself be
influenced by […] because he was seeking security in some way.’
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‘They were illegal. He arranged accommodation for them; he arranged
documents for them so that they could go to a temporary employment
agency; there they registered and they could work […] a great many peo-
ple we spoke later on said “[actor Y], he is a social worker to us”.’
3.5.5 Coercive power
As the opposite of reward power, ‘coercive power’ is a source of individual
dominance that is seen less frequently within jihadi clusters. However, now
and then actors complied with requirements, fulfilled wishes, or lived up to
expectations of the demanding party for fear of negative consequences.
Although there is presumably no group that has a formal or efficient sanc-
tions system, some individuals cleverly took advantage of the god-fearing
attitude of others. They preached the wrath of God to anyone who deviated
from the right path that they pointed out to them. The partner of a potential
attacker testified as follows:
‘I remember that, when we were in Afghanistan, we had gathered on the
occasion of the feast of the […] in the mosque which [actor X] and I had
built. [Jihadist Y] spoke through a microphone of a speaker [sic]; he told
us that we should not reveal ourselves to the kafir45 and the police; if we
did not obey, our punishment would be that [we] would become kafir
ourselves and that we would be punished even harder by God.’
Occasionally, influential actors threatened to impose penalties and reprisals
on people who acted wrongly. A Salafist-jihadi teacher from one cooperation,
for instance, demanded financial gifts for the jihad from young people who
had missed their lessons. His followers, however, appeared to rarely if ever
comply with this demand, probably because of the informal and voluntary
atmosphere. In addition, actors who were in the position to expel others from
the group against their will could raise fear of banishment and commanded
submission as a result. In one of the clusters, this form of coercion was also
used to force people to conform to the ideology of the group. In this context,
a complicated psychological mechanism was used: on the one hand, actors
were cast out of the group if they questioned the ideology propagated in this
group; on the other hand, they could not leave the group without consequen-
ces because they would then be regarded as renegades with all that that
entailed. Any objections in the group were thus nipped in the bud, as a result
of which leading actors had considerable control over their closest followers.
‘[…] he said to me “if you don’t like what I am trying to tell you here, what
are you doing here then?” or at least words to that effect […].’
45 ‘unbelievers’
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‘[…] someone who leaves their group is a renegade and you are allowed to
kill this person, at least fight him; that is how they think.’
Once, a spiritual leader from yet another cluster pronounced a death sen-
tence in a fatwa against an actor who had embezzled very valuable items
from the network. Also, several actors from our case files exercised coercive
power simply because they acted in a violent or threatening manner. But to
others such explicit threats were not even essential to maintain their position
of power. These individuals had such an intimidating personality that it was
clear to their followers in advance: breach of loyalty would be followed by
revenge, physical or otherwise. Even the investigating officers were some-
times impressed by these individuals. One of the officers interviewed spoke
about the way in which the physically strong suspect ‘X’ inspired fear and
awe in people:
‘After the first interview, one of my best police detectives [team member]
came back. He said that he had been really afraid of this fellow. This man
[X] is really scary, dangerous. If you know [team member]: he is simply a
tough detective. And he is the one who said: “I have never seen someone
like that before. He saw right through me […]”.’
If we consider the way in which power manifests itself, we conclude that all
the factors of power and power relationships described above played a role in
all the cooperations studied. In this respect, we did not find many differences
among the cooperations studied, even though some clusters stood out more
for the efforts made to offer advantages and rewards whereas other clusters
were found to rely more on the directional capacity of expert power.
Expert power, reward power, and coercive power were the main factors of
power that fulfilled significant functions in all cooperations. In most cases,
the guiding actors exercised several forms of power over their followers. A
spiritual teacher was, for instance, able to influence one actor because this
actor attached value to his expertise, whereas he had more ‘control’over
another actor by rewarding or punishing him. We, however, found that it was
more often a combination of power factors that was effective. In particular,
the older guiding actors from our case files appeared to be capable of exercis-
ing all the above-mentioned forms of power to a greater or lesser extent.
3.6 Structural characteristics and cohesion of a jihadi movement
In the preceding sections, the focus of our analyses was on substantive char-
acteristics of jihadi cooperations and on how these characteristics promoted
and shaped the commitments and relationships among the different actors.
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In this section, we will elucidate several structural characteristics of the jihadi
cooperations studied and of the underlying networks that connect them.
Although not all clusters of cooperating individuals analysed by us had been
subjected to police investigation at the same time, it was strikingly evident
that – without exception – they were related to one another by social connec-
tions and were thus part of a larger jihadi movement.
Certainly at the transnational level, but also within the Netherlands, the
actors from different cooperations had contact with one another. Jihadis who
were active within various cooperations were found to have connections to
each other, whether directly or indirectly, and to use each others’ services
now and then. The jihadi cooperations studied consequently do not seem to
consist of isolated and static groups of cooperating individuals. Instead, there
seemed to be dynamic and varying social connections within which different
activities were performed.
We found, however, that a remarkable degree of interconnectedness existed
not only among the various jihadi clusters, but also within the individual
cooperations, where many actors were also in close relation to one another;
these relationships among the actors were often remarkably intense.46
In this section, we will discuss several factors that were particularly responsi-
ble for the fact that all actors who were part of the jihadi movement were
hardly ever more than a few social connections removed from one another.
We will give a description of the factors that both contributed to and devel-
oped the remarkable structural cohesion of this broader and cross-border
network. In this context, we did not subject the investigation data to an
advanced social network analysis (see Van der Hulst, 2008, 2009a, 2009b for
more information), but we did use several concepts from the literature on
social networks to describe the characteristics of the movement and to
understand its cohesive structure.
The section starts with an analysis of the social foundations, such as family
relationships and relationships of trust, which provide an explanation for the
intensity and durability of many connections between actors. We will subse-
quently describe how geographical and virtual meeting places contribute to
the connections among actors. Next, we will discuss the key figures. These are
people who fulfil binding roles on account of their structural and active pres-
ence. Finally, we will illustrate how the abovementioned factors also shape
cohesion in the larger jihadi network at the international level.
3.6.1 Social Foundations
Jihadi cooperations derive their internal cohesion predominantly from long-
lasting social foundations, which are often based on mutual trust. Long-last-
ing bonds of friendship, shared histories, family relationships, and marriages
46 This sounds obvious, but it is not. In organised crime, often people who are part of the same organisation
hardly know one another, if at all (Kleemans et al., 2002).
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create stable social relationships. Various actors in the cooperations analysed
had known one another for years, and had already had contact with one
another even before they joined a jihadi cluster. They had known one
another from places of birth or residence, from schools, from temporary or
permanent home addresses, or from asylum seekers centres. While one
friendship had been made on the battlefield of a gruesome civil war, the
other had originated during games of football on a grassy field. One actor, for
instance, recounted the following about his bond with another actor, ‘X’:
‘[…] Between my house and [X]’s house was a green field which formed
the boundary between the houses. And I was invited by the neighbours to
play football on that stretch of grass, and [X] joined us. That is when we
became acquainted. Due to the fact that we were neighbours, I knew his
family, for [X] lived with his parents.’
Some relationships had already had religion as a binding factor for a longer
period of time. Such relationships concerned, for instance, individuals who
had first met one another in mosques and had visited prayer services
together since then. Close and intimate ties often developed in guest houses
and transit houses, where illegal foreigners and travelling or transiting jihadis
found temporary rented or free accommodation. However, relationships of
trust among people who met each other in militant circles also often fulfilled
a structural role within jihadi cooperations. Such ties had in particular been
developed in asylum seekers centres and prisons. Particularly during deten-
tion, sentenced jihadis were found to regularly cultivate new relationships
that would be of value after their release. Sometimes actors from our case
files appeared to use the circumstances in detention to develop relationships
of trust, to enthuse people about jihadi Salafism, and to contact criminals as
possible future suppliers of weapons and explosives. We will discuss such
activities more extensively in Chapter 4.
Jihadi clusters that are formed, expanded, and consolidated often owe their
solid structures and permanent nature to various types of family ties. For
instance, in the cooperations studied by us several brothers operated
together. Corresponding life experiences and common acquaintances can
partly explain why brothers sometimes came into contact with extremist
views and cooperations. Nevertheless, a corresponding point of departure for
individual radicalisation – being siblings – hardly ever leads to corresponding
trajectories of individual development, let alone to an identical final stage.
Whereas one brother mainly followed the example of an older brother; the
other was not – or not yet – prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice, but facili-
tated his more fanatical sibling in all sorts of ways. And in another case, a
brother was known to be an apolitical Salafist who presumably only com-
plied with dubious requests from a jihadi family member out of brotherly
loyalty.
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Marriages, which generally create relationships of trust between families that
used to be divided, also contributed to the close ties of jihadi cooperations
and networks. Relationships between actors from different in-laws (fathers-
in-law and sons-in-law, or brothers-in-law) had often been tried and trusted
for a longer period of time. If such ties are incorporated in a jihadi cluster
after a largely innocent history, they can suddenly turn out to be conducive to
its structural cohesion. In this way, several important individuals in a terro-
rist cooperation had been related to each other through brother-in-law rela-
tionships for years.
But there were also marriages and relationships of love that actually devel-
oped during the process of forming jihadi clusters. Whether consciously initi-
ated or promoted by guiding heartland-oriented actors or not, such relation-
ships gave an additional, consolidating dimension to existing relationships
within extremist and radicalising groups of friends and acquaintances. Illus-
trative of this is a cooperation in which several male actors were married
within a few years. Their wives subsequently got to know one another and
also made contact with one anothers’ partners and friends; partly – encour-
aged by their husbands – to study the jihadi ideology together. During this
process, new cross-bonds and double bonds were created to consolidate the
relevant cooperation even further. The following account of a witness out-
lines how actors may become acquainted by marriages. This quotation also
illustrates that contracting marriages is promoted by the jihadi ideology
which they adhere to.
‘[....] After some time [woman X] became engaged to [man Y], but it soon
appeared that this was not the right choice. [Woman X] became acquaint-
ed with [man Z] through [man Y]. [Man Z] informed [woman X] that he
wanted to marry her. Marriage is an important duty each Muslim man
should fulfil before he dies. It struck me that [man Z] was in quite a hurry
to get married.’
3.6.2 Meeting places
A second factor that may be conducive to the connectedness of jihadi clusters
is the existence of both geographical and virtual ports of call. Jihadis who
operate both in the Netherlands and abroad tend to gather at specific geo-
graphical locations and virtual forums. Because they feel drawn to such pla-
ces, where they find adherents of the same faith, they can maintain relation-
ships, make new contacts, and secure social access to previously unknown
clusters within the already relatively small and intimate movement of jihadi
Salafists in and related to the Netherlands.
Such meeting places are found in semi-public areas in particular, areas which
in the Muslim community are known as popular locations to meet friends
and to listen to lectures and sermons. In this way, several Salafist centres and
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mosques in the large cities function as important places where receptive
actors on the one hand and guiding fundamentalists on the other hand meet
one another – in particular during the first stages of the formation of jihadi
clusters. And even though most Muslims who go there do not want to have
anything to do with the violent jihad, these places may become attractive
ports of call for radical Muslims, at least at specific moments or in specific
– often closed – parts of these places. At a later stage of the formation of jihadi
clusters, the actors will, however, hardly ever have sufficient opportunities to
develop all their militant core activities. Nevertheless, the mosque will still
continue to be the potential source of new actors – and in exceptional cases,
the setting of active recruitment and indoctrination. Individuals from differ-
ent clusters in the Netherlands regularly visited the same Salafist and ultra-
Salafist mosques. As a result of this, connections were also established here
among already existing cooperations.
Irrespective of the exact locations of their initial interactions – including, for
instance, call shops and Internet cafés – individuals in the process of radicali-
sation, as well as those who were already militant, usually sought more pri-
vate meeting places to carry out concrete collective jihadi activities. Joint
ideological education, deliberations, and terrorism-related activities conse-
quently took place in the back rooms of Internet cafés or call shops, in the
private houses of individuals who were involved, or at other private places.
According to witnesses, actors were incited there by means of political-reli-
gious literature and audiovisual material, sometimes during pre-scheduled
meetings, on other occasions during impromptu sessions. Individuals who
often still spoke tactfully and in veiled terms in mosques, expressed their true
views and intentions at these private places.
Although not all members of the jihadi clusters are generally welcome at
these ‘living-room meetings’, or during occassional field activities,47 those
who do get access establish many new connections that in their turn often
lead to meetings with other relevant actors. A Dutch Moroccan, for instance,
stated how he was introduced in jihadi circles through an invitation from
radicalising mosque-goers to eat and drink something together. At the apart-
ment of his hosts, he was shown films about the war in Chechnya. There were
also other radical visitors. Such informal meeting places strengthen the con-
nections within and among jihadi cooperations.
Meeting places on the Internet essentially have corresponding binding func-
tions. Chat groups and other closed virtual forums, which often originate and
grow as a result of earlier personal meetings, consolidate existing relation-
ships and also bring people together who do not know each other. Our case
files also exhibit various examples of this. We will give you one example.
When the police had traced a Moroccan male who had uttered online death
threats against a well-known politician, it soon became clear that he
47 From our case files, a few places emerged where a number of actors met to carry out physical and spiritual
activities together, including a sports centre and a farmyard campsite.
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belonged to a small cooperation that was preparing terrorist attacks in the
Netherlands. Initially, the police detectives treated this group of cases as a
relatively isolated phenomenon. But later on it was found that the suspect
uttering the threats was also a member of some MSN-group in which mem-
bers of another, considerably larger, extremist group also participated in dis-
cussions about the anti-Western jihad. The police could not assess whether
there were also operational ties between the two groups. But it was certain
that, through this virtual junction, both groups were extremely well connect-
ed within a joint jihadi cluster. In addition, further investigation revealed that
the Moroccan from the first group also maintained real-life contacts with a
spiritual source of inspiration and a number of other violent and non-violent
actors from the second group.
Sometimes, these virtual meeting places not only encourage the progress of
the fundamentalist discourse and cohesion within the jihadi movement, but
now and then they also serve as a bridge to individuals outside this move-
ment. Several fanatical actors from a jihadi cluster, for instance, made new
contacts with Muslim women and non-Islamic girls who bombarded chat
rooms and discussion panels with questions. Later on these young women
actually met these men, allowed themselves to be converted by them, and
subsequently ended up in an ultra-radical world – sometimes temporarily,
sometimes permanently. Furthermore, some actors from this same network
were often online to mobilise people for the holy war. The prospective jihadis
they encounter at Internet forums could contact them for information about
– and connections to – training camps abroad. A chat conversation between
one of the actors, ‘X’ from this cooperation and the unknown Internet user ‘Y’
is illustrative of this:
Internet user Y: ‘...how did you get in [sic] that camp?’
Actor X: ‘contact persons’
Actor X: ‘but you will understand that I do not want to say
too much about it.’
Internet user Y: ‘aha’
Actor X: ‘yes’
Actor X: ‘but let me put it this way’
Internet user Y: ‘I certainly get it’
Actor X: ‘I know people there’
Actor X: ‘And other people have contacts there’
Actor X: ‘if I go there I call them’
Actor X: ‘and give them the date and time of arrival and
the like’
Actor X: ‘then they’ll come and pick you up’
Actor X: ‘and they will take you [to the next station]’
Actor X: ‘you won’t take a direct route’
Actor X: ‘but via a couple of stations’
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3.6.3 Key figures
A third phenomenon that binds jihadi clusters internally and externally, and
consequently also facilitates their fluid cohesion, is related to human links or
‘key figures’. In every group there are several individuals who have dispro-
portionately more relationships, both within and outside the group. Among
these key figures are invariably guiding heartland-oriented actors, who again
and again are found at the ‘cradle’ of growing jihadi cooperations by seeking,
uniting, and mobilising receptive actors. They make careful choices when
investing in social capital: valuable social contacts they might be able to use
to reach their goals and create new opportunities (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 2000;
Coleman, 1990; Lin, 2001). Their efforts will pay off later on in collective
jihadi activities. At the same time, these actors often maintain many external,
sometimes international, contacts with other heartland-oriented actors.
These broad connecting characteristics are pre-eminently suitable for coor-
dinating and guiding roles. Most of the time, however, some of their enthusi-
astic followers also function as key figures, because they assume coordinating
tasks, for example with regard to forgery of documents and financing. Others
develop into key figures because they actively engage in propagating an intol-
erant and violent Islamic message in imitation of their role models.
Key figures and meeting places are, of course, also often connected. The fol-
lowing description, recorded by an investigating officer about a key figure
from one of the cooperations, demonstrates this:
‘[Actor X] ensured that people got false identity documents by calling in
contacts. He made it possible for people to get accommodation. But he
was also involved in drawing up the wills and testaments of people who
would go abroad as jihadis, and he established contacts with persons
inside and outside of Europe. And he arranged a central meeting place in
his house, which served as a kind of sanctuary for adherents of the same
faith who wanted to meet each other under his guidance.’
3.6.4 Cohesion at the international level
Social foundations, meeting places, and key figures not only ensure structural
cohesion at the national or cluster level, these three factors also enable the
Dutch clusters to be communicating and active components at the interna-
tional level, within a larger network of worldwide Salafist-jihadis and their
assistants. In this context, it is a matter of mutual interdependence. On the
one hand, the local groups studied reacted continuously to stimuli from this
global movement. Sometimes, concrete instructions were received, but more
frequently it concerned informal requests, schooling, global direction, and
other forms of communication. Conversely, the same local jihadi groups
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invariably supported the international movement – whose reason for exis-
tence is intrinsically to continue and expand – both in words and actions.
A consistent observation is first of all that in all clusters identified there were
individuals who maintained relationships to various degrees with actors and
groups in the European branch of international jihadism. These relationships
usually concerned connections between energetic key figures from local
groups and itinerant key figures from the GICM, the GSPC, the GICT, and the
GIA: groups that have partially or entirely adopted the international jihadi
ideology. Especially these key figures, who are often North African represen-
tatives or veterans of terrorist organisations, function as driving forces within
the European branch of the internationally oriented jihad, thereby cooperat-
ing in fluid and dynamic networks.
Various members of network (A), which had prepared and committed acts of
violence in our country, maintained contact with, for example a coordinator
of the GICM. This man, who was presumably also involved in a series of
bloody suicide attacks in North Africa, gave instructions to some of them,
although the police have not been able to identify the exact nature of those
instructions. It is however certain that he referred actors to contact persons
in Belgium.
Characteristic of the cross-border cohesion of the jihadi movement is also
that an actor from network (A) described above (here referred to as A1) was
also acquainted with the Algerian passport forger B1 from an entirely differ-
ent jihadi cooperation (B) in the Netherlands. In the latter facilitating cluster,
both B1 and the Afghan illegal foreigner B2 received money sent from Swit-
zerland by C1, a key figure for the GIA. B1 and B2 probably channelled at
least part of these funds to A1. In the mean time, B1 and B2 also turned up as
forgers within a Spanish GIA group (C) that was preparing a heavy bomb
attack on an important public building in Madrid under the leadership of C1.
In the Netherlands, B1 and B2 were experimenting with detonators, as has
become apparent from investigations carried out by the Spanish authorities
and security services.
Other investigation data emphasised the international cohesion and the
cross-border nature of the jihadi movement in the Netherlands. Two appa-
rently separate cooperations, for instance, facilitated the assassination of an
Afghan military leader who was reputed to be an ally of the West; both proba-
bly acted through the same key figures in a Belgian cluster composed of
members of the GICT and the GSPC. The majority of these Tunisian – but
also Algerian and Moroccan – actors who were residing in Belgium were
under the directional influence of Al Qaeda spokesmen who had forged alli-
ances between Algerian and Tunisian militants in exile since the nineties
from an extremist melting pot in London. Also people who had been active in
the two Dutch cooperations had visited this British base, had allowed them-
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selves to be influenced by various charismatic key figures, and had increased
their jihadi circle of acquaintances there.
In addition to numerous social connections that led to international key fig-
ures from our case files, we consequently observed that some actors travelled
to various geographical meeting places, which functioned as nerve centres
for the mixed international network of Salafist-jihadis. The places they visited
included radical mosques in large European cities, training camps in Paki-
stan and Afghanistan, Qur’an schools in the Islamic world, and homes and
safe houses abroad.
Conversely, internationally operating jihadis – for the greater part heartland-
oriented actors – also mixed with cooperations that were active in the Neth-
erlands through local key figures and meeting places. A notable example of
such an indigenous melting pot is a sports centre, where different groups of
Arab men gathered regularly. They attended lessons given by a North African
immigrant with an Islamic past. At the time of the criminal investigation, he
belonged to a cooperation that operated from the Netherlands and suppor-
ted the international jihad. His students included fanatics from this coopera-
tion, but also notorious jihadis from Morocco and Iraq, various Arabs, and
individuals who were raised in the West. Dozens of actors obtained certifi-
cates using false names on the basis of which they could obtain materials to
facilitate terrorist actions. Later on, Moroccan and French investigation serv-
ices found a number of these certificates in the possession of people who
were probably planning attacks on targets associated with the West.
3.7 Interaction, formation of clusters, and collective radicalisation
3.7.1 The perspective of resemblance
As described above, jihadi cooperations in the Netherlands often consist of
heterogeneous groups of people with different backgrounds and profiles. Dif-
ferent binding mechanisms and different social foundations, however, result
in one case group having relatively many illegal foreigners active in it,
whereas another stands out because it has more young adults with Dutch
backgrounds. Such clusters have strongly influenced the perception held by
the outside world. They have often provided observers with enough argu-
ments to strongly emphasise the differences between the cooperations. As a
result of this, investigation services, public prosecutors, researchers, and
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journalists attribute different characteristics to different cooperations, which
in turn may result in various characterisations, stereotypes, and labels.48
Categorisation from such a perspective, however, does not do justice to our
finding that the different cooperations, considered in their entire social com-
positions, strongly resemble one another exactly because of their remarkable
human diversity, but particularly also in the way in which they function. In all
cooperations, social systems are formed by a similar complex interaction
between roughly two groups: on the one hand, guiding heartland-oriented
actors and, on the other hand, people in various degrees of receptivity: those
who can be characterised as heartland-oriented actors as well as converts
without Muslim backgrounds, second-generation Muslims, and other indi-
viduals who do not carry a dominant ideological frame of reference from the
Islamic world with them. This process of interaction seems to be an essential
characteristic of international Salafist jihadism in the Netherlands. All jihadi
cooperations studied by us showed a dominating orientation toward the
worldwide struggle in the name of Islam; they were active both locally and
internationally; they were part of a broader jihadi movement; and they
evolved as a result of roughly corresponding interactions within mixed net-
works.
3.7.2 Formation and consolidation
The mechanism of forming jihadi clusters deserves a detailed explanation.
The fact is that the interaction between guiding heartland-oriented actors
and receptive individuals that is conducive to the formation of clusters can-
not directly be attributed to actions of individual actors with predictable
offender profiles. There simply is not one profile of somebody who is involved
in terrorism, even though this may be an interesting and tempting idea for
investigation purposes (cf. Horgan, 2005; Bovenkerk, 2009). Models that
attempt to describe and explain the processes of radicalisation and formation
of clusters often take the individual as their starting point (Taylor & Horgan,
2006). Personal characteristics, background variables, and the degree to
which people are influenced by group pressure play a role in this context.
These models, however, disregard the complexity, dynamics, and unpredict-
ability of collective or individual radicalisation processes. That is why it is
only natural not to focus on individual actors, but on consistent interactions
among the actors. Our case files furthermore revealed that interactions
between guiding heartland-oriented actors and the people in their wake are
time and time again crucial to the formation of jihadi cooperations.
48 Researchers and authorities have already suggested different classification models (see, among others, Sage-
man, 2008). The AIVD (2006a) also classified networks by member profiles and identified the following three
types of jihadi networks on the basis of thorough historical analysis of network formation: (1) transnational
networks; (2) internationally-oriented local networks; and (3) local autonomous networks. We understand the
significance of such categorisations, but in this report we stress the similarities in the way in which these net-
works function.
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In the clusters studied, fundamentalist heartland-oriented actors usually
manifested or presented themselves as authoritative representatives of a
movement that had revived in the Islamic (Arab) world (see Chapter 2). When
these actors, with their clearly articulated ideology and relative credibility,
come into contact with individuals or groups of individuals who prove to be
receptive to their message or to other advantages these actors have to offer
for whatever reason, this may act as decisive stimuli for the processes of radi-
calisation. These processes may subsequently develop further within groups
that have already existed for however long. In this context, there is in fact a
form of self-selection. Those who are receptive – and remain receptive – to
guiding heartland-oriented actors or individuals associated with them – con-
tinue to radicalise collectively. Others choose to dissociate themselves. In
each case, it is a dynamic process. Those who consider their environment as
too radical at a specific moment, leave the group. Other individuals who
prove to be receptive – either to the jihadi ideology or to other advantages
offered by the actors – join the group. Our source material showed that
extremists from the cradle of traditional Islam could also play a stimulating
role at later stages of these developments: in some cases, because group
members actively sought teachers who could continue to educate them in
radical Islam, in other cases, because teachers continued to actively contact
them.
Illustrations on the basis of police data
To illustrate this mechanism, we will give several examples of how jihadi
clusters originate and function. One of the clusters studied, for instance,
changed from a non-committal and loose network of friends and vague
acquaintances into a closer jihadi cluster in a short period of time. This pro-
cess was stimulated by the catalytic presence of an extremist Salafist
preacher from the Middle East. From the moment of his arrival, several
actors proved to be receptive to his authority. Among these actors was a
Dutchman who was in search of his identity, social status or the meaning of
life after a difficult and traumatic youth. A second actor may have felt cultur-
ally uprooted as a Moroccan with a partially Dutch background. Some wit-
nesses assumed that he harboured a grudge against Dutch society after
unsuccessful undertakings and contact with the criminal justice system; oth-
ers thought that he was trying to straighten things out for himself after a life
of sin by exerting himself for his faith. For a third actor, it was the perception
of worldwide injustice to Muslims that had taken hold.49 To him, the group
was mainly the place where he could vent his political grievances; he possibly
also longed for self-expression and a heroic role in a grand story (see also De
Graaff, 2007). Number four mainly wanted to be released from loneliness –
that is at least what we concluded from his statements. And a fifth individual
was residing in the Netherlands as an illegal foreigner. By following and imi-
49 Relative group deprivation (Runciman, 1966).
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tating the preacher from the Middle East, this man was, among other things,
given accommodation among his admirers. Still other individuals had
already mastered the Islamic doctrine and, in the changed social context
after the attacks of 11 September 2001, had felt the urge to defend their faith
with tooth and nail.
In summary: the circumstances that contributed to these actors being recep-
tive to directional influences were numerous and seldom unrelated.50 Never-
theless, all receptive actors initially had something in common: that they
lacked the elements they needed to be able to give concrete and effective
substance to jihadism, namely leadership, a mobilised and accessible group,
ideological awareness, spiritual expertise, and connections. These were the
very elements that were finally provided by the authoritative heartland-ori-
ented actor in various degrees.
Receptive to the intolerant message of this charismatic man, this group of
potential actors was thus transformed into real actors. The extremist who was
an illegal resident, with many contacts in Islamic circles, gave courses and
lectures, organised meetings, contracted marriages, and incited the individu-
als concerned to take action in the name of the jihad and the intolerant takfir
doctrine. He consequently revealed himself as a guiding and inciting factor,
and brought receptive actors together, both physically and ideologically. His
actions strengthened their interrelationships and created informal and
dynamic cooperating structures within the group. Several of his pupils
acquired such a level of ideological stability and jihadi discipline that they
took over tasks from him or started to imitate him. Initiated in an ideology, in
the Salafist-jihadi movement, and in the art of indoctrination, they developed
various parallel and sometimes almost independent activities, adeptly using
their jihadi cluster that was ready for it. Not as solitary ‘self-igniting extrem-
ists’ (AIVD, 2006a; Bessems, 2005),51 but stimulated and given the opportu-
nity by the target-oriented campaign of an heartland-oriented actor, they
expanded this group and functioned as energetic guardians of the intolerant
group ideology. Actors furthermore established local and international con-
tacts, travelled to training camps or war zones, preached and uttered threats,
organised lectures and meetings, collected and distributed propaganda
material, and planned or committed violent acts. Whether or not explicit, the
group continued to be under the auspices of the guiding initiator from the
Middle East.
Although the Dutch jihadi groups that we studied were invariably influenced
by actors whose main frame of reference was the Islamic world with its radi-
cal stimuli, the actors who consolidated these clusters at a later stage were not
50 Individual developmental paths will be described in more detail in Chapter 5.
51 Our case files did not reveal any persons who, although inspired by Internet propaganda and virtual contacts,
proceeded to undertake jihadi activities in an entirely independent manner. Even though Internet experiences
evidently have a catalytic impact on individual radicalisation, in each case the real-life relationships and meet-
ings were decisive in this process of developing a practical interpretation of religious-extremist ideology. The
way we selected the cases may explain why ‘self- ignitors’ are absent in our case files.
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always extremist exiles and immigrants. They did, however, remarkably often
exert their influence in this context. Inspiring individuals who act like their
role models or even want to surpass them, may develop – with their fanati-
cism – into fanatical forces and key figures who promote the group cohesion.
Some converts and second-generation immigrants who were born in the
West even assumed characteristics of heartland-oriented actors in the pro-
cess, for instance, because they had drawn inspiration from and received
additional education and direction in foreign jihadi training camps; or
because they had established active international connections in North Afri-
can networks with international and violent Salafist ambitions.
Other clusters, however, continued – beyond their initial creation – to be
strongly dependant on the interaction between the guiding actors from the
fundamentalist diaspora and their mixed multitude of receptive followers.
Several heartland-oriented actors from our case files who originated from
countries in North Africa and the Middle East were, for instance, at the basis
of a cooperation that facilitated, recruited, and trained others for the purpose
of worldwide jihadi activities. Their lectures and courses were well received
by a group of vulnerable Muslim young people who were subsequently
assigned supporting – often criminal – roles, who could study the Salafist reli-
gious doctrine more closely, or who were allowed to prepare themselves
mentally and physically for the fight.52 Other actors in the cooperation, which
was composed of a considerable group of illegal foreigners and asylum seek-
ers, allowed themselves to be influenced and used partially or fully from posi-
tions of dependence. The jihadi ‘missionaries’ frequently provided potential
supporters with shelter, forged or look-alike documents, citizen service num-
bers, and work.53
In the formation and consolidation of jihadi clusters in or related to the Neth-
erlands, there is consequently no question of one-way traffic. It is true that
radical clergymen, emirs54 or jihad veterans, who pretend to come from the
cradle of Islam with a special vocation, are often actively searching for adher-
ents, but they are likewise sought and found by people with various needs.55
We have already explained that this mutual search – for followers or vice
versa for role models – result in dynamic processes of mobilisation as well as
self-selection.
In one of the cooperations analysed, several mobilising actors were so per-
suasive and possessed so much charisma that their supporters even drew
inspiration from relatively brief meetings, and remained receptive and loyal
52 The files do not provide any insight into the exact size and composition of this group. It is clear that it is a
mixed company of young people with different backgrounds and nationalities. The investigation services con-
cerned did not, however, focus on this group of followers.
53 The files also partially disregarded this group of followers that are residing illegally in the Netherlands.
54 Originally, the term emir is an Arabic noble title meaning ‘leader’ or ‘commander’. Nowadays, this title is also
borne by people who have a leadership role in less formal contexts.
55 In addition to primary needs – such as security and safety – social needs often play a role in this context,
including friendship, intimacy, respect, and appreciation. Although the hierarchy established in the different
necessities of life by the American psychologist Abraham Harold Maslow is controversial, his work provides
interesting descriptions of the motivations underlying human actions (Maslow, 1943).
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at a distance. The relevant cooperation flourished on long-lasting social con-
tacts among people who had known each other from the old days, or had met
each other in mosques. After a few actors had been taken in by important key
figures from the cross-border jihadi cooperation, this created some sort of
snowball effect in the network. Generally individuals with Western European
background as well as North African migrants and illegal foreigners proved to
be particularly receptive, for example to the rhetoric of an Algerian extremist
and the effective incitement of an extremist British spiritual leader. These
contacts managed to motivate a remarkably large number of people to break
with their past. As converts to Islam or as reborn Muslims, they put a stop to
their life in sin with drug problems, alcohol abuse, or lawlessness. As a result
of the social direction provided by this duo, and to a lesser extent by their fol-
lowers, the actors from the original cooperation established more and more
ties with other dominant and ultra-orthodox heartland-oriented actors. This
was also conducive to their interrelatedness. And, as they continued to com-
ply with the requests from international jihadi circles to provide facilities, the
cluster began – in a more systematic manner – to be of service to this move-
ment.
3.8 Organisation and allocation of tasks
3.8.1 Dependence-receptivity relationships
Our case files revealed that actors who performed jihadi activities on Dutch
soil and elsewhere were always part of fluid, dynamic, and informal coopera-
tions. In the absence of formal hierarchical relationships, these cooperations
principally function on the basis of ‘dependence-receptivity relationships’.
We are introducing this term to indicate that the social connections within
jihadi clusters are all but equal or horizontal without giving the impression
that we are dealing with strictly organised vertical relationships here. The rel-
ative character of the term furthermore indicates that it is not an established
fact in advance who is dependent and who is receptive, as this differs by rela-
tionship.
This requires an explanation on the basis of empirical observations. The
example of a jihadi who got a Moroccan male from the drugs circuit to do his
dirty work is, in our opinion, illustrative of a dependence-receptivity relation-
ship. This violent Algerian veteran had a major coordinating role within a
cooperation that – among other things – generated funds for the interna-
tional jihad. In that capacity, it is obvious that he strongly depended on use-
ful connections and manpower, and the Moroccan proved to fall into this
category. After an initial meeting, the war veteran encouraged him to do
more for his faith. He also sent him some propaganda material over the Inter-
net. Receptive to the status, the message, and the social dominance of the
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war veteran, the experienced drug criminal started to carry cocaine ship-
ments to different European countries. The proceeds of these shipments
were used for the holy war. The coordinating Algerian, in his turn, did not act
on his own initiative, for he proved to be receptive to the directional influ-
ence of the most important key figure within the facilitating cooperation: a
spiritual inspirator who was held in high regard as ‘sheik’. In this relation-
ship, the charismatic primus inter pares was, in his turn, dependent on the
commitment of the Algerian to be able to put his jihadi intentions into prac-
tice.
How such serially-linked social dependence-receptivity relationships can
compensate for the absence of formal hierarchical structures is evident from
the same network, though from another chain of connections. These connec-
tions originated from two actors who together initiated and coordinated vari-
ous recruitment activities: an Islamic scholar from Libia and a former muja-
hid from Iraq. Where the one actor derived his authority from his religious
knowledge and expertise, the other mainly inspired awe because of his physi-
cal qualities and his status as a veteran. For the implementation of their
recruitment plans, they relied on others, including the efforts of a loyal fol-
lower from Mauritania, who primarily functioned as a spiritual counsellor.
This man, for instance, took actors who had been prepared for the jihad
under his care and also frequently supplied prospective fighters himself. For
this, he was of course dependent on a continuous intake of receptive candi-
dates. But that was no problem to him, for as a counsellor who had connec-
tions in the Middle East – even though he had a less prominent position –
and a solid religious basis, he projected a certain authority to this target
group. He, for instance, convinced a young Egyptian man to offer his services
as a martyr and to travel abroad, possibly in the near future. During an intro-
ductory interview, the Egyptian had complained to him about the severe con-
ditions he was confronted with as an employee in the horticulture sector. The
Mauritanian responded to this by offering him work and accommodation.
When the boy subsequently actually moved in with him, he could not escape
being indoctrinated by the Mauritanian.
These are examples of how these dependence-receptivity relationships give
direction to the collective capacity of jihadi cooperations. Individuals who
need others to achieve something in such contexts rely on people who turn
out to be receptive to the requests and directions for different reasons. Like-
wise, they may be receptive themselves to the influences of other actors and
key figures in the Netherlands or abroad. With the ideological vanguard of
the internationally-oriented Salafist-jihadi movement in the Netherlands as
its driving force, the most zealous and authoritative actors are frequently
found at the functional bases of such informal chains. From here, they
branch off through complex social processes to the more peripheral or ‘grey’
zones of jihadi clusters, where, for instance, opportunistic criminals, vulnera-
ble young people, or naive acquaintances also do their bit.
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3.8.2 Dependence-receptivity relationships at the international level
Within the cooperations studied by us, which functioned on the basis of
dependence-receptivity relationships among actors as explained above, there
were no fixed relationships, but rather power structures which were continu-
ally subject to change. This raises the question as to whether there is any
jihadi cooperation in the Netherlands that may be considered an organised
or formal operational arm of Al Qaeda. It is clear that various key figures in
the clusters maintain dependence-receptivity relationships with the organi-
sations and individuals who originate from the current or earlier sphere of
influence of this core group (see also Section 3.5). The influence from this
quarter is meaningful, but certainly not hierarchic or rigid.
More generally, the readiness of the local clusters to help the international
movement of jihadis usually stems from receptivity or own initiative. Impor-
tant actors from the international jihadi scene appear to command respect by
their position in the network of social connections, their record of service,
and the contacts they maintain. In brief, they are held in high regard, and to
many local fanatics they are role models and trendsetters. Individuals who
have ambitions within the dynamic social pecking order of their own group
or of the broader jihadi movement are glad to associate with them, and read-
ily follow their instructions. A young Dutch man who visited a militant train-
ing camp in Pakistan received the non-committal request to make himself
useful by ‘collecting balloons’ in his homeland.56 During a chat conversation
later on, he showed respect and admiration for his principals:
‘Wallah I have never met people with a better aglaak57 than they have.
Their characters are simply perfect. They know exactly when they must be
friendly and gentle. And when to be tough and strict. They just have per-
fect appreciation of the situation.’
He furthermore indicated that roles that had been elevated artificially or offi-
cially established were not the major source of authority for the leaders in the
Pakistani camp.
‘[....] It even happened that when a man is pouring tea for others and is
serving the rest. That man turns out to be emir. But that he is still so sub-
servient. Really SubhaanAllah you will only come across this there; fur-
thermore they follow the sunnah58 precisely.’
56 The police suspect that the term ‘balloons’ here is code language for ‘bombs’, but the term may also refer to
‘people’ to be recruited.
57 ‘character’
58 The Sunnah refers to the ‘manner’ of the Prophet Muhammad, such as the traditions of his words and deeds
which have been recorded in the Hadith.
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3.8.3 Organisational interpretation
With the dependence-receptivity relationships shaping the allocations of
tasks and relationships at different levels of jihadi cooperations, we can theo-
retically typify the organisational structures of the clusters analysed as infor-
mal, fluid, diffuse, and highly decentralised. Incited or encouraged by others,
the individuals in these cooperations implemented a wide variety of tasks
with great freedom to improvise. They worked together in various social
groups; and they also frequently did this on an ad hoc basis. The degree to
which someone had authority depended on his relative position in relation to
the ideological vanguard in his own system of dependence-receptivity rela-
tionships. The difference between these cooperations and pyramidal hier-
archical organisations is that this system of dependence-receptivity relation-
ships allows several individuals to exercise considerable influence on the
doings and dealings of part of or the whole collective without necessarily
coordinating their actions among themselves. In addition, the different levels
of jihadi actions were rarely structurally separated from one another. A prom-
inent key figure planning a jihadi strategy might consequently also be closely
involved in the tactical or technical aspects of implementing this strategy.
3.8.4 Organisational nuances
Within the margins of this overall picture, it is obvious that one cooperation
may have slightly more or different organisational substance than another. It
seems as if the degree and way in which this is developed also depends on
the nature of the activities organised within these cooperations. Specific
activities simply require more coordination and a stricter allocation of tasks
than other activities. Because each cooperation usually organises numerous
activities, the roles and functions of the individuals change all the time. Fur-
thermore, groups in which relatively many older and experienced jihadis had
dominant positions seemed to be able to organise their activities in a more
orderly and consistent manner than groups with relatively many young adult
actors. Those actors operated in a more impatient, impulsive and capricious
manner because their seasoned role models were fewer in number or were
more likely to remain in the background. One suspect typified the young
majority of such a cluster as ‘chaotic, wrought up, and brainwashed’.
Although he, as a former member of the Syrian arm of the Muslim Brother-
hood, hardly saw any resemblance to organised Islamic groups, he would
certainly not suggest that its members proceeded in an uncontrolled manner:
‘[….] [One man] is above the group and nobody else. The rest are just fol-
lowers.’
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Special affiliations and practices also point to subtle organisational differen-
ces within the jihadi movement in the Netherlands. Irrespective of the infor-
mal atmosphere that prevailed in all groups, some clusters clearly had more
connections with foreign groups than others. While in one cooperation the
most prominent actors occasionally performed semi-solemn rituals and
assumed certain titles, the mores of other cooperations did not permit this.59
One specific cluster, for instance, stood out because various people referred
to two prominent Algerian figures by using the titles of ‘sjeik’ or ‘emir’. The
police data furthermore showed that this network demonstrated a marked
orientation towards the GSPC. At least one subject pledged allegiance to the
leader of this organisation on a sound recording. In spite of this, the group
presumably does not have a formal position in the organisation of the GSPC,
and it actually performs its activities within a considerably broader jihadi and
cross-border context.
3.9 Recapitulation
The jihadi cooperations, as they emerged from the rough investigation data
analysed, may be characterised on the basis of largely similar features. The
individuals who were the driving forces behind the cooperations were
inspired by a violence-oriented Salafist-jihadi ideology with worldwide pre-
tentions. They propagated this ideology and implemented it through a great
variety of activities. Despite differences in priority, they generally performed
activities both in the Netherlands and abroad.
Although there were also people involved in these cooperations who only
contributed to the operationalisation of this ideology indirectly, or with less
ideological enthusiasm, in this report we refer to all individuals who are
actively involved in these cooperations as jihadi ‘actors’. Without the oppor-
tunist or less deliberate participation of some individuals, the cooperations
would after all be functioning differently. Because people with criminal
records, converts, and sympathisers have become involved in jihadi coopera-
tions, and in addition the individuals are of very different backgrounds, these
groups have a mixed character. Such heterogeneity also applies to their social
and cultural characteristics. All cooperations studied include actors with dif-
ferent national and geographical roots. They speak different languages and
have different cultural backgrounds. In addition to this, we found that in all
cooperations, persons from different age categories interact with one
another, and in some groups both men and women are active. It is only with
respect to religion that the cooperations appear to be homogeneous: nearly
59 Ultra-orthodox Salafists, who want to implement the tawhid principle beyond all limits, consider it un-Islamic
to put secular figures on a pedestal.
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all actors base their religious convictions on the Sunni movement within
Islam.
The common religion is just one binding factor that explains why specific
people are attracted to jihadi cooperations. In particular, the ideology that
follows from this, and which is propagated by the vanguard, is an important
binding factor. The majority of actors, however, seem to be attracted mainly
by aspects of this ideology, such as the theme of worldwide injustice against
Muslims, rebellion against the existing social system, and/or rigid guidelines
for a pure existence. Some actors also join the jihadi cooperations primarily
because these groups include people who are capable of providing essential
daily necessities. Other binding factors are joint activities, role models and
social advantages. Individuals who give guidance or direction to actors also
have binding qualities as a result of this. They can secure social and ideologi-
cal stability and cohesion within jihadi clusters. The qualities that give these
persons a form of power and authority often include religious and ideological
expertise, life experience or experience in combat, and the fact that they have
the power to both reward and punish other people.
Several structural characteristics of jihadi cooperations ensure solid connec-
tions among the actors individually and the clusters of actors as a whole. The
presence of long-lasting social foundations (relations of trust), real and vir-
tual meeting places and key figures explain why these cooperations do not
only show solid internal cohesion, but also dynamic interrelated cohesion. As
a result of this, they – as clusters – are part of a broader international jihadi
movement.
The presence of individuals who carry an ideological or militant frame of ref-
erence based on experiences in the Islamic world is – or was – crucial to the
formation or consolidation of all jihadi clusters. These ‘heartland-oriented’
actors mobilise and/or attract people. In a Western context, they have a rela-
tively strong ability to sell a coherent jihadi story. Due to their specific quali-
ties, contacts and experiences – which are beneficial to their credibility and
social status – they relatively often serve as examples or role models to others.
Complex interactions between these persons on the one hand and receptive
persons on the other hand – in particular illegal foreigners, converts and
Muslims who grew up or were educated locally – give decisive impetus to
radicalisation processes.
Interactions of this kind make jihadi groups function in spite of the absence
of any formal hierarchical structures. Although one cooperation may have a
greater degree of organisational substance than the other, the relationships
are always informal, fluid and strongly decentralised, leaving the group mem-
bers with freedom to improvise when conducting various tasks. The coopera-
tions are never strictly organised in a vertical, hierarchical manner. We found
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serially linked social connections created by informal dependence-receptiv-
ity relationships. Actors who relied on the commitment and abilities of oth-
ers, gave direction to individuals who showed themselves to be receptive to
them. Such relationships have a relative nature, for guiding actors often
appeared to be receptive themselves to the direction of other actors at home




What activities do the jihadi cooperations actually perform in – or relating
to – Dutch society? As argued above, the mixed and informal jihadi clusters
consistently prove to be composed of a rich diversity of people. Their actors
operate in extremely various degrees of purposefulness and ideological
involvement. It is, therefore, only logical that our case files revealed more
than purely jihadi activities. All sorts of marginal phenomena and curiosities
reminded us of the diffuse social context of the cooperations. It is important
to pay attention to them here, all the more because these observations may
be useful for judicial purposes. In addition, they will provide a more balanced
picture of jihadism in the Netherlands.
This chapter will therefore describe five forms of activities. In Section 4.1, we
will first of all pay attention to actions which are related to the conversion,
education, and schooling of receptive people, and to the training and dis-
patch of willing jihadis. A second set of activities includes acts that are
directly related to threats, attacks, and the practical preparations involved
(Section 4.2). In the third place (Section 4.3), we will discuss all actions (sup-
porting activities) that facilitate the first two types of jihadi core activities. In
the fourth place (Section 4.4), we will give a description of all defensive and
protective activities by which jihadis interfere with the work of the investiga-
tion services. As argued above, however, not only their militant activities are
relevant to this report. To show how jihadi activities have been embedded in
everyday life, we will also outline the way in which the actors concerned
function in their living environment (Section 4.5).
4.1 Conversion, education, schooling, and training
4.1.1 Conversion
Every cooperation included, without exception, individuals with a remarka-
ble ability to convert others to a Salafist political variant of Islam. The most
authoritative heartland-oriented actors always proved to take the lead, but
their example was often followed by a number of inspired people. They per-
formed their activities jointly or simultaneously within their range of social
influence. They manipulated anyone who proved to be receptive, irrespective
of age, gender, socio-cultural background, and ideological beliefs. Broadly
interpreted, as a consequence of their acts non-Muslims started to profess
the politicised puritan Islamic faith and Muslims who no longer or hardly
ever practised their faith experienced a new spiritual stimulus towards that
direction (born-again Muslims). We consequently define the term ‘converts’
in this context as individuals who have consciously chosen to become funda-
mentalist Muslims at a certain moment in life.
Actors who successfully performed activities to convert others took advant-
age of the personal circumstances of individuals in their target group. They
struck the right chord with criminals, alcoholics, and drug addicts, among
others, by convincing them that all their sins would be forgiven by the con-
fession of the Islamic faith, the shahada. A suspect, who was of the opinion
that he was serving a just religious cause within a jihadi cooperation, stated
that he used to do the ‘wrong things’ in the past. He had stolen and vandal-
ised things, had used soft drugs, and had finally ended up at a correctional
boarding school. In the middle of his teens, he converted to Islam, for
‘[...] I would like to go to paradise and to get there Allah told me to do
something good.’
The experiences of a militant Tunisian in his thirties are typical of how jihadis
who convert others often tend to procede with their activities. A prominent
jihadi, who he first met in a mosque, won him over with charisma and verbal
power of persuasion. On several occasions, this inspiring heartland-oriented
actor familiarised him with the puritan prescriptions, as a result of which the
Tunisian – in his own words – swore off his addiction. The man had induced
him to turn the two call girls, with whom he lived together, out of the house,
and to put a stop to his sinful past. Convinced and swayed by the jihadi, he
made his house mainly available to people who came to talk about Islam with
him. His mentor, he generalised
‘[…] made sure that people followed him, particularly the inexperienced
persons in Islam, the individuals who had just been converted, and whom
he had managed to convince in the name of Islam by getting them out of
the problems they had, whether it concerned problems of addiction or
family problems.’
Under the veil of a new beginning, jihadis who convert others also manage to
get through to persons who experience crises for other reasons. They, for
instance, address specific young second-generation Moroccan men, who feel
uncomfortable and unwelcome both in the Netherlands and in their parents’
country. With a globalised Salafist story that crosses borders and cultures,
they stimulate the wish of these rootless ‘drifters’ to become part of some-
thing universal (Roy, 2004, 2005). At specific locations and in some districts
– especially where the problems of young people with non-Dutch back-
grounds, who are in search of their identities, are obvious – their message is
received in passing by individuals and within existing circles of friends and
acquaintances. Jihadis who actively incite people to accept the radical form
of Islam also succeed in inspiring non-Muslims of Dutch origin. These con-
verts sometimes seem to convert from a certain recalcitrance: as a dramatic
act by which they distinguish themselves from the mass (Benjamin, 2007). To
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several others, the shahada appears to be a way out in their search for struc-
ture, an ideal or a spiritual meaning in life. A teenage girl from a village in the
country, who had attended college for several years, for instance, decided
that she wanted to lead an Islamic life from then on. From that moment
onwards, she regularly travelled back and forth from her place of residence to
an ultra-Salafist mosque in the urban area of western Holland. She also took
a home course in Arabic. Through her contacts in and around the house of
worship, she developed sympathy for radical views. Finally, she was caught
up in a jihadi cluster. At the time, this young woman considered the violent
plans of her new sympathisers somewhat naively – according to her state-
ment – to be mainly non-serious ‘macho behaviour’. She discovered only
later that they were really serious.
Although most conversion activities take place in the everyday social sphere,
some actors – mostly followers of the more authoritative jihadis – also use the
Internet to lead others up the path of extremist Salafism. These efforts are
rarely structured, but usually improvised and changeable. They sometimes
send items, propaganda material, or links to jihadi websites to their online
contacts by e-mail. At least one individual involved tried to launch a website
containing information about Islamic religious doctrine. Several individuals
occasionally searched chat rooms, forums, and other online groups – with
varying success – to propagate radical Islam. A teenager who came into con-
tact with a jihadi on the Internet said the following:
‘I think I chatted with him for a few months in succession. It was not like
that every day. In the beginning, the chats mainly related to the basic ele-
ments of Islam. I was 15 years of age and I was in search for knowledge on
Islam. There were quite a number of things I did not know about and he
would often explain it to me […]. I cannot remember what was literally
chatted. I got the feeling that he was a boy who really thought about the
things he said […].’
One place used by jihadis to propagate Islam is particularly noticeable: the
penal institutions. Inspired jihadis who have been imprisoned or remanded
in custody by the State are sometimes actively looking for people who are
receptive to a religious message during their stay in their temporary accom-
modation: for example, the message of rehabilitation as a result of religious
devotion. A reliable source, for instance, stated the following about a charis-
matic key figure from a jihadi cluster who managed to create an untenable
situation in a remand centre within two weeks:
‘He had converted half the corridor of cells. Later on, he was transferred
and it happened again.’
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An investigation file stated the following about a detained extremist from
another cooperation:
‘The young Muslims hang on his lips. During Friday prayer, he stood on a
box and his feet were kissed by his fellow detainees.’
Our data does not provide sufficient clarity about the scale and degree to
which sentenced jihadis in the Netherlands attempt to convert fellow detain-
ees to a puritan doctrine. It is, however, clear that such practices did occur
within our borders during the research period. Internationally, our country is
no exception. The special circumstances in detention centres have unavoida-
bly created new needs among detainees. In this way, extremists are able to
persuade fellow detainees to convert to Islam, to provide them with a frame-
work to make a new start in life and/or to give them a sense of safety within a
religious community (Precht, 2007; Spalek & El-Hassan, 2007).60
4.1.2 Education and schooling
Following from – and sometimes closely related to – conversion activities,
various jihadis attempted to ‘sell’ a politicised and militant variant of Islam.61
For this purpose, they manipulated the Islamic religious principles of others.
Reasoning from the convictions of their contact persons, they preached views
and actions which corresponded with the doctrines of international Salafist
jihadism. In a process of interaction, they sought and found an audience
among receptive people (process of mobilisation), but they were also sought
and found by interested people with activist ambitions. In the latter case, this
is a matter of self-selection. More so than other activities, education and
schooling took place systematically and on a broad scale within all coopera-
tions from our case files.
Initiatives that served to instruct groups of people in Salafist-jihadi dogmas
nearly always originated from the ideological vanguard of jihadi clusters.
Authoritative actors – and some of their loyalists – organised lectures, guest
lectures, prayers, or other meetings for guests aimed at education. In general,
this was done consistently, but also in an informal and moderately structured
to unstructured way. On the one hand, this means that such sessions were
held with some regularity at safe locations in the Netherlands and at specific
points in time. Jihadi education and schooling were often given at the homes
of the persons involved, in backrooms of call shops and Internet cafes, in
other private places, and/or at pre-announced or opportune moments, such
60 Since February 2006, prisoners with terrorist backgrounds have been imprisoned in a limited number of insti-
tutions in the Netherlands to counter recruitment and radicalisation in prisons.
61 It should be noted that the distinction between conversion on the one hand and education and schooling on
the other hand is analytical in this argument. In practice, actors often succeed in converting unbelievers to an
extremist variant of Islam in one go. As a result of this, conversion activities sometimes coincide with the pro-
cess of education and schooling.
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as at the end of prayer services in Salafist mosques. On the other hand, such
meetings were usually characterised by a brotherly atmosphere and erratic
dynamics. Witness testimonies revealed that theological discussion evenings
could end in long torrents of abuse aimed at the West and Israel – ‘the zionist
entity’ – without any reason, and that fundamentalist teachers sometimes
spontaneously left the initiative to others to let these enthusiastic and incited
listeners carry out their subversive activities.
Within this broad context, the activities aimed at education differed per
jihadi cluster with respect to their setup and intensity. For a cooperation that
facilitated the international jihad by motivating young people and dispatch-
ing them to conflict zones, the educational sessions were, for instance, also
an essential part of a kind of recruitment process. The clergymen and teach-
ers from this cluster therefore also explicitly took both functional and social
aspects into consideration when deciding which individuals to admit, invite,
or recruit for the jihad. This assumption is substantiated by evidence, such as
the following fragment that was found on a note by the police during a search
of premises:
‘It is a boy of about 20 years old, 1.75 tall. He hangs out with young people
who were born here in the Netherlands. I have seen this for myself. He
says his prayers in the Islamic centre. He is not a firm believer. I learned
from my own inquiries that he works and that [he] has a small car. His
presence in the Mosque depends on the length of his stay in [place]. I was
told that his parents live in this country. He dresses in an ordinary fash-
ion. He is said to have a simple personality.’
The theological meetings within this jihadi cluster that stir up hatred must
have had a special awe-inspiring dimension for these young individuals.
Their seasoned mentors used statements from influential clergymen from
Saudi Arabia to legitimise the jihad. And these mentors were consistently
addressed as ‘sheik’ or ‘imam’. It is true that this occurred in a jovial and
socialising atmosphere, but this is how distinct power relationships devel-
oped (for more information on this subject, see also Section 3.5). Guiding
actors furthermore gave names to sanctuaries as well as teaching locations
and other locations that appeal to the imagination, such as the ‘House of
Safety and Stability’. Young people who were particularly loyal, skilled, and
motivated were given the privilege of visiting these places. This is where they
could demonstrate their knowledge by reciting a number of verses from the
Qur’an. Some of them also made sound recordings of statements to the effect
that they would support the holy war.
Within most cooperations, education and schooling activities were less goal-
oriented, but they were held frequently and with more spontaneity; they
mainly consolidated social cohesion and the extremist group ideology. On
account of their ambiguous nature, these types of sessions may be typified as
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‘living-room meetings’: when actors of different ages and origins meet in an
amicable setting, sometimes to listen to the sermons and lectures of an
authoritative heartland-oriented actor; other times to participate in a group
discussion in which their most enthusiastic and literate followers dominate
the conversation. The contents and course of the debates were often not only
determined by religious writings and sources, but also by audio-visual contri-
butions. Sometimes they played ‘cassette sermons’ by clergymen from
abroad. More than once, participants showed videos that could heat things
up and arouse a longing for retaliation;, for example, as a result of fragments
that provided a ghastly illustration of Muslim suffering caused by actions of
the West and Israel. Other images, on the contrary, glorified the extreme acts
of violence committed by jihadi brothers all over the world. During or after
these activities, group members read from the Qur’an or assisted each other
in learning the Arabic language. A witness who had been in the company of
jihadis several times sketched a picture that seems to be typical of the normal
procedure at such meetings:
‘Usually, there were about four or five men. All of them were Moroccans
and they often spoke Arabic or Berber. […] There were also older men.
There was also a learned man of about forty years of age who was suppos-
edly teaching. Everyone listened to him, but I did not believe the man.
[…] There, at [X’s] house, they also showed us ghastly pictures on a lap-
top. Of people who were slaughtered in the Middle East or something like
that, or of a Russian soldier whose throat is being cut. They used to say
“look what is happening to your brothers”. I think those other boys even
enjoyed it. [Actor X] also enjoyed it. He also used words such as “fucking
bastards who…”. A good Muslim should not say these things.’
Although meetings may be of the greatest ‘educational’ importance within all
groups, learning processes at a more individual level are also effective. The
investigation services, however, did not notice many of these activities. It is at
least clear that guiding actors regularly have private meetings with their most
loyal followers to talk to them, teach them, and instruct them. In addition,
many individuals approach each other about their doings and dealings in a
moralistic way. In everday social interactions, self-proclaimed and estab-
lished jihadis continue to try to convince others of their points of view,
among other things by confronting them with propaganda pictures and
newspaper cuttings. In this context, actors continue to judge each other criti-
cally.
These kinds of ‘educational’ practices also occur on the Internet. Especially
younger actors appear to consider this medium an easy tool to explain the
basic principles of the jihadi doctrine (NCTb, 2006a). They either respond to
questions asked by interested persons at forums and in chat rooms, or they
debate with real-life acquaintances from their cluster in MSN groups. They
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often literally teach people a lesson during these interactions. A jihadi gave
the following answer to the question of a chat partner about what the differ-
ence was between ‘them’ – ordinary Salafists – and ‘us’ – jihadis:
‘They call us khawarijj62 because we are engaged in the destructive Islam
that harms people and as a result of this we cause chaos and corruption
and we are khawarijj who must be beheaded. As a result of this, the king
[in Saudi Arabia] has rounded up and beheaded many mujaheddin, sin-
cere ulama.63 They even issued fatwas that philistia must be given to the
jews. And that Americans are permitted to come to jazeerat al Arab.64
Everything to the satisfaction of the king. They declared that sheich
osama [Osama Bin Laden] was khawarijj, and that saddam [Saddam Hus-
sein] was Muslim.65’
Finally, various actors sometimes also received all or part of their radical
and/or jihadi education and schooling outside the Netherlands. For this pur-
pose, they could turn to key figures and geographical junctions within the
broader transnational network of the international Salafist jihad. A number of
individuals, for instance, were influenced in Great Britain during the lessons
of – and personal consultations with – extremist Muslim clergymen who,
according to the local authorities, maintained ties with Al Qaeda. A few peo-
ple attended services and meetings in notorious mosques abroad. A suspect
stated how he committed himself to the holy war in a British house of wor-
ship. He was shown various videos and he listened to heroic stories about
fighters in Georgia and Afghanistan. Militant visitors challenged him to join
the jihad, among other things, by being asked the provoking question of
whether he was ‘a boy or a girl’.
In by far the majority of the education-oriented activities, teaching and prop-
aganda materials are essential. First of all, jihadis are very selective in choos-
ing verses and passages from the Qur’an and the Hadith. As described above,
they also ensure that their contact persons come into contact with different
media. They are often persuasive and have the ability to politicise. Being
aware of this strength, many fanatic and guiding actors build their own col-
lections (whether digital or physical) of videos, images, audio fragments and/
or writings. They also distribute this material actively. An Algerian key figure
within a specific cooperation even maintained an enormous information
library with hundreds of cassette tapes, videos, and writings, including com-
muniqués and press releases of foreign jihadi organisations. He collected
62 The Khawarij (Kharidjites) manifested themselves as a rebellious sect during the rule of the last of the first four
rightful caliphs. Muslims usually associate them with renegades and criminals. As a result of this, their name
has a strongly negative connotation.
63 ‘religious leaders’
64 ‘the Arabian Peninsula’
65 Jihadis consider secular heads of state and dictators, such as the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, as
renegades.
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some cassette tapes for what he referred to as the ‘The Right Path Channel’.
Notices such as ‘please return’ or ‘only for inspection’ indicated that he also
made these media available to others. This is not unique in the Netherlands.
A Moroccan in another jihadi cooperation who taught and indoctrinated oth-
ers by means of Arabic writings, had personally collected, translated and
reviewed many of these texts. His digital documents, which at the very least
appeared to justify violence and homicide, found their way to dozens of inter-
ested people and sympathisers through Internet forums and other online
media.
A few fundamentalist imams and ultra-Salafist and Salafist mosques also
contributed to jihadi learning processes, whether consciously or uncon-
sciously. This occurred more often in the ‘grey’ periphery of the jihadi coop-
erations analysed. Although the relevant clergymen and institutions usually
kept their distance from jihadi groups, and rarely explicitly propagated vio-
lence, radicalising actors sometimes appeared to interpret their radical
dawa66 as an incitement to this effect. One suspect explained that the imams
of a notoriously puritan house of worship manage to create an emotional dis-
tance between young people and their environment. According to him, they
‘moulded’ the minds of their audience to prepare them for the jihad:
‘They got special imams from Saudi Arabia to the Netherlands to preach
about Islam and the corrupt influences of Western society.’
‘The imams kept saying God will punish heathens [non-Muslims] to
which the mosque-goers said in unison ‘amen’.’
Conversely, subjects who had long passed the stage of peaceful Islamic acti-
vism often took the initiative to seek recognition in the few mosques – and
with the few imams – that met their extremist views. This also shows that rad-
icalisation is a two-way process between being mobilised and self-selection.
People rarely just slip – completely defenceless against external influences –
into radical behaviour. They always have the freedom – to a greater or lesser
degree – to choose, and to assume moral responsibility. Various witnesses
that were heard by the police had, at a certain moment, chosen not to be
involved any longer with intolerant political Salafists or jihadis.67 Since then,
they have avoided specific Islamic centres, ignored specific individuals, or
– like the witness who made the following statement – no longer accepted
66 The report The radical dawa in transition: The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands (AIVD, 2007)
describes the non-violent variant of radical Islam in the Netherlands. In spite of this, the AIVD stated that
intolerant, isolationist and radical voices from this movement constitute a source of inspiration for radicalisa-
tion processes that actually end in violent behavior.
67 Individual withdrawal and processes of deradicalisation were examined in more detail, among other things, on
the basis of fieldwork (interviews), in the report: Teruggang en uittreding: processen van deradicalisering
ontleed (Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie, 2008).
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invitations for living-room meetings where guiding heartland-oriented actors
gave their sermons:
‘It was especially his manner of speech; I saw the devil in him. […]He tried
to stir up hatred and he also said that if you sacrificed yourself, you would
immediately go to heaven. By sacrificing, he meant that you had to elimi-
nate the enemy and that you had to give your own life in the act […]. That
evening, they tried to sow hatred against the Western world, just like this
is done in the […] Mosque. I did not think that the sermons by that
teacher affected us in any way.’
4.1.3 Preparing, training, and dispatching fighters
In the majority of the groups studied, there were people who had the ambi-
tion to actually participate in the violent jihad on the world stage but did not
always succeed in realising these ambitions. In a few clusters, the actors
joined forces effectively and purposively to ensure that candidates who par-
ticipated in the holy war were well prepared. In other clusters, however, jiha-
dis seemed to consider this aspect more as an interesting sideline and a pro-
cess of ‘trial and error’. Some individuals, in practice, operated mainly on an
individual basis.
Especially within those cooperations that are clearly oriented towards facili-
tating the international jihad, the training, preparation and dispatch for the
fight abroad usually took place systematically, and in a concrete manner. In
one specific cluster, young people and young adults were, for instance, given
the opportunity – parallel to their attendence at radical-ideological lessons
and meetings – to record wills and testaments and jihadi declarations of
intent on audio tapes. They did this under the supervision of clergymen or
teachers. Because their intentions had been recorded, it would be less easy to
back out at a later stage. In addition, a physically trained jihad veteran took
some young people to sports camps several times. During these events, in
addition to training activities, such as canoeing and tossing logs, he also
organised collective prayer sessions which were clearly dominated by the
theme of violent jihad. According to a police source, the key figures of this
cooperation were on the point of dispatching a number of people to a con-
flict zone. At the time of their arrest, these guiding heartland-oriented actors
were furthermore known to have supervised the trip of an Algerian to Iran at
an earlier date. Although his mission failed in that country for unknown rea-
sons, the boy concerned had explicitly declared in a will and testament
– which was held by one of his mentors in the Netherlands – that he was
going to Afghanistan for the jihad (probably via Iran). The investigation serv-
ices furthermore found farewell letters, in which he had written that he had
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given himself up into God’s hands and that he had decided to fulfil his duty
to the jihad in Afghanistan.
Now and then, supposedly preparatory acts of would-be fighters assume
remarkable forms. Alarmed by the zeal of some actors within the cluster
described above to support the international jihad, the police ran into a Tuni-
sian course leader. The man, with an Islamic activist background, was giving
lessons in particular skills to several members of the jihadi cluster, including
two experienced fighters of Iraqi nationality. In the home of one of them, a
coordinating key figure who in his turn had close ties with the militant clergy-
men who gave direction to the cooperation, the police found photos and neg-
atives of even more course members.
Investigation by the KLPD revealed that the Tunisian course leader had
trained more than a hundred men, mainly of Arabic origin, over a period of
five years. The police suspected that he trained people under the supervision
of the Iraqi actor, so that they could subsequently participate in terrorist
activities somewhere in the world. The most influential player (a ‘sheik’)
within the jihadi cluster was in the company of another course member when
he was apprehended. In addition, he was found to have the personal details
of a man who had been sentenced abroad for plotting attacks against Ameri-
can and British military targets.
Trips to prominent jihadi key figures or junctions in Pakistan or Afghanistan
to receive ideological as well as practical instructions are highly thought of in
jihadi circles. Only a few actors from our case files, however, managed to
accomplish such an undertaking. Due to the complicated geographical,
socio-cultural, and political circumstances in these countries, the Dutch
investigation services do not have much detailed information about these
kinds of trips.
A number of individuals, who mainly fulfilled important roles in coopera-
tions in other European countries, had presumably received training in the
Afghan or Pakistani free ports for Al Qaeda’s core group or its affiliated
groups even before the attacks of 11 September 2001. One of them, for
instance, had allegedly taken lessons in explosives and weapons there. Some-
body else had allegedly volunteered to commit an attack in Europe. They also
stated to have met with and to have received concrete instructions from the
then Al Qaeda leaders, but the truthfulness of these statements is doubted.
Through connections in the international Salafist-jihadi network, a few
young adults who had been raised in the Netherlands had also managed to
reach the terrorist free ports in Pakistan. They did not stay there for longer
than a few weeks and often returned full of cock and bull stories and a good
dose of inspiration. Various data points out that they were told, during a
short crash course, how they could make themselves useful for the jihad from
within the Netherlands. When these actors attempted to convince others
after their return to also go to such training camps, the more shadowy details
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about the nature and the organisation of these trips surfaced. An interested
person, who had come into contact with an already trained jihadi, testified as
follows:
‘At some point, he started talking about doing practical things for the
jihad. I mean that he started to talk about training camps. He chatted that
he had been to a training camp in Pakistan three times. Two of these
times he had been caught [by the authorities], and once he had been in
training for three weeks. He said that the last time he had been caught, he
had received a warning. […] I remember that he once said that society did
not only need fighters, but also people who could build bridges and make
weapons. That is why he wanted me to take a technical course […].’
‘He also told me how I could go to a training camp. I would need 1,000
Euros in pocket money, which I would have to arrange myself. I was to go
to Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and they would hand over a ticket and so
on to me. He was talking about ‘they’, in plural. As soon as I was on the
plane, they would inform my parents by letter. I once asked him which
language they spoke there. According to [actor], there were also Dutch
boys there and they also spoke English there. He never mentioned any
place names, only that you would go to Pakistan to a training camp for six
months.’
The statement of this recruiting jihadi, that pocket money would suffice for
candidates undertaking a trip to a Pakistani training camp, and that airline
tickets and family businesses would be arranged by a third party, confirms
the idea that he, together with an accomplice, formed a bridge to other facili-
tating clusters in the international jihadi cooperation.
Nevertheless, jihad travellers by no means always have helpful international
connections and financial or logistic sources at their disposal. This was
clearly shown in data from our case files, describing how actors had suddenly
decided, at a young age, to visit their militant brothers in faith in hotbeds of
conflict. Because their hazardous undertakings ended in failure or in a per-
sonal anticlimax, it is tempting to state that these examples concern ill-con-
sidered and individualist actions. Before embarking on these expeditions,
they had allowed themselves to be encouraged by social interactions in cir-
cles of sympathisers and by the influence of guiding heartland-oriented
actors. They also often already have a firm ideological basis on which they
substantiate their decisions.
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4.2 Attacks and threats
In the ideological centres of jihadi networks, the sentiment prevails that the
pure ultra-Salafist Islam is being subjected to great pressure all over the
world, and that violence is a legitimate tool to defend it and to propagate it.
In practice, the majority of activists still limit themselves to ‘big talk’ moral
support, or more indirect facilitating acts. Only a few actors are prepared to
run major risks by actually and directly plotting and committing acts of vio-
lence or terrorism. The majority of persons concerned also showed remarka-
ble restraint when it came to making threats. This does not alter the fact that
these types of activities do indeed take place on a regular basis. In addition,
they may have a seriously disruptive effect on societies as well as individuals
who have fallen victim to them.
4.2.1 Attacks
The jihadis from our case files, who stated that they were willing to carry out
or prepare attacks against Western targets, appeared not to make a funda-
mental distinction between domestic and foreign targets. Reasoning from
their universalist ideology, their enemies could be anywhere in the world.
Their choice for a specific target is mainly made on an opportunistic basis.
Various factors and considerations play a role in these choices, such as per-
sonal motives, preferences of other people (whether influential or not), trig-
ger events, time, geographical proximity, available means and connections,
chance of success, and – in particular – symbolism. Due to the changeable
nature of these factors as well as the informal nature of jihadi cooperations,
terrorist projects often proceed with much improvisation and last-minute
decision-making.
In this context, terrorist activities are shaped and given substance from a
unique point of departure. For instance, two actors, an Algerian and a man of
Tunisian origin, focused on American targets in several West European coun-
tries. Here, so-called ‘high-profile targets’ were concerned: mediagenic diplo-
matic and military targets of great symbolic value. In making these choices,
the actors were presumably guided to a great extent by recent experiences in
Afghan and Pakistani training camps of Al Qaeda or its associated organisa-
tions. Investigation services, however, have so far been unable to establish
whether they operated on the basis of concrete instructions. Instead, it seems
as if they had been inspired in the jihadi free ports to independently imple-
ment an overall strategic body of thought with the knowledge and terrorist
skills they had acquired. In order to provide themselves with support, they
mobilised a number of individuals in their already existing extremist clusters
and cooperations, including ideologists and facilitators from the interna-
tional jihadi network, and individuals who were residing in the Netherlands.
Especially the Algerian, who had acquired a major binding and coordinating
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function in this cluster as a charismatic preacher over the course of years,
exercised his influence.
According to witness testimonies and his own confession, the Tunisian
immigrant wanted to execute the final attack, or suicide attack. He was
remarkably eager and had prepared for this in a neighbouring country of the
Netherlands. While observing possible targets together with another radical
man (a restaurant owner), he also searched for dealers or wholesalers who
could supply him with explosives. In the restaurant – which also served as a
meeting place for jihadis from the broader network of cooperations – the
police later found approximately a hundred kilogrammes of components and
the chemical formula for an explosive.68 While searching the residence of the
would-be attacker, police officers also came across a firearm, a forged Dutch
driving licence, and a forged Pakistani visa. Because this Tunisian had asked
two fundamentalists in the Netherlands whether they could provide him with
accommodation and fake diplomatic passports, the police suspected that he
was considering carrying out an attack on an embassy (possibly an American
embassy).
Actors in other clusters also plotted or committed terrorist acts of violence
with an international jihadi purpose, sometimes with more opportunism and
inconsistency. Police forces abroad, for instance, apprehended three men
from the Netherlands who possibly wanted to carry out an attack during an
event that could count on substantial worldwide interest and media cover-
age. One of them seemed to have been keen on seizing every opportunity to
make statements about terrorism aimed at unbelievers and renegades. He
was apprehended again in the Netherlands one year later in possession of a
firearm. This time, there was strong evidence that he, together with several
accomplices, had set his sights on prominent public figures who had criti-
cised Islam. The relentlessness with which he plotted terrorist actions and, in
particular, incited other members of his jihadi network, including several
women, was evident – among other things – from a salient testimony.
According to a girl to whom he had been married, he suggested on their wed-
ding night that she blow herself up in a truck in a shopping centre.
To jihadi terrorists with international ambitions and connections it some-
times simply appeared to be more attractive or easier to put their violence-
glorifying body of thought in practice, particularly at the national level. This
applied, for instance, to several individuals from the same cluster. All of them
were under the substantial influence of a guiding heartland-oriented actor.
They visited training camps abroad, proved to be receptive to instructions
from key figures in the broader transnational jihadi network, or made jihad
trips. As self-declared representatives of the ‘Islamic jihad’ in the Nether-
lands, however, these relatively young extremist considered it also their duty
68 A detail that illustrates the social context of this cooperation well is that these chemicals were bought from a
pharmacist of Turkish origin. Later on, this supplier channelled a letter from the proprietor who had in the
meantime been detained. In this letter, he asked a relative to dispose of two incriminating jerry cans.
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to deal with local – but sometimes internationally known – critics of Islam
(people who also frequently showed up in their own places of residence) in a
violent and symbolic way. When one of them had actually carried out an
attack, the others went on to look for the home addresses of new potential
victims. A few of them presumably also plotted attacks against government
buildings or sensitive installations in the Netherlands. The fact that they also
focused on authorities, such as the intelligence and security services, may
ensue from feelings of revenge stemming from previous confrontations with
the judicial authorities and the AIVD (see for interactions between states and
rebellious non-state entities, Della Porta, 1995). Various individuals further-
more seem to derive status from their terrorist activities. One actor, for
instance, boasted as follows during a chat session:
‘[…] I have been busy lately. Plotting an assassination attempt here, carry-
ing out an attack there, enough to drive you mad […].’
It may be true that actors who intended to carry out attacks in the Nether-
lands regularly acted in a disorderly and opportunistic manner, but they were
by no means unprepared. The police frequently discovered that suspects had
collected addresses, maps, and other information of possible targets. They
also observed people and objects. The police furthermore sometimes found
terrorist manuals, ingredients, chemical formulae, and components for
explosives during searches of premises. Testimonies and evidence suggest
that jihadis are active in their social environment and – now and then –
openly ask about weapons and explosives. Although these materials are often
expensive, some of them tell their potential suppliers that they have connec-
tions who may be able to provide the required funds. In addition, would-be
attackers more than once were in possession of firearms or explosives and
accessories such as munition, silencers, and protective vests. As a result of
this, police arrest teams have occasionally been confronted with life-threat-
ening situations.
4.2.2 Threats
It may be because the jihadi groups studied were always formed around peo-
ple who acutally had terrorist intentions that most actors were careful
enough not to issue threats in the public domain. This occurred only sporadi-
cally in our case files, such as in the case of a young Moroccan who posted
intimidating letters to critics of Islam on a public online youth forum. But in
general, actors mainly used threatening language among themselves (incite-
ment); usually in closed circles, or on entirely or partly protected Internet
forums. In a number of cases, the intelligence and/or investigation services
were able to trace or intercept these conversations by tapping telephone or
Internet communication. In this way, for instance, the police were able to
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reconstruct how an extremist young man, who had been active on a MSN
group with other connections from a jihadi cluster, was able to pass on the
home address of a prominent Dutchman and describe how he had observed
this premises. Several days later, he posted a message, in which threatened
the ‘renegade’ with death. The fact that jihadis also utter such threats pri-
vately was evident from various tapped conversations. The police, for
instance, possess a fragment of a conversation between two extremists in
their home. In this conversation, they praised a recent assassination attempt
and swore that they would also take similar actions against critics of Islam.
However, our case files also contained examples of individuals uttering
threats that addressed the alleged enemies directly. They tended to do this by
e-mail and/or on homemade films that were apparently intended to inspire
additional fear in the recipient.
4.2.3 Intolerance and threats
Now we get to the crux of the matter: the jihadi cooperations studied strive to
create an atmosphere of threat both inwards and outwards. The theme of
intolerance against dissenters, strengthened by the ideological legitimisation
of and individual preparedness to commit acts of violence, is a thread that
links all activities that have so far passed in review. The mere fact that this
intolerance might result in major, unpredictable, and seemingly random
attacks causes citizens, businesses, and authorities to view the jihadi move-
ment as dangerous (AIVD, 2006a, p. 53 et seq.). The disruptive and polarising
effect of this perception of society is often greater than the immediate actual
injury and material damage caused by those actors (AIVD, 2009).
Likewise, the systematically intolerant activities of religious extremists have
serious repercussions on the ambience within their networks. Various sus-
pects and subjects exhibited a combination of admiration for and fear of con-
tact persons who effectively preached hatred and violence, who impressed
others by their aggressive language and actions, who were constantly busy
with weapons, or who made it otherwise clear that they would not tolerate
ideological disloyalty.
Our data showed that internal differences of opinion and conflicts could also
result in actual threatening and dangerous situations. This particularly
applied to people who were branded as traitors, for instance, because they
had embezzled ‘community’ money, or because they had given incriminating
evidence. These actors were confronted with fatwas, warning letters and tele-
phone calls, or intimidating confrontations. But also people who had joined
jihadi groups partly from naivety or opportunism, and who later reconsid-
ered their positions, considered their extremist environment to be threaten-
ing. They knew better than anybody else how easily group members could
downgrade them to ‘renegades’, with all possible associated consequences.
Finally, zealous actors sometimes used threats as a means of coercion or
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weapon against people who operated more in the ‘grey zones’ of jihadi clus-
ters. One example involves an extremist who put several old acquaintances
under pressure to help him. According to a statement made by a witness, he
said:
‘Muslims help each other, if you refuse, you will be punished. With your
hands tied behind your back, you will get a bullet through your head.’
4.3 Supporting activities
In order to ensure the continuity of their own jihadi core activities as well as
to facilitate those of their brothers elswhere, jihadis perform all sorts of sup-
porting activities and services. Our empirical data revealed that they not only
rely on the abilities of sympathisers for this purpose, but also on the abilities
of less convinced actors in their broader networks (see more on this subject
in Mascini & Verhoeven, 2005). Nearly all subjects in the investigation files
analysed by us were Muslims and converts. Their supporting activities were
usually of a criminal nature.
4.3.1 Document forgery and fraud
Individuals who produced, bought or traded in forged documents, or people
who mediated in these activities, were found to be extremely active within
jihadi clusters in and related to the Netherlands. Their efforts often had a
multi-functional character. First of all, they provided themselves and jihadis
who had stayed here as illegal foreigners with forged or look-alike passports,
identity cards, public transport cards, visas, driving licences, and/or citizen
service numbers – sometimes for payment. As a result of this, militant cus-
tomers had more freedom of movement in our country and could get a job or
access to facilities in this way. By providing such documents, these ‘facilita-
tors’ enabled other extremists to make international trips, whether or not for
the purpose of jihad, or even to carry out attacks. Actors who responded to a
broader demand from the circle of illegal foreigners by providing these serv-
ices also generated funds for themselves, for the group, or for national or
international jihadism. The jihadis occasionally used ordinary criminal forg-
ers who were in it for the money.
Activities related to forged documents clearly show to what extent the ‘Dutch’
cooperations have been interwoven with the international jihadi network.
Extremists, for instance, supplied forged documents to a North African man
who coordinated the trip of two foreign fighters who later killed a Western
ally in Afghanistan. And an important jihadi who was also a forger in a cluster
that was active in the Netherlands, later worked together with jihadis who
were preparing a bomb attack elswhere in Europe. In another case, a key fig-
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ure from GICM, while in Southern Europe, asked a number of extremists in
the Netherlands whether they could arrange a ‘notebook’ (presumably a
passport) for him. Other facilitators in the Netherlands supplied, among
other things, forged documents to people who went to Afghanistan, and one
forged driving licence to a Spanish terrorist suspect. A would-be suicide
bomber also asked them to supply very specific forgeries, possibly to gain
access to his foreign target. Among the various examples, the strong interna-
tional dimension is finally demonstrated by the apprehension of an Algerian.
When the police stopped him at the border, they found him in the possesson
of some sixty forged documents, and this after he had driven to mosques
throughout Europe in a short period of time, including mosques in Hamburg
and Milan.69
Jihadi actors often use stolen documents, which they subsequently adapt or
forge. They sometimes steal these documents themselves, but these docu-
ments come into their possession more often through receivers of stolen
property. During searches of premises, the investigation services also found
– more than once – passports that were part of the loot from large-scale bur-
glaries at government agencies in neighbouring countries. Some actors fur-
thermore had ‘mobile forging studios’ or equipment with which they could
produce relatively high-quality forgeries. Other accessories confiscated by
the police included stamps, municipality stamps, needles, markers, folding
and cropping equipment for photo processing, and press moulds. However,
jihadi forgery practices were sometimes also a matter of trial and error – or
simply amateurish. This was shown, among other things, by a forged letter
from the Tax Administration with various grammatical mistakes, or when an
Algerian fundamentalist complained that a passport had been damaged
irreparably when it was altered. Finally, experience has shown that jihadis
also use authentic look-alike passports (from other people), for instance, to
be able to leave the country quickly.
4.3.2 House burglary and theft
Partly for jihadi purposes and partly to support themselves, extremists occa-
sionally steal money and property. A number of actors from one cooperation,
for instance, systematically committed burglaries in the Netherlands as well
as in bordering countries. In order to support their fraudulent and forgery-
related activities, they not only stole passports and payment cards from the
houses of the legitimate owners, but also laptops and less valuable items.
They usually commited these crimes in groups of about three people, and
they always gave false names when arrested. Partly as a result of this, the
investigation services were not able to gain insight into terrorism-related
69 Like the Finsbury Park mosque in London, ultra-Salafist mosques in Milan and Hamburg fulfilled prominent
roles in the international jihadi network – at least until recently (see, among others, Vidino, 2006).
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motives behind many burglaries in the past until after the final apprehension
of the perpetrators.
Jihadis sometimes take advantage of the criminal activities of brothers in
faith or fellow-countrymen who are otherwise hardly involved in active jihad-
ism or terrorism. Apparently because of solidarity in the circle of illegal for-
eigners, or a radical interpretation of zakat,70 burglars or shoplifters may
share part of their loot with jihadis. Two men who had been apprehended for
burglary stated that they would take items, such as personal documents, to a
mosque that served as a local meeting place for jihadis. And several illegal
foreigners who committed acts of shoplifting on a large scale, donated the
stolen clothes through the same mosque to individuals from Afghanistan and
Chechnya.
Because money flows cannot be traced in jihadi circles, the investigation
services in the cases analysed by us were only able to state in general terms
that jihadis often used the proceeds from criminal acts for various purposes.
And in a few cases, it amounted to little more than suspicions. When a young
man with jihadi ambitions and a sympathiser were suspected of a joint
armed robbery, the police detectives were kept in the dark about their
motives. One of the two, who was caught in the act, refused to confirm the
identity of his partner and did not make any other incriminating statements.
4.3.3 Drug production and trade
From an international perspective, it is not new that terrorist movements
generate income from drug production and/or trade. Groups who have the
capacities for this tend to enjoy a degree of financial security, are less
dependent on the generosity of third parties, and exist independently of, for
instance, any state sponsorship contributions (Cilluffo, 2000).71 In the coop-
erations studied, actors were only rarely engaged in drug-related activities.
The proceeds of such activities are, however, substantial. In one of the coop-
erations identified, drug production and trade clearly created a conflict of
interest between a jihadi cooperation and circles in organised crime. Several
authoritative players in this cooperation managed to indoctrinate a member
of a violent drug organisation. They convinced him of his religious duty to
transport cocaine to Italy in a car especially converted for the purpose. At
least a portion of this cocaine was pressed into blocks by jihadi actors. Two
transportations, with a probable value of tens of thousands of Euros, failed.
But the proceeds from another transportation helped finance the various
facilitating activities of the cooperation for the benefit of international Sala-
fist jihadism.
70 Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam and obliges Muslims to transfer part of their own prosperity to the
deprived and those needing help.
71 This is how the terrorist Hezbollah movement in Lebanon – be it partially – relies on financial support from
Iran; parallel to this, the movement has attempted to secure income by producing and exporting drugs.
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4.3.4 Credit card fraud
One of the methods with which actors from our case files supported the holy
war and which is less easy to reconstruct is credit card fraud. This form of
facilitating crime is yet another indication of the considerable interrelated-
ness between local cooperations and the pan-European movement of jihadis.
A typical example is the role of ‘X’, a Western convert. He acted as an inter-
mediary and as an courier from the Netherlands: on the one hand for extrem-
ists who initiated credit card fraud in Great Britain, and on the other hand for
clusters, including a cluster in Spain that was oriented towards the GSPC. The
British suspects in this case were under the influence of prominent preachers
and key figures who created ties among various North African militants in
Europe for international jihadi purposes. By producing, using, and selling
forged credit cards on a large scale, they generated jihadi funds from Eng-
land. For these practices, they had dozens of skimming devices that they
used, for instance, in shops and restaurants. With the credit card details of
unsuspecting citizens copied to homemade duplicate cards they subse-
quently collected their illegally obtained proceeds.
But they also left this job to their national and international contacts. And
this is where X appears on the scene again. While staying in the Netherlands,
he received a skimming device from Great Britain that he wanted to have
‘placed’ at a suitable location by his connections. He subsequently sent back
a portion of the skimmed card details to the jihadi group in England for
duplication. The same probably applied to a portion of his local proceeds.
Telephone taps by the police revealed that X had previously channelled skim-
ming devices to the cluster of Algerian jihadis in Spain. It has been estab-
lished that he supplied forged credit cards to these actors, who were associ-
ated with the GSPC. According to the Spanish authorities, the suspects used
the proceeds to buy equipment for the conflicts in Algeria and Afghanistan,
including radio equipment, night vision binoculars, satellite telephones,
weapons, and munition.
4.3.5 Fund-raising activities
A few groups raised funds not only through criminal activities, but occasion-
ally through charitable activities. Actors skilfully take advantage of the reli-
gious convictions, the emotions, and the community spirit of potential
donors. Some of them acted rather rashly in this context, such as a Turkish
man, ‘X’, who raised financial contributions for jihadi purposes on the
instructions of a guiding heartland-oriented actor. A police source stated the
following about him:
‘[X] gets off the train, rushes to you, and tells you that he is collecting
money for the jihad and he asks you to donate money as well. This is how
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far he goes. He really does the collecting himself. He also approached var-
ious Islamic shopkeepers. He just walks right into the shops. And repeats
this every day.’
Evidence shows that part of the money collected is designated for the muja-
heddin in Chechnya. The group presumably wanted to have a trusted courier
bring the proceeds to the conflict area.
As jihadis apply an informal modus operandi and use a methodology by
which financial transactions are made in cash (couriers) or primarily through
unregulated channels,72 many of their fund-raising activities continue to be
difficult to detect or even invisible. For instance, the police obtained informa-
tion from a reliable source about individuals who were said to be collecting
money within an extremist cluster for an attack on a famous critic of Islam.
During the criminal investigation, however, the police detectives were unable
to find any additional evidence. Sometimes it is simply not clear whether the
money collected is to be used for humanitarian or violent activities, for
instance when radical Muslims ask for donations for the Palestinian cause.
4.3.6 Accommodation and residence
However dangerous and intolerant their views may be, within their own radi-
cal community – but often also within their broader circle of relatives, friends
and acquaintances – the actors in the population analysed proved to be
social and willing to help others. For many of these actors, providing hospi-
tality to sympathisers as well as other Islamic or non-Islamic contact persons
is an important religiously and culturally-defined value. At the same time,
jihadis take advantage of this custom to convince dissenters of the worth of
their ultra-Salafist ideology.
Conversely, this custom allows jihadis to regularly call on Muslims who are
not involved in jihadism. This diffuse social context makes it difficult for the
police to assess the degree of involvement of individual actors in a living
environment (home-owners, guests, visitors, and housemates).
Irrespective of these nuances, in our case files the activities in the area of
accommodation and residence regularly had clearly facilitating purposes.
This was, for instance, evident when an extremist key figure, who was also
known as the provider of forged documents, provided accommodation to
travelling Algerian jihadis. In a statement, one of his accomplices also men-
tioned that he wanted to bring wounded fighters from Afghanistan to Europe
for their recovery. In another cluster, a Syrian human-trafficker helped a fel-
72 It is assumed that jihadis often use Informal Value Tranfser Systems (IVTSs), for example hawala banking. The
Dutch police files selected by us hardly provided any information about this. This may be due to the relative
untraceability of money flows in IVTS, which are often based on centuries-old cultural traditions and on rela-
tionships of trust in social networks. Although IVTSs are sensitive to abuse by criminals and terrorists as a
result of this (Looney, 2003), there are still many myths and misconceptions about the phenomenon (Passas,
1999).
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low-countryman, who was sought by the police, in his flight from the Nether-
lands. He mobilised, among others, his contacts in Turkey and Syria to
ensure that the man, who was a source of inspiration for all sorts of violent
and non-violent jihadi acts, would receive safe accommodation in both
countries.
4.4 Protection
In the past few years, it has not become easier for radical and militant Sala-
fists. Since 11 September 2001, national and international authorities have
paid considerable attention and applied substantial resources to the identifi-
cation, repression, and prevention of Islamic and other forms of terrorism
and radicalisation. To jihadis this means that they must watch their step
more than ever. In the Netherlands as well, they have protected their activi-
ties against discovery by the police in a variety of ways, and they have proved
to be extremely creative in doing so. At the same time, their efforts in this
area also have a social binding function. Mysterious behaviour and secret
‘coded’ language, for instance, appeared to have been able to develop into
the ‘macho’ aspects of an extremist subculture with which – mainly young –
actors can identify.
4.4.1 False identities and aliases
A frequently occurring obstruction in investigations is that jihadis often use
different names and/or forged identity documents. In jihadi circles, actors
with more than two aliases are the rule rather than the exception. Guiding
heartland-oriented actors often use a number of aliases.
Various individuals from our case files possessed several forged identity
papers with different personal data. Partly for this reason, the police have
more than once been unable to trace the true identities of a few important
– but uncooperative – persons under arrest. Some facilitating extremists, for
instance, appeared to have been apprehended on several occasions for bur-
glaries carried out in the past. At the time, however, they always gave differ-
ent identities. Forged documents are therefore certainly useful to jihadis for
protecting their jihadi activities. But for those among them with an illegal res-
idence status, these documents sometimes also – or even primarily – served
to procure work or benefits.
Perhaps less deliberately, the informal use of names also has a protective
effect among actors. It is common practice among jihadis to address one
another with nicknames or battle names, which often start with abu for men.
In Arabic this means ‘son of’. Sympathisers of Bin Laden, for instance, often
call the Al Qaeda leader ‘Abu Abdallah’. And the original name of Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, was completely different.
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He partly derived the battle name, under which he became known, from his
place of birth in Jordan: Zarqa. In our Dutch case files, we also came across
such customs. Some individuals assumed a battle name to give them a sense
of belonging, others had been given this name by mates or in training camps
abroad. The actors also often used other nicknames, first names, abbreviated
names, or even pet names. The police have also established that suspects
regularly spell their own names differently at different points in time and on
different occasions. These kinds of practices, including the fact that several
actors within a jihadi network sometimes use the same names, have compli-
cated both the identification process and the gathering of judicial evidence.
4.4.2 Limited communication and veiled language
Whatever form of communication is used, jihadis are always aware that
investigation and security services could – and moreover want to – intercept
conversations and messages. For this reason, they are often careful about
what they say. In addition, they often do not give trusted contact persons any
more information than necessary, if they provide any information at all. This
was also clearly evident from our data: for example in statements from peo-
ple who had promised to not to talk to unbelievers and the police upon their
departure from jihadi camps in the Afghan-Pakistan region. Below is an
example of a suspect, who attempted to arrange jihad trips for candidates
during chat sessions, urged a chat partner to discipline himself:
‘You now know all you need to know for now. What you know now, is
enough for you. Keep tight and do it. […] Those who do not talk much will
be respected, so just be silent and discreet, OK.’
On the other hand, actors do not always apply their prescribed procedures
consistently themselves. This became evident, among other things, when the
same suspect wrote the following to other contact persons in unveiled terms:
‘[…] I have now been instructed to take as many boys as possible with me,
that is why I have been searching for extremists in chat rooms on the
Internet, and I have already found 1.’
Because actors must be able to communicate for effective coordination
among themselves, they often abandon self-censorship and use coded or
veiled language instead. This requires additional effort from the police, espe-
cially in the case of Berber or Arabic conversations. For instance, individuals
in the same groups spoke in terms of ‘matches’, ‘players’ and ‘winning’,
sometimes in connection with recruitment activities, and sometimes regard-
ing jihad trips. Other actors used the term ‘my aunt’ to refer to prison, and
they used the terms ‘booklets’ or ‘notebooks’ presumably to refer to all sorts
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of documents. Although it is not too difficult for investigation services to
understand such words in specific contexts, they can hardly ever be used in
court without additional evidence. Jihadis make things even more difficult for
the police and judicial authorities by talking about ‘the man who will be
doing this’ and the goods ‘that will do well’.
4.4.3 Phone use
Jihadis use their protective measures not only in actual communication, but
also in the way in which they deploy means of communication. This is first of
all evident from their phone use. By applying various methods and construc-
tions, they attempt to prevent the police from tapping their conversations or
identifying them. A number of actors, for instance, used a telephone data car-
rousel, a sort of round-robin transmission scheme, which enables several
persons to make use of the same numbers or telephones. Jihadis frequently
called unpredictably and anonymously with various prepaid telephones, or
alternately from different call shops and telephone booths. One authoritative
key figure complicated the tapping of conversations by using dozens of
mobile phones. Some of them may also do so for more economic reasons.
Another suspect, who was an informal trader, used different telephones
because he first used up the relevant pre-paid calltime before selling the tele-
phones. It was furthermore revealed that some jihadis had written down
national and international telephone numbers in agendas and phone books
in codes. They, for instance, added or deducted a predetermined number to
or from the last three figures.
4.4.4 Internet and computer use
Nowadays, jihadism without the Internet is unthinkable. Subjects from our
case files were inspired through the Internet and downloaded documents
which they could use to protect their activities, including documents such as
‘How does a lie detector work?’ But above all they frequently communicated
through the worldwide web and various Internet applications. This complex
digital medium provides numerous options to disguise data traffic. Apart
from the fact that some were reticent or used veiled language, and others
simply did not communicate through the Internet at all (see Section 4.4.2),
actors usually used a variety of applications to protect their doings and deal-
ings on the web.
A few extremists used services that made it possible to reserve (server)space
on the Internet anonymously. With the aid of a user’s name and a password
they could subsequently post or read data files or messages wherever they
were, anywhere in the world. In a similar way, they occasionally used free
webmail accounts. They did not send any messages with the relevant – and
often misleadingly innocent – e-mail addresses, but left draft messages in
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their so-called ‘dead letter boxes’ for other users to read, for instance, to
make appointments with each other.
In addition, some individuals within the jihadi cooperations studied used
Internet communication applications which are difficult to tap, if at all,
including ‘Voice over IP’ (VoIP), ‘Skytalk’ and ‘Paltalk’. Groups in organised
crime have been known for a some time to deliberately communicate
through VoIP to disguise their activities (KLPD, 2008). Jihadis who use Inter-
net-based chat programmes may also put up barriers for the police in this
way. They occasionally attempted to protect their conversations even more
by using such applications with the help of encryption programmes.73 This
could be derived, among other things, from the following chat session
between two actors:
Actor X: ‘... first install this programme’
Actor Y: ‘what is it?’
Actor X: ‘a mashAllah74. Encryption programme. So that nobody
can read over our shoulders.’
Actor X: ‘ ;) ‘
Actor X: ‘once you have installed it, you can say anything you like
Actor Y: ‘????W!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!111. so then we can talk about J’




Actor Y: ‘...can we talk now?’
Actor X: ‘I think so’
More generally, actors enjoy relative anonymity on the Internet. While
online, they usually do not leave any evidence behind but their computer
‘fingerprints’, namely in the form of IP numbers. Investigation services have
therefore not always been able to identify – with complete certainly – the
actors who had left traces behind while surfing and mailing. The fact is that
they often operate from computers of Internet cafes, employers, family mem-
bers, and acquaintances. This particularly applies to illegal foreigners. Con-
flicting evidence and statements may add to the confusion. When the police
apprehended a Moroccan man for offences, including carrying out prepara-
tory acts, the police detectives were not able to properly identify one of his
radical Internet contacts, a supposed accomplice. The older brother of the
man who owned the computer, who had initially been apprehended as sec-
ond suspect, stated that he had maintained contacts with the militant Moroc-
73 Within the jihadi clusters studied, however, the actors appeared to rarely use very sophisticated computer pro-
tection software, such as steganography (see for more information: Van der Hulst & Neve, 2008). Although it
is not ruled out that such techniques remain hidden for the police, Muslim extremists are presumably mainly
creative in using the more ordinary instruments and systems.
74 This means something like: ‘what Allah wants’.
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can using the PC and the log-in data of his brother. Whether he told the truth
or whether he was protecting his blood relation remained unclear.
Finally, less effectively, jihadis also protect themselves at times by using ali-
ases and nicknames on the Internet or Internet forums or by deleting their
computer memories from time to time.
4.4.5 Face-to-face interactions
A striking point in our case files is that the investigation services only derived
their information position from tapping of telephone or digital communica-
tion to a very limited extent. Jihadis seemed to prefer to share detailed infor-
mation about violent and facilitating jihadi activities face-to-face. They did,
however, use telephones and the Internet to exchange extremist views and to
make appointments for face-to-face meetings and specific consultations.
There were, however, also actors who systematically avoided contacts
through communication channels that were sensitive to tapping. Existing
social interactions and/or standard meeting places provided these actors
with sufficent opportunities for coordination and discussion.
4.4.6 Secret and closed meetings
In all cooperations studied, actors also frequently organised face-to-face
meetings at group level. We have already given a detailed description in this
report of living-room meetings or other private meetings, jihad lessons,
prayer sessions and/or field activities (see also Section 4.1). It is presumably
during these kinds of meetings, in particular, that extremists discuss their
views, strategies and plans in plain terms. Due to the – by definition – closed
character of these sessions, they have a distinctly protective function for jiha-
dis. When these meetings were not held in private houses, but in public
buildings, such as call shops or Internet cafes, the participants often used pri-
vate rooms. This does not mean, however, that such meetings were always
held in all secret. Various people on the social periphery of jihadi clusters
– including former or current fellow believers, neighbours, acquaintances,
and relatives – frequently appeared to be well informed about the fact that
individuals with radical views gathered and held meetings at specific places.
Other meetings of action-oriented groups were, however, of a more secret
nature.
4.4.7 Outward behaviour
Jihadis are fully aware of the stereotype picture that many people have of
them: jihadi terrorists supposedly grow beards, wear Islamic clothes (like a
jalaba), say prayers several times a day, and do not drink any alcohol, to
mention just a few of the assumptions regarding external behavioural charac-
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teristics.75 Radicalising individuals, who do not – or not yet – pursue violence,
often conform with this picture. These ‘wannabes’ appear to be proud of
their conviction and do not mind being associated with certain violent move-
ments. Their need to create a distinct profile for themselves or to exhibit
themselves exceeds any necessity to protect themselves. Individuals who
actually breach the national and/or international rule of law, on the other
hand, usually behave less conspicuously. During an interrogation, a suspect
described how his close partner had shaved off his beard and had started
wearing Western clothes after the attacks of 11 September 2001. In different
tapped conversations, the police heard how actors encourage one another to
dress ‘sexy’, to put ‘some gel’ in their hair, or to come to a meeting ‘shaven’
and ‘discrete’. This is also evident from the following digital dialogue
between ‘X’ and ‘Y’ that was full of spelling errors in the original Dutch lan-
guage:
X: ‘right (Y). O yes, one more thing’
Y: ‘yeah?’
X: ‘Dress a bit sexy ok?’
Y ‘stagviroullah! Haha’
X: ‘you know what I mean. Gel in your hair’
Y: ‘hahahaha I know’
X: ‘tight trousers etc...’
Y: ‘tight? I don’t have such clothes’
X: ‘you have to dress like a clown in this country to not attract
attention’
Y ‘yeah I understand’
X ‘you should just look like some crazy Moroccan. You know’
Y ‘haha ok’
X ‘Like someone who is only busy with girls all day long’
Y ‘yeah ok.,..’
X ‘a bit macho’
Y ‘and uh something else. Don’t tell […] I will see him over there
haha’
X ‘In any case NOT in sunni clothes or something like that’
Y ‘no, ok...’
Authoritative role models do not always take such measures, though. Spiri-
tual guides, in particular, are suposed to honour their status and be ideologi-
cally credible to their followers by living (and dressing) according to the
example of the Prophet.
75 In this context, it is, however, essential to point out that also large groups of non-violent Salafists comply with
these clothing and behavioural regulations. Such outward appearance consequently does not prove in any
way that a Salafist is also a jihadi.
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4.4.8 Knowledge of the working procedures of the police
During various investigations, the police found that some actors were well
informed of the working procedures of investigation services. The way they
drove, for instance, was so that they could check whether they were being fol-
lowed or so that possible observation teams would be thrown off their tail.
The investigation teams also found that actors in some groups consulted with
one another in police jargon about the procedures used by the police teams.
The police suspected that individuals who had come into contact with inves-
tigators would give an extensive account of this to connections to whom this
information could be of importance.
4.5 Life style and living environment
It is self-evident that there is also an everyday side to the existence of jihadis.
Jihadi Muslims often provide for families, spouses, housemates, or guests.
They also visit places, such as shops, call shops, schools, or mosques; they
interact within specific communities; and they assert their influences at spe-
cific locations. This section will outline how actors from our case files lived
and functioned in and with their evironment, and how jihadi activities were
embedded in the actors’ daily lives.
4.5.1 Family and relatives
Although the criminal investigation files studied did not always provide full
information on this subject, it would be incorrect to describe jihadis as being
typically single and unattached or as individuals who have been cast out by
their families and have nothing to lose. The fact is that many of them were
not only committed to their radical religious community, but were also mar-
ried, had children, and had close ties with relatives.
In this respect, we came across a wide range of lifestyles. Several actors with
non-Western roots, both young and old, got married in Western Europe to
converted European women, or to Muslim women from North African origin.
Others, however, had brought their partner and/or children to the Nether-
lands from abroad. And still others were unmarried and still lived with their
parents. Some of them had functioned in a family – again or for the first
time – for just a few years; for instance, after their coming to the Netherlands
in the context of family reunification. Islamic cultures generally consider the
family to be the most natural building block of society; and Muslim children
generally do not leave their parental homes until they get married (which
they usually do at a relatively young age). They sometimes continue to live
with their parents even after their marriage.
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In the social systems in which radical players operate, as well, both nuclear
and extended families thus often have important and binding functions.
These relatives were consequently aware of the doings and dealings of their
radical family members to a certain extent. In a number of cases, jihadis
clearly felt supported or were even assisted by their relatives, including their
wives, brothers, fathers, mothers, or their in-laws. But in the majority of fami-
lies, even though these families professed the Salafist religious doctrine,
jihadi relatives could not count on much sympathy for their actions. Never-
theless, relatives hardly ever made incriminating statements about each
other to the police or before the court. They tended to protect their relatives
against the outside world.
The involvement of close relatives in radicalism or jihadism was, however,
frequently a subject of debate – and sometimes also a source of conflict. On
the one hand, actors often engaged in heated political-religious discussions
with family members who refused to adopt their strict lifestyle or who reso-
lutely disapproved of their behaviour. In exceptional cases, this even resulted
in threats and/or broken relationships. On the other hand, families some-
times tried to intervene personally. When a strongly indoctrinated girl want-
ed to marry a convinced jihadi, her father and brother-in-law attempted to
prevent the marriage. Her sister also advised against it, and for this reason
finally contacted the mother of the young man, ‘X’:
‘I have been to the mother of [X] to call her to account about what her son
has done to my sister. The mother had, in the meantime, acquired the
same ideas as her son […].’
4.5.2 Living and hospitatlity
Providing hospitality to others has an important place in the Islamic system
of standards and values. In their expressions of warmth and hospitality to
travellers, illegal foreigners, and homeless people, strictly religious Muslims
are frequently guided by the Qur’an and the Hadith (see also Khan, 2005).
In fundamentalist and Salafist jihadi circles, it is common that anyone with a
house or an appartment opens their doors to visitors and guests. Extremists
in the Netherlands often receive travelling sympathisers with open arms.
Actors who are staying here illegally, but who do have accommodation, fre-
quently open their doors to acquaintances from the circle of illegal foreigners
in need of a roof over their heads. Many of these relationships originate in or
around mosques, for instance, when extremists offer new friends or contact
persons a place to sleep. Through visitors or connections of the host, the
guest is subsequently welcome to stay somewhere else. In this way, nearly
everyone has an address of a place to stay. This shows that jihadis mobilise
their networks for a variety of purposes.
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Houses where a number of actors make stop-overs or find temporary accom-
modation can sometimes have tense atmospheres. The relationship between
a radical Yemenite house owner and his guests was upset when one of his
guests lodged two children in the appartment for a long period of time. This
example also shows, however, that actors do not always base their hospitality
on Muhammadan brotherly love. According to his guests – who later became
suspects of terrorism – this man asked an unusually high contribution to the
rent.
Finally, all sorts of social manifestations provided insight into the warm and
friendly manner in which jihadis received others into their home. Subjects
invited people for lectures or living-room meetings, but also for less ideologi-
cally charged occasions, such as watching televion with friends and acquain-
tances, or having a drink or dinner together. On some occasions, they even
allowed women to join them, although the women nearly always stayed in
other rooms, separate from the men. Even though jihadis usually move in
radical circles, most of them also had ordinary visitors, followers, acquain-
tances, and friends paying them visits.
4.5.3 Daily routines: education or work
Although radical Salfism prescribes aloofness towards modern society, a limit-
ed number of actors integrated into our society to participate in – sometimes
secular – forms of education and training courses or by participating in the
regular labour market in the Netherlands.
Education
The younger men and women, in particular, frequently combined their jihadi
existence with attendence at ordinary lessons at secondary schools, training
courses, college or university. The reasons for following training courses
occasionally appeared to be quite rational. An Eritrean jihadi, for instance,
decided to take an evening course after losing his job, and another jihadi was
taking a training course for assistent in electro-technical installation at a
regional training centre (ROC). The police, nevertheless, believed that some
suspects were taking courses specifically for the benefit of their jihadi careers.
For most actors, however, education is not – or no longer – an important fac-
tor. Several of the older actors had already taken courses in their countries of
origin a long time ago. Many young people, on the other hand, had recently
broken off their school career or had been sent away from school. In a few
cases, such events were clearly related to their radicalisation processes. One
individual had dropped out of school several years prior to his arrest. The cir-
cumstances at his VMBO school conflicted with the doctrine he professed
together with the radical and jihadi companions he had met shortly before he
left school. He stated as follows:
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‘My faith prescribed that I was not allowed to look at girls. I had chosen
economics. There were a lot of girls there. There were perhaps four boys
in a class of 22 students. I could not just change over to engineering and
technology […] there were also Moroccan girls who did not comply with
the Islamic clothing regulations. There were also other temptations. I was
afraid that I would overstep the limits as a result of this.’
Work
The investigation services conducted relatively little investigation into the
professional practices and sources of income of subjects involved in jihad-
ism. It is evident, however, that only a few actors had developed a stable pro-
fessional existence. This applied to a teacher of religion, a plasterer, and a
service engineer who was a respectful employee ar an IT company and who
had a permanent contract.
Most suspects, however, regularly changed jobs, worked at the market place
or traded informally, or lived on some kind of benefit – whether this benefit
was lawfully due or not. We more frequently observed these phenomena in
combination. Many individuals ended up in jobs that did not require much, if
any, education, such as jobs at help desks or at a waste treatment company.
They got these jobs through temporary employment agencies mostly. The
illegal immigrants among them often registered with malafide employment
agencies with forged identity papers. It is estimated that there are between
five and six thousand of these temporary employment agencies in the Neth-
erlands,76 whose business it is to secretly employ illegal foreigners (Research
voor Beleid, 2008). It is striking that several of these temporary employment
agencies – which often operate illegally – were found to fulfil a modest key
role for the jihadi movement in the Netherlands because they served as meet-
ing places. Other illegal actors also found work without the mediation of such
agencies, for instance, at an Islamic butcher, a baker, or a contracting firm in
the Westland area.
The example of a fundamentalist Syrian, who fulfilled a facilitating function
within a jihadi cluster as a human-trafficker, provided insight into the way in
which some legal migrants also performed daily activities for their livelihood.
With the help of his entire family, the man bought large quantities of cheap
telephones and telephone cards at a wide variety of places, in order to subse-
quently sell them at the market place for a higher price.
4.5.4 Daily routines in and around Islamic centres
Nearly all jihadi actors visit the mosque frequently. They visit houses of wor-
ship that best meet their radical political-religious views. In the Netherlands,
there are about ten ultra-Salafist institutions which can mainly be found in
the large citites, and each of which have eloquent fundamentalist preachers
76 These malafide agencies would jointly mediate on behalf of about a hundred thousand people.
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(see also AIVD, 2007). Some suspects went to the mosque five times a day
and, for instance, kept a list of the times of sunrises for the purpose of saying
their morning prayer. The majority of actors, however, went to the mosque if
their timetable allowed for this, or social pressure (including from a group)
encouraged them to do so. Sporadically, some radicalisation processes took
such extreme turns that the actors even considered ultra-orthodox mosques
as too liberal for their liking. Although they could occasionally be found in or
around these mosques for social reasons – or, for instance, during special
occasions, such as the Ramadan – they no longer frequently participated in
prayer at the mosques.
While the institutional involvement of ultra-Salafist Islamic centres in jihad-
ism is generally limited, these institutions and their immediate surroundings
could become the very places for actors to become acquainted or to continue
to meet one another. As meeting places they were found to play a crucial role
for the formation of clusters and social consolidation within all jihadi cooper-
ations. Friends and acquaintances found one another there and they tended
to experience the local religious community as providing a ‘warm blanket’ of
welcome. In a few mosques, the actors furthermore took lessons in Arabic
language and culture.
At the same time, these were also the places where self-taught jihadis some-
times delivered speeches – outside the regular prayer services – often
addressing a young audience. Militant religious scholars or other authorita-
tive heartland-oriented actors used these places to gather interested people
for forthcoming meetings or lessons there. Specific individuals, including in
one case the librarian of a cultural institute affiliated to this mosque, distrib-
uted propaganda material there. Apart from this, several strictly Salafist
houses of worship included areas where visitors can also buy writings and
video and cassette tapes with isolationist or intolerant messages.
4.5.5 Semi-public places: call shops and internet cafes
Besides religious centres, jihadis frequently show up in other semi-public
places, in particular certain Internet cafes and call shops. Within the com-
munities in which they move, these semi-public spaces also fulfil an impor-
tant role. They are often melting pots of illegal foreigners, migrants, second-
generation immigrants, and other people who want to make phone calls or
send messages to people abroad frequently and relatively cheaply. Jihadi
actors become acquainted with sympathisers, meet brothers from abroad,
and in this way they are able to protect their phone and Internet use to a cer-
tain extent. People without permanent or temporary addresses often visit
these places, sometimes out of necessity. An illegal young man who attempt-
ed to convince women, in particular, of his jihadi ideas through Internet
forums and chat sites used call shops and Internet cafes, among other places.
Other subjects found work in such shops, or even a place to stay the night.
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As meeting points for extremists, call shops and Internet cafes could develop
into alternatives to mosques. This was particularly so for a jihadi network in
which several managers of a telephone centre played a role. These managers
had adopted a sympathetic and helpful attitude towards a group of radicalis-
ing visitors and their guiding key figures. These ‘customers’ did not come to
the shop for the telephone and computer facilities, but for meetings, lectures,
and courses in a room screened off from the shop. A few young people
among them always greeted the owner on entering the shop with the words
‘we are mujaheddin’. The same individuals also met in Internet cafes else-
where in the country for their jihadi activities.
4.5.6 Jihadism and asylum seekers centres
Various suspects were in asylum seekers centres at the time of their jihadi
commitment. Awaiting the outcome of asylum procedures, they were assured
of food and accommodation. In the meantime, they frequently left their tem-
porary accommodation, for instance, to visit fundamentalist friends or
acquaintances. Through them, they were introduced to extremist migrants
residing legally in the Netherlands and radicalising young people who had
been raised in this country. Conversely, the actors who were staying in asy-
lum seekers centres ocassionally received visitors there. It seems as if guiding
jihadis, in particular, sometimes purposefully travelled to various institutions
to convert those staying there to their cause.
As frequent meeting places for radical Muslims, the asylum seekers centres
may play a role in the jihadi formation of clusters as well as in actual jihadi
activities. This is where individuals with a variety of socio-cultural back-
grounds and life stories experience the same circumstances and problems,
and establish relationships on the basis of common interests and shared per-
ceptions of the world. Preachers of militant Salafism sometimes turned out to
be influential players. An employee at an asylum seekers centre stated the
following about ‘X’, a well-known jihadi propagandist:
‘I furthermore had the impression that [X] was a leading figure in the
Muslim community of the asylum seekers centre. I noticed every week
that X and a number of inhabitants were in conversation with each other
at a table and that he was a kind of discussion leader in it. […] that he
tried to make something clear to these men. […] It was tough going some-
times […] he could really get worked up during these discussions and
then he would state his views using wide gestures and a loud voice.’
4.5.7 Jihadism and penal institutions
Prisons and detention centres are also places where jihadis are frequently
active. We already described above how enthusiastic jihadis all too often
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managed to convince fellow detainees in penal institutions of radical and
extremist views (see Section 4.1.1). An officer, who was involved in a criminal
investigation, stated the following about a charismatic suspect:
‘Each week, he was transferred from one ward to the other. He was the
one who also started to indoctrinate everyone in prison. And recruit
everyone. So these [young Moroccans] who were serving sentences for
house burglaries, and who had nothing to do with this, completely fell for
him. They were wearing dresses, started praying five times a day, and
refused to eat pork any longer. That was awkward, so [he] was constantly
getting transferred.’
Some actors went even further. They also approached criminal fellow detain-
ees to secure weapons and explosives in the future, whether or not through
them. Take, for instance, the actor who systematically attempted to enthuse
all Muslim detainees for the jihad during his detention. He recklessly talked
about his longing to blow himself up in the middle of a large crowd and
attempted in the mean time to get information from various detainees about
explosives and suppliers.
From prison, and occasionally also from police cells, jihadis also maintained
contacts with family, friends, and associates on the outside. This sometimes
revealed intriguing facts, such as in the case of two extremists who were vis-
ited by – as it turned out later – another dangerous jihadi and an accompany-
ing sympathiser. The two visitors, who brought some food for the prisoners,
behaved in an extremely recalcitrant way towards the prison officers. The
communications of a few detained actors with the outside world furthermore
showed that jihadis sometimes regard their imprisonment as a part of, or a
road to, their martyrdom. When a suspect called his brother from prison, he
formulated this attitude as follows:
‘[…] it has been this way for all prophets from the beginning. Those who
were with them were always put in gaol and they were always tortured.’
4.6 Recapitulation
The criminal investigations we analysed show that actors in the Netherlands
are active in various ways. Almost without exception, these activities show
how strongly the jihadi cooperations that formed part of our research were
interwoven with international jihadi networks. In this context, it was revealed
again and again that the actors – both at home and abroad – are very mobile,
and appear to prefer face-to-face contacts for coordination and exchange of
information, instead of communication at a distance (Internet and tele-
phone). We can classify their activities by type.
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With respect to activities aimed at converting, influencing, teaching and
training people, there is generally an interaction between mobilisation and
self-selection: jihadi role models seek receptive persons, but they are often
sought out at the same time.
Actors who actually intend to commit attacks, and who carry out preparatory
acts, are often inspired by role models and Al Qaedan views, but they usually
act relatively independently and with much improvisation. In this context,
they frequently seem to act in an opportunistic way, and seem to make no
fundamental distinction between national or international targets. If actors
in the selected investigation files utter threats to persons or organisations,
these threats are very seldom made in the public domain, and their main
objective seems to be to provoke and agitate members of the jihadi clusters.
Many of the numerous acts with which actors support jihadi core activities
are criminal in nature: forgery of documents, document fraud, burglary and
robbery and – to a lesser degree – drugs trafficking and production, and
credit card fraud. They also facilitate activities by raising funds or by provid-
ing accommodation to extremist brothers. Money and goods (such as stolen
passports) are often exchanged personally or by means of couriers. To be
able to travel, actors frequently use stolen public transport passes and pass-
ports. This particularly applies to illegal actors. The facilitation of travel
appears to be a business in itself within the jihadi movement.
At the same time, jihadis are aware that they may be under surveillance. They
cover their tracks in various ways. According to the police, actors are often
well informed of the way in which the investigation services operate. This
may complicate police work. As most contacts and appointments between
jihadis occur face-to-face, it is difficult for investigation and security services
to monitor activities of these actors from a distance.
Finally, the investigation material can teach us something about the way in
which jihadi activities are embedded in the daily lives of the actors. In partic-
ular, this material provides an insight into the places where jihadi actors usu-
ally go and where they meet others. Among the most noticeable meeting pla-
ces are call shops, Internet cafes, asylum seekers centres, penitentiaries, and
Islamic centres.
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5 Actors
Insight into the nature of jihadi activities and jihadi cooperations is essential
for counterterrorism purposes. But ultimately it is the individual actors, with
their different backgrounds and motivations, who create these phenomena
as a result of their interactions. Who are these people? What moves them? In
order to provide insight into the nature of the people who were active in the
cases studied by us, we will first list several quantitative details about their
backgrounds in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we will describe anonymously
several individuals from this population of actors in more detail, to provide
an impression of the different life stories of these actors, and the diversity of
the groups in which they moved.
Although no stereotypical terrorist profiles have emerged from the investiga-
tion data, such as ‘social failures’ or ‘intelligent starry-eyed idealists’, there is
common ground shared among the different actors. On the basis of corre-
sponding backgrounds and motivations, it is possible to distinguish four
groups. We will give a description of each group in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4,
we will elaborate on female actors. Although women did not emerge as for-
mal suspects from the cases studied, it was clear from the source material
that they were often part of jihadi clusters and contributed to jihadi activities,
whether consciously or not. We will therefore also shed light on their roles in
this chapter.
5.1 Quantitative data on the population of actors
As we already indicated in the first chapter of this report, this research was
based on a selection of the criminal investigations conducted in the Nether-
lands in the period between July 2001 and July 2005. It is consequently
impossible to sketch an overall picture of the entire population of jihadi
actors who were active on Dutch soil in this research period. In this chapter,
we will describe the population of actors as it emerged from the twelve crimi-
nal investigations selected. The resulting picture might have been different if
we had selected different cases. In selecting the cases, however, we also
attempted to provide the broadest picture possible of the way in which jihad-
ism has developed in the Netherlands. We consequently did not take a ran-
dom sample of the criminal investigations conducted in the Netherlands in
that period. The figures presented below must be seen in this light.
5.1.1 Age, gender, country of origin, and nationality
The criminal investigations selected revealed a total of 113 different actors
that were or had been active on Dutch soil: 93 men and 20 women. Their
average age was 28 years, but the range is substantial; their ages ranged from
16 to 48 years of age.
In general, the female actors were younger than the male actors. The average
age of the women was 23 years (the median being 21 years of age), whereas
the average age of the men was 29 years (the median being 28 years of age).
On the basis of their gender, we also observed another difference among the
individuals in our case files: the majority of the women had been born in the
Netherlands (12 out of 20), whereas, out of 93, only 11 men had been born in
the Netherlands.
In total, 27 out of 113 actors spent their youth in the Netherlands: 12 men and
15 women.77 Thirty-four individuals had the Dutch nationality: 17 men and
17 women. Out of these Dutch nationals, 9 had dual nationalities (8 men and
1 woman). Four actors had other West European nationalities (2 men and 2
women). In addition, 64 men did not have West European nationalities and
the nationalities of 10 men and 1 woman remained unknown.
The majority of the male actors had been born in North Africa (see Table 1),
whereas only 2 women originated from this area, and only one of them had
also spent her youth there.
Table 1 Country of birth of the actors
Country of birth Men Women Total
The Netherlands 11 12 23
Western Europe 4 3 7
Eastern Europe and Northern Caucasus 5 0 5
North Africa 60 2 62
Horn of Africa 2 0 2
Middle East 11 0 11
South America 0 3 3
Total 93 20 113
The majority of the men who had been born in North Africa originated from
Algeria (30), and a smaller number originated from Morocco (17). The other
11 men who had spent their youth in North Africa, originated from countries
such as Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania. With regard to the actors who had
spent their youth in the Middle East, more than half of them originated from
Syria. The actors who had been born in the Middle East, had come to the
Netherlands approximately 4.5 years before their arrest;78 the North Africans
approximately 3.6 years before their arrest, and the individuals from Eastern
Europe and the Northern Caucasus on average 4 years before their arrest.
77 One of the male actors had been born in the Netherlands, but had spent his youth outside the Netherlands;
another actor had come to live in the Netherlands as a toddler; and yet another actor had lived in the Nether-
lands since the age of 12. Of 20 men, we could not establish exactly on the basis of the files in what year they
had come to the Netherlands, but on the basis of available information, we assume that these men spent their
youth outside the Netherlands.
78 A number of the actors have never been apprehended. In their cases, the period of time referred to is the
period between the moment they arrived in the Netherlands and the moment at which they came under police
observation in the context of the criminal investigations studied by us.
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5.1.2 Residence status
The study revealed that, of the actors who had been active in the jihadi clus-
ters studied, 48 were residing legally in the Netherlands, and 10 individuals
had legal statuses in other West European countries such as Belgium, France,
Germany, or Great Britain. It furthermore emerged that 44 actors were stay-
ing in the Netherlands as illegal foreigners, and 7 individuals had temporary
residence permits. The residence status of 4 individuals was not known (see
Table 2). In this respect as well, there is a striking difference between men
and women. None of the women were found to be residing illegally in West-
ern Europe, whereas approximately half the male actors were residing ille-
gally here.
Table 2 Residence status of the actors
Residence status Men Women Total
Legal 30 18 48
Illegal foreigners 44 0 44
Legal in Western Europe 9 1 10
Temporary residence permit 7 0 7
Unknown 3 1 4
Total 93 20 113
The actors who were residing illegally in the Netherlands, had come to live in
this country approximately 3.3 years before their apprehension; the individu-
als with temporary residence permits approximately 5 years before their
apprehension.
5.1.3 Marital status
The marital statuses of the actors could not always be deduced from the
police files. We could trace the marital statuses of 60 individuals. Out of these
60 individuals, more than half were married (23 men and 11 women), and 5
individuals had steady partners. Six individuals had been divorced, and 15
actors were single (10 men and 5 women). In addition, we know that 24
actors also had children (16 men and 8 women), but information about this
was not structurally included in the files either.
5.1.4 Educational level
Another aspect about which we could not retrieve much information in the
files was the educational level of the actors. The data we could retrieve (about
33% of the actors total population) sketched a varied picture. Approximately
a quarter of these actors had only attended primary school. Another 25% had
either attended secondary school or finished it, and approximately a quarter
had attended and finished an Upper Secondary Vocational Education course.
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The remaining actors had either followed a university programme or Higher
Professional Education course for a specific period of time. Hardly any of the
actors whose educational level was known had actually finished a university
degree or college course. Some actors were still studying, but a considerable
number of the actors had broken off their studies prematurely.
5.1.5 Work and study
The police files also did not systematically include any data on the daily activ-
ities of the actors. From the information available, we found that approxi-
mately half the actors appeared to have work, and the other half were still
studying or were unemployed. All actors who attended school or college were
residing legally in the Netherlands. Other than that, there were no systematic
differences between those with residence permits and illegal actors.
Table 3 Work and study of the actors
Work and study Men Women Total
Schoolgoing 7 4 11
Working 22 3 25
Unemployed with benefit 10 0 10
Without benefit 5 0 5
Disability benefit 1 0 1
Unknown 48 13 60
Total 93 20 113
5.1.6 Criminal records
The police files studied did not systematically include any data on criminal
records. This information was often added if individuals had notably attrac-
ted the attention of the police or the judicial authorities in the past. On the
basis of this data, represented in Table 4, we may cautiously conclude that
many male actors from the files studied were – or had been – criminally
active. Their criminal records vary. Many actors with criminal records had
committed crimes against property, but fraud, forgery, violent offences, drug-
related offences, possession of weapons, and disturbance of public order also
occurred.
Table 4 Criminal records of the actors
Criminal records Men Women Total
Yes 45 1 46
No 7 16 23
Unknown 41 3 44
Total 93 20 113
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5.1.7 Backgrounds and roles
Finally, we analysed the roles fulfilled by the actors in their cooperations. On
the basis of the data we retrieved regarding the backgrounds of the actors, we
could not systematically establish to which extent the role fulfilled by an
actor depended on his educational level or his criminal record. We did, how-
ever, discover a connection between the immgration status of an actor and
the role or function he fulfilled in the jihadi movement. Actors who either ful-
filled executive or guiding roles in the cooperations were noticeably often
found to be residing as illegal foreigners in the Netherlands,79 whereas indi-
viduals who were residing legally in this country were – relatively often –
found to be performing the facilitating activities.80 On the one hand, this
could point to the fact that some of these actors had come to the Netherlands
with a mission, and operated in a far more purposeful and structured manner
than people had generally assumed. On the other hand, there were also indi-
cations that a few guiding individuals had not come into contact with jihad-
ism until after their arrival in the Netherlands. On the basis of characteristics
that enhance one’s authority, such as knowledge of Arabic and the Qur’an,
these actors may subsequently acquire a guiding position in jihadi clusters
within a relatively short time. We will come back to this in Section 5.3.
5.2 Examples of individual life stories and developmental paths
In this section we will outline the life stories of some of the actors to give an
impression of the different backgrounds, circumstances, and motives from
which the actors got involved in the jihadi movement. We consider it impor-
tant to emphasise this diversity, because later on in this chapter we will dis-
cuss groups of individuals with corresponding characteristics. Although we
will do this on the basis of strikingly similar background characteristics, the
unique stories below will emphasise once again that there are worlds of dif-
ference present within, as well as between, the groups typified.
5.2.1 The story of ‘A’
Actor ‘A’ was an unmarried man of Turkish origin in his early thirties. He had
been residing legally in the Netherlands for a long time. Investigation services
regarded him as an important facilitator within a jihadi cooperation.
79 Among the twelve leading actors about whom sufficient data was available, two of them were residing legally
in Western Europe and nine of them did not have a legal residence status in either the Netherlands or West-
ern Europe. One leading actor had a temporary residence permit at the time that investigations were being
conducted into his activities.
80 If we limit ourselves to the actors about whom sufficient information was included in the files to be able to
make a statement about their residence statuses and about the activities performed by them, we conclude
that 22 out of the 44 actors who were residing legally in the Netherlands or in Western Europe performed
facilitating activities, whereas this applies to 13 out of the 36 illegal actors. Of of the 7 actors with temporary
residence permits, 1 actor performed facilitating activities.
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Shortly after his adolescence, ‘A’, together with others, started to approach
Muslims who – in his opinion – were practising Islam inadequately or incor-
rectly. He did this on behalf of a local branch of a essentially apolitical foun-
dation from Pakistan. Since then, he had applied for – and obtained – new
identification papers at least twelve times. What exactly happened to ‘A’ in
that period of roughly ten years remains unclear. For some time, he lived at
the address of an actor known to the authorities from an entirely different
terrorism case. He furthermore established contacts with a charitable institu-
tion that was suspected of supporting foreign jihadi organisations. Because
there were also various actors from other jihadi cooperations active in this
institution, police sources stated that it was highly plausible that the Turkish
man maintained connections that led to various clusters within the broader
jihadi movement in the Netherlands.
This and other data points to the importance of social affiliates in the devel-
opment process of ‘A’. This is emphasised by the fact that at the moment that
he was apprehended, he lived with a key figure from his cooperation and with
a younger man who was making preparations to participate in the holy war
abroad. During a search, the criminal investigators found an audio tape. On
this tape, he promised that – guided by his authoritative housemate – he
would collect money faithfully and strictly confidentially. He specifically
addressed these words to the leader of a North African terrorist organisation
that was affiliated to Al Qaeda.
‘A’ proved to be very active as a fund raiser, but occasionally also rather reck-
less, for example when he was begging for funds for the jihad in public areas,
in which he was, in fact, regularly successful. In addition, in a more recruiting
role, he accosted Moroccan young people, in particular, in the street or on
the tram, in order to arouse interest in them for the armed fight. But above
all, the police considered him to be an important money courier. In a period
of four years, he was found or apprehended at different places in the world
carrying sums of money amounting to tens of thousands of Euros. ‘A’ was
constantly travelling around the world. During a visit to Australia, he had
contact with terrorism suspects, and documents in his dwelling suggested
that he was on the point of personally handing over amounts of money in
Chechnya. The impression he left on the police was that of a foolhardy, yet
highly dedicated, man. Several years after the closing of the investigation
analysed by us, ‘A’ appeared to have been brought in again, this time primar-
ily on suspicion of recruiting people for the jihad.
5.2.2 The story of ‘B’
The Frenchman ‘B’, who was residing in the Netherlands, functioned as an
important link between a cross-border jihadi cooperation and one of its sub-
clusters composed of facilitating radicals and criminals who partly operated
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from the Netherlands. When the police brought him in, he was in his late
twenties.
As a Catholic boy from a French provincial town, ‘B’ initially had a normal
upbringing. He played sports, was interested in girls, and enjoyed life. A fam-
ily rift seems to have put an end to this. Together with his younger brother, he
started using drugs habitually, and fell on hard times. The two brothers made
friends with a number of extremists. During work for a fruit and vegetables
seller at the market, ‘B’ met an Algerian who had personally maintained con-
tact for some time with a guiding key figure within the international jihadi
network. On this man’s advice, ‘B’ put a stop to his past as an addict and con-
verted to an ultra-Salafist variant of Islam.
Travelling through Europe, he visited meetings of radical and militant Mus-
lims from that moment onwards. When, some time later, he visited his
brother in England – who was already actively involved in jihadi activities at
the time – radical preachers and contact persons introduced him to Al Qae-
dan circles and views. ‘B’ then moved to the Netherlands where he, as the de
facto coordinator, used his local and international network of acquaintances
particularly to provide financial and logistic support to the anti-Western
jihad. It remains debatable whether his commitment resulted from complete
submission to this ideology, or whether it was mainly dictated by his sense of
self-worth or his social and financial needs. But the fact that the police once
observed him having a beer and a helping of pork points to the latter.
5.2.3 The story of ‘C’
Actor ‘C’, who was in his thirties, probably fulfilled a modest, and sometimes
possibly unintentional, role within an extensive jihadi cluster of which the
ideological vanguard preached and prepared acts of violence against Western
targets in the Netherlands and abroad.
As an Islamic refugee from former Yugoslavia, ‘C’ had been granted perma-
nent residence for the Netherlands four years previously. He took up resi-
dence in a Southern province together with his wife and children and
received double child allowances in addition to a benefit. During a visit to his
brother, who was waiting in vain for a residence permit in an asylum seekers
centre, he met an extremist Arab who had, for some time, been giving direc-
tion to a growing network of militant and radicalising individuals.
This meeting, in particular, seemed to be crucial in C’s development. The
Arab presented himself to ‘C’ as a convincing Islamic clergyman and scholar,
and later on the Arab visited him several times in his home, during which he
sometime brought some sweets for the children. The families of both men
became acquainted as well. They met for example during a maternity visit,
and a relationship of trust seemed to develop between them. ‘C’, in his turn,
was clearly sympathetic to the radical Islamic body of thought preached by
the Arab. He also became acquainted with several militant confidants.
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To the investigation services, the Yugoslav did not emerge as a relevant actor
for the broader jihadi cooperation until his influential Arab acquaintance
used his passport to avoid being caught by the Dutch police. ‘C’ himself
argued that the man had stolen this passport from his home. But on the basis
of a tapped conversation, the police suspected that he had intentionally
handed over his identity card to the man, in consultation with others.
5.2.4 The story of ‘D’
The jihad dominates the life of the violent Moroccan-Dutch extremist ‘D’. In
circles of militant Muslims, even at the age of twenty, he presented himself as
a driving force. He was admired because of his travels, his knowledge, and his
nearly inexhaustible efforts.
‘D’ was born in the Netherlands into a large Moroccan family. In his teens, he
was a difficult child, which his teachers at secondary school noticed. His
intolerable behaviour resulted in his expulsion from school. With the blessing
of his parents, who may have hoped that a stricter religious curriculum would
have a positive effect on ‘D’, he left for the Middle East to take a two-year
course at a Qur’an school. As a result of this, he became well acquainted with
the Arab language and Islamic doctrine.
However, on his homecoming at an adult age, his short-tempered and some-
times aggressive character appeared to be unchanged. He threatened his sis-
ter, and his parents had no – or hardly any – hold over him. He also had regu-
lar arguments with his neighbours, which on occasion resulted in an inter-
vention by the police. In the meantime, he often changed jobs. According to
people in his environment, he became more dominant, and listened – with
increasing frequency – only to people with extreme political views about
Islam. Presumably with the help of such contacts, he ended up in a jihadi
training camp in Pakistan two years later. There, among other international
would-be fighters and renowned veterans, he increased his circle of acquain-
tances and met another radicalising young man from the Netherlands. In this
boy, ‘D’ found a friend and a sympathiser for the next few years.
Once he had returned to the Netherlands, ‘D’ acquired status in the growing
and merging extremist circle of acquaintances of himself and that of his new
comrade. He brought a few extremely fanatic and action-oriented jihadis
from this network into contact with his own militant acquaintances, includ-
ing an important coordinator of the GICM abroad. He furthermore organised
meetings and delivered radical sermons and lectures. With his threatening
attitude and authoritarian character he filled others both with admiration
and fear, not in the least because he actively participated in preparing and
committing terrorist acts.
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5.2.5 The story of ‘E’
By the time investigation services started to focus their attention on ‘E’, this
Algerian immigrant of around forty years of age had been staying in the Neth-
erlands as an illegal foreigner for years. With his intellectual and technical
skills, ‘E’ supported jihadis both nationally and internationally, and he also
functioned as an important intermediary.
‘E’ completed a study in information technology in his country of birth, and
finally applied for asylum in this country as an already strictly religious Mus-
lim. In the meantime, he left his wife and children behind in Syria and he
presumably had a nomadic existence in different European countries. When
his asylum application in the Netherlands was refused, he decided to stay
here illegally. He moved to a small room in a house where several other illegal
foreigners were lodging. ‘E’ became acquainted with legal and illegal lodgers
from Morocco and Algeria who lived in a few neighbouring premises and
elsewhere in the deprived urban area.
Although, according to his own testimony, ‘E’ earned his living by giving les-
sons in information technology and repairing computers and telephones in
an Islamic centre in the neighbourhood, he was specifically skilled in forging
and distributing documents and identity cards. While many of his illegal con-
tact persons supported themselves by theft and other crimes, ‘E’ kept his
head above water through his trade in forged documents, largely within that
same circle of illegal foreigners. When the police stopped him together with a
few accomplices, he was on the point of handing over dozens of forged docu-
ments. The items which the police detectives had found in his room con-
firmed that he had forged technically high-quality Dutch, Belgian, French,
Spanish, and British documents on a large scale.
In the capacity of forger, ‘E’ facilitated various terrorist cooperations in this
country and abroad. He did so deliberately. With his affinity for jihadi views,
he seemed to give a somewhat nobler dimension to his – incidentally purely
profitable – criminal activities. On the other hand, the fact that jihadis, some
of whom were leading figures, also channelled international money flows and
communication through him suggest that his involvement even went further.
According to several sources, he was said to also have used his engineering
expertise to manufacture explosives.
5.3 Common backgrounds and motives
The above life stories illustrate how people with various backgrounds and
motives meet under the ideological umbrella of internationally-oriented
Salafist jihadism. Although we are fully aware that the precise ‘how’ and
‘why’ differ per person, we still observed four characteristic groups in our
population of actors that could by identified by the following categories of
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corresponding circumstances and motivations: (1) illegal foreigners;
(2) active and/or reformed criminals and addicts; (3) ‘seekers’; and (4) ideal-
ists and political activists. In reality, actors fell into more than one category.
5.3.1 Illegal foreigners
The most noticeable fact that systematically emerged from our data is that
individuals who were residing illegally in the Netherlands were amply repre-
sented within all cooperations analysed.81 This is an interesting fact. Illegal
foreigners find themselves in uncertain situations in various respects. Basic
needs, such as housing, food, legally valid documents, and work are not avail-
able to them as a matter-of-course. They are not familiar with the Dutch
institutes, customs, language, and culture, which are even deliberately avoi-
ded by some illegal foreigners. In addition, illegal foreigners often have to
struggle to make a place for themselves within social structures that are for-
eign to them. The consequence of all this is that they take up an exceptional
position in our society, a position that by definition turns them into a vulner-
able group.
Whether there is a causal connection between the problems experienced
daily by illegal foreigners and their disproportional involvement in jihadism,
is a debatable question. During the criminal investigations, the police
focused more on facts than on subjective background information from and
about the suspects. The majority also remained silent during the interroga-
tions, probably for legal reasons.
We cannot, however, ignore the fact that illegal actors benefit from linking up
with jihadi cooperations. In these extremist networks, it is common practice
to support and take care of one another in daily life. Participants who were
illegal foreigners were therefore able to turn to several people for accommo-
dation, lodging, food, and drink. They often managed to obtain forged iden-
tity papers through facilitating jihadis. By joining in with other supporting
activities, such as financial fraud, fund raising, and theft, some actors also
secured a moderate income and clothing for themselves. And a number of
them found work thanks to militant key figures. Besides physical sustenance,
illegal migrants who sympathise with the cooperations receive a warm wel-
come, a sense of homecoming, a ‘pleasant’ circle of acquaintances, and a
renewed sense of self-worth. For illegal foreigners, such needs are often less
easy to satisfy in the normal society (see Engbersen, Van der Leun, Staring,
and Kehla, 1999 for more information on this subject).
Although it remains uncertain to what extent extremist illegal foreigners were
guided by such rational considerations, the success of their participation in
jihadi clusters also clearly appeared to increase as they acquired more
authority and respect within these cooperations. More doors were opened to
81 See Table 2 for the overall picture: at the time of the criminal investigations, nearly half of the male actors
were residing illegally in the Netherlands.
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them, so to speak. To some illegal heartland-oriented actors, this might have
been an additional motivation to initiate guiding or recruiting activities in the
Netherlands.
This also applies to adolescents who imitated the activities of role models. An
young, illegal Moroccan, for instance, who – following the example of a radi-
cal Islamic clergyman – inexhaustibly organised meetings and preached mili-
tant Islamic views, also used his growing status to get some secular matters
done as well. By successfully relying on the principles of solidarity preached
by himself, he was able to secure accommodation for himself with at least
five cluster members. He furthermore had his car registered and insured by a
loyal brother, a formality he could not arrange himself as an illegal foreigner.
Salafist jihadism, often labelled as ideologically motivated crime (KLPD,
2008), may thus also become a tool for illegal foreigners to acquire social sta-
tus and power or other social and material advantages.
Actors without residence permits therefore constitute an interesting group
on account of their specific needs that may promote radicalisation. But as
sources of motivation, these factors are rarely isolated. It is only in conjunc-
tion with various other factors that these needs may become a reason why
individuals are driven to join jihadi networks.
Then there are, of course, also those illegal foreigners who have already had a
relatively long career as a jihadi, and to whom self-preservation is hardly, if at
all, a source of motivation. On the basis of various indications, but without
having firm evidence, the police suspect that some illegal foreigners have
been travelling around the world propagating violence for some time, and/or
have fought in their own countries as well as in hotbeds such as Yugoslavia,
Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These heartland-oriented actors had pre-
sumably been active within Islamic parties and terrorist groups – including
the Muslim Brotherhood, the FIS, the GIA, and the GSPC – long before their
arrival in the Netherlands, (see also NCTb, 2008, p. 49 et seq. for more infor-
mation about this). Here in the Netherlands, these actors appear able to facil-
itate old groups and to form new groups.
5.3.2 Criminals, former criminals, and addicts
The jihadi movement, as it emerged from the selection of criminal investiga-
tions, also included a group of extremists with a background of addiction or
criminal activities. Initially, these addicts, habitual offenders, and former
detainees appeared to be incomparable ‘problem cases’. The background
variables that were responsible for their deviant behaviour differed per per-
son, and it seemed that these variables must be sought in individual vulnera-
bilities in the one case and more in environmental factors in the other.
The fact that we mention delinquents and addicts (and former delinquents
and addicts) together as notable jihadi actors is because their motivations
may correspond, at least partially. Statements and other police data pointed
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out that we were dealing with a group of people who had experienced a sense
of having been at a crossroads, where they had to choose between continuing
on a sinful or damaging path, or starting an unblemished life dedicated to
religion. A number of criminals who had taken the latter path, however, con-
tinued to be criminally active, for instance, in order to support jihadi activi-
ties (Section 4.3). Reasoning from their newly acquired Salafist-jihadi percep-
tion of the world, they considered theft on hostile territory legitimate, or even
a duty (BVD, 2001b). To put it briefly, former criminals and addicts who used
to pursue egocentric desires were now making the necessary effort to profess
and defend their new views.
Above all, these people found a possible way out in the puritan principles of
jihadi Salafism. The strict and clear guidelines provided by this body of
thought, in combination with group pressure and self-discipline, constitute
an effective regime that might give delinquents, alcoholics and drug addicts,
who were seeking a way out of their problematic situation, something to hold
on to. Those who live strictly by following the examples of the Islamic ances-
tors, also protect themselves against relapse. And actors who subsequently
actually carried out activities or supported the jihad seemed to be willing to
eliminate any doubt about the success and totality of their transformation of
themselves and their environment.
The story of a terrorism suspect, who told someone during a telephone con-
versation that he ‘left the other path five years ago’, gives an accurate picture
of the way in which criminal records and a background of addiction may lead
to radical and militant behaviour. In the past, the man had come into contact
with the police several times for shoplifting, burglaries, and aggressiveness.
In this context, he had repeatedly indicated that he could not do without
drugs and he sometimes appeared to be confused. His introduction into a
group of radicalising young adults, after a few meetings in a mosque, gave
him an obvious alternative. He currently seems to be proud of his status as a
reborn Muslim, as someone who has resolutely put an end to his sinful past,
and who now essentially lives for this faith and his brothers.
Remarkably, preachers of international Salafist jihadism were able to get
through to individuals who were receptive to a religious-extremist message
on account of their delinquency or addiction. One guiding heartland-orient-
ed actor from our case seemed to specifically aiming at people from this ‘tar-
get group’. Nevertheless, some criminal actors, for instance, also took a puri-
tan path on their own initiative by studying the religious writings more
closely or by deliberately seeking alliance with radical groups.
The picture of criminals and addicts who found solace in the jihad is, of
course, an abstraction from reality. In practice, their life stories were differ-
ent. Typical of this is the case of a Moroccan who was probably initially active
for a criminal drugs organisation merely for profit. Under the influence of an
Algerian jihadi, he converted to the ultra-Salafist doctrine. Convinced of the
view that he should exert himself for Islam, he started to carry out interna-
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tional cocaine shipments for a jihadi cluster. The proceeds of these ship-
ments were used for the holy war. But it soon emerged that his calculating
criminal nature had not been completely changed by his uncompromising
jihadi views. After several shipments, he decided to nick a shipment of drugs,
as well as a vehicle, and to sell them for personal gain.
5.3.3 ‘Seekers’
Although – and it is typically human – all subjects from the investigation files
were more or less pursuing existential certainty, a meaning in life, a positive
self-image, social ties, or structure (in life), in some cases this is or was evi-
dent to such a degree that we can safely speak of a group of ‘seekers’, or for-
mer seekers.
The most clearly identifiable seekers lived through a stage in which they were
actually at a complete loss with themselves, and totally uncertain of what to
do. They were unstable and/or were craving for security. And if at that
moment something presented itself that might reduce their uncertainty or to
which they may cling, whether ideologically or socially, this could result in or
contribute to their committing themselves to the violent jihad or to a cooper-
ation with jihadi intentions. In practice, there are of course different degrees
of seekers. Significantly, there is considerable overlap between this group of
actors and the other groups identified in this section.
Seekers, too, are more or less attempting to escape problems. But unlike ille-
gal foreigners, criminals or addicts who essentially have concrete worries,
they are primarily confronted with dilemmas or crises that are more of a psy-
chological, socio-psychological, or philosophical nature. Such a personal cri-
sis may, for instance, arise when someone gets the feeling that they have
arrived at a crucial moment in their life, or starts to doubt the meaning of
their existence. The time may be right for him or her to seek solace in a clear
theorem such as international jihadi Salafism, which may remove existential
doubts with its universal message (Buijs et al., 2006). The strict rules of life
connected with this doctrine may also satisfy the need for structure and
clarity in an increasingly complex society.
These kinds of motives may have played a role in cases such as that of actor
‘X’, who radicalised in a very short period of time according to witness testi-
monies. He suddenly started to behave in an increasingly more introverted
way, and soon spent most of his time in his apartment. Glued to his com-
puter, ‘X’ visited extremist websites, collected jihadi writings and videos, and
established chat contacts with radicals all over the world. When the police
arrested him they found a meticulously positioned firearm with a Qur’an and
a balaclava inside a mirror-fronted cabinet. From this it may be deduced that
his newly acquired jihadi élan also satisfied his search for a positive self-
image, self-expression or heroism (De Graaff, 2007; Richardson, 2006). An
investigating officer in this case, who stated that such a ritual arrangement
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was seen more frequently in jihadi circles, also suspected this, and stated as
follows:
‘Perhaps that [X] goes down on his knees there and that he sees himself in
the mirror with that weapon. Something like those video images they
found at [Y].82’
‘[On those video images] [Y] also posed somewhat in the manner of
Osama bin Laden. There is also a weapon […] and he is also down on his
knees while saying that prayer.’
Other actors who are craving for a way out of their loneliness, or for a warm
welcome in a intimate community in which they can identify better with oth-
ers, may also end up in the jihadi movement. In these cases, the attraction of
jihadi cooperations is determined rather by ‘in-group love’ than by ‘out-
group hate’ (Sageman, 2004). The intense feelings of friendship, deep bonds
of fate, spirituality, and exclusiveness which often originate in such networks
may be particularly appealing to these ‘social seekers’.
5.3.4 Idealists and political activists
Finally, we identified various suspects in our case files to whom a deep social
dissatisfaction constituted a decisive source of motivation. In this respect, we
refer, in particular, to idealists and political activists who are guided over-
whelmingly by social, external, contexts and who ‘join in with’ the interna-
tional jihadi movement in reaction to this. As a result of this, they clearly dis-
tinguish themselves from many other individuals. Although it is true that
people who radicalise or commit extremist acts are invariably exposed to
causal influences at (1) individual; (2) social; and (3) external level (TTSRL,
2008), these three levels may not be equally decisive for all actors. As noted
above, it is primarily personal and social circumstances that may be of
importance to illegal foreigners, criminals, addicts, and seekers within the
jihadi movement.
The small number of subjects to whom we are referring in this subsection is
– more than anything else – driven by an intense and genuine indignation
about external factors, such as political, geopolitical, economic, cultural, and
– not in the least – military inequality and injustice in the world. Whereas
many people would go into the nuances of this variety of problems, they – on
the contrary – seek recognition in a religiously inspired ideology which inten-
sifies the absoluteness of their perception of society even further (perpetrator
and victim, nothing in between) and which legitimises violent reactions to
this. The following are two extracts from a farewell letter of a convert who
– according to him – went to ‘the country of the jihad to help dispel the unbe-
82 ‘Y’ is another jihadi from our case files.
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lievers, and to help erect the Islamic state’ are illustrative of the way of think-
ing common to these idealist and political-activist jihadis:
‘We are living in an age in which the Muslim community is being attacked
from all sides, both physically and ideologically by the army of unbelief
and corruption under the command of America and Israel. This has resul-
ted in, among other things, the occupation and mass murders of Muslims
in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq, the Philippines, Indonesia, Bos-
nia, Kosovo, China, Algeria, various parts of Africa, and – of course –
 Palestine.’
‘As a Muslim I cannot and may not stand around watching everything
that is happening to Muslims. The prophet (may his peace and blessings
be on him) said: “Each Muslim is a brother to any other Muslim. He helps
them, and does not abandon them”.’
It is remarkable that the repeatedly recurring themes which excite the actors
in this group from the perspective of their supposedly true Muslim identity
appear to be based on indirect perception and imitation rather than their
own experience. In other words, there was very little evidence in the investi-
gation files to show that they accepted Islamic extremism on account of per-
sonal experiences with injustice, discrimination, and relative deprivation. On
the contrary, these people usually refer to television images, videos, audio
tapes, websites, and sermons or stories of others. Cumulatively, the idea is
formed that, worldwide, the group they identify with is under pressure
through actions by unbelievers and renegades. We consequently cannot sub-
stantiate – on the basis of our Dutch data – the hypothesis that the theme of
global injustice against Muslims often resonates with personal experiences
(Sageman, 2008).
To Muslim ‘X’, who had spent many hours watching television as a teenager,
the following question had become a complete obsession: ‘Why always the
Muslims?’ His window to the world showed him pictures of destruction, gen-
ocide, and Islamic citizens of the Balkans who fled. Time and time again, he
saw pictures of Palestinian children who had been killed by Israeli fire. ‘X’
could get angry about the short-sighted media coverage on this subject and
about the indifference he thought he could discern among his friends and
family. ‘Is a murder of a Muslim child not a major crime?’ Irritated, he deci-
ded to find more in-depth information in books and on the Internet. The sto-
ries and the often atrocious pictures ‘X’ found strengthened his perception of
a world full of injustice and hypocrisy, especially at the cost of Muslims and
Islam. And they incited his feelings of anger and thirst for revenge even fur-
ther (Silke, 2008). ‘X’, however, not only directed his anger against the West,
and in particular towards the US, but also against ‘ordinary’ Salafists and fun-
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damentalists who did not share his views and his admiration for violent
opposition.
Actors like this young man who developed a desire to take action primarily
from idealism and social dissatisfaction may receive crucial impetus from
emotional meetings, iconic pictures, or other trigger-events that result in
their orientation towards, and participation in, international Salafist jihad-
ism. The attacks of 11 September 2001, for instance, had such a catalytic
effect on ‘X’:
‘After eleven September, video tapes of Osama bin Laden were shown
[on] which he praised the attacks of eleven September, I was proud of
him, how a multi-millionaire chose to live in a tent instead of [in] a
palace, and only because he has chosen Allah’s path.’
After these events, ‘X’ became intrigued by the Al Qaedan view of the world,
presumably in particular on account of the close parallels with his own view.
He consciously chose to seek alliance with the international jihadi move-
ment. At the same time, he freed himself from unpleasant isolation. From
now on, he could share and give vent to his frustrations and views with sev-
eral people. Although his actions only escalated into acts of violence at a later
stage, it was mainly during this period that the ideological and social context
of his political activism took shape.
Following other researchers (including Nesser, 2007), we also established that
actors who framed their – short-term or long-term – frustrated idealism and
political activism in a radical and religious ideology – and who actually regar-
ded themselves as mujaheddin at a specific point in time – became the driv-
ing forces and consequently most dangerous powers within most coopera-
tions. They often manifested themselves as the elements who put words into
action: as those actors with the strongest motivation to put words into prac-
tice, more particularly into violent acts. It still remains debatable whether the
intentions underlying these acts were as revolutionary as the religious princi-
ples they preached led us to suspect. It is hard to believe that all the individu-
als we may count as members of this group actually had the illusion that the
Caliphate would be realised by terrorism. They more frequently seem to be
oriented towards revenge or retaliation, or they hope to lure ‘the enemy’ into
a reaction, by which both their action and the cause for which they fight will
acquire a form of recognition and honour (see also Richardson, 2006).
5.4 Women
Within the fundamentalist social context of these actors, in which men nearly
always rule the roost, it is easy to ignore the significance of female actors, the
more so because they did not once emerge as formal suspects from our files.
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In most cooperations, however, we came across women who had a relevant
influence – whether passively or actively – on the performance of the oppo-
site sex and their broader extremist environment.
5.4.1 Man-woman relationships and friendships
The principal binding factors, as a result of which the women in our case files
became more or less involved in jihadism, were marriages and love affairs
with male actors. A few foreign women had emigrated to the Netherlands
together with or following their husbands. But even more interesting was the
observation that locally born Muslim women as well as female converts with
non-Islamic backgrounds constituted a significant majority within the group
of spouses, whereas the majority of their husbands – on the contrary – had
come to the West as Islamic immigrants.
There may be various explanations for this last observation. First of all, a radi-
cal Muslim originating from abroad who is staying in the West on his own,
may simply fill a void by entering into a relationship with a Western woman.
This is a natural and everyday process of love or lust that we will take at face
value.
In addition, however, a considerable number of illegal actors could obtain a
residence permit by marrying a woman who already has Dutch nationality.
Various individuals stated frankly that this prospect was the reason for their
marriage. Investigation services furthermore had evidence that some sus-
pects arranged purely practical ‘sham marriages’ to avoid being repatriated.
A Syrian facilitator who had exhausted all legal remedies to obtain a resi-
dence permit, for instance, received a telephone call from an intermediary
who mentioned several superficial details about a divorced woman of Alger-
ian origin. The caller asked him to pay 2,000 Euros if his efforts resulted in a
wedding. During another telephone call, this Syrian negotiated directly with a
candidate. He proposed that she enter into a relationship – legal or other-
wise – of two years and offered compensation for a few additional costs.
In the light of this sort of advantageous marriage, it is therefore even more
remarkable that in all large cooperations, very influential heartland-oriented
actors were married to locally converted women. The example of a guiding
Arab jihad veteran, who married a highly educated Dutch aid worker after a
meeting ‘in the field’ abroad, is telling. Since her drastic conversion to Islam,
she had been wearing an all-concealing burka in public. In another cluster, a
skilful coordinator of jihadism, who in fact mainly exercised influence on a
subcluster in the Netherlands from abroad, married a converted French
woman. And an authoritative Arab source of inspiration of extremism in yet
another cooperation married a Dutch woman of Latin-American origin. From
that moment onwards, she followed her partner in his faith and in his views.
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Because some of these marriages had not been contracted legally, but purely
on an informal religious basis (the Islamic marriage),83 it is not possible to
point to residence permits as the only possible underlying reason for the
many relationships between converted local women and legal and illegal
actors. Another motivation may be that guiding heartland-oriented actors
seem to acquire a higher social status in their environment when they show
off with women they have personally convinced of the pure Islamic doctrine.
In addition, they can present the conversion of their formerly ‘unbelieving’
wives as an ultimate expression of loyalty and dedication.
Social gain is probably sometimes also a motive for jihadis to influence
women in the broader sense. A young illegal Moroccan, for instance, found a
listening ear in many teenage girls and young women with his militant dawa.
He knew a few of these women through his contact persons, and he had
approached the others through Internet forums. He converted or introduced
them to his intolerant ideology and tried to make them members of a com-
munity of radical Muslim women who developed parallel activities within a
jihadi cooperation that was dominated by men. As a result of his success with
women, he stood head and shoulder above the rest.
Other women also got involved in jihadism, often in the slipstream of man-
woman relationships: for instance, family members such as daughters and
sisters, or friends and acquaintances. A Dutch woman who had converted to
Islam from Christianity, for instance, made her house available for the
inflammatory sermons and Islam lessons given by a young jihadi. At the time,
she had not known him for very long as he was the new husband of a friend
from a mosque. When the couple was on the run from the police, she helped
them, among other things, by giving them shelter and transport.
5.4.2 The roles of women
This raises the question of which variety of roles was actually fulfilled by the
women in the movements we studied. Women often supported their hus-
bands, of course, and they were aware of their activities. The concept of
matrimonial loyalty still had its limits, sometimes also for partners of radical
and jihadi Muslims. Some of them therefore kept as much distance as possi-
ble, or attempted to make their husbands change their minds. They may nev-
ertheless be confronted with fierce conflicts or even with divorce if they reject
the puritan clothing prescriptions and behavioural requirements. In this con-
text, a Moroccan woman left her husband, because he had ‘badly changed’ in
a short period of time due to – according to her – his newly acquired ties with
extremists. After a process of mutual estrangement, various rows, and at least
one incident of abuse, his new wish to marry a second partner on the basis of
83 The studies Informele islamitische huwelijken (NCTb, 2006b) and Informele huwelijken in Nederland; een explo-
ratieve studie (Van der Leun & Leupen, 2009) describe the backgrounds of this phenomenon, the manner in
which they appear in the Netherlands, and its possible social consequences.
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his puritan religious convictions was the last drop that caused her to divorce
him.
Other women, on the other hand, had less problems with their husbands’
radicalisation, and consequently interacted more frequently in jihadi circles.
During an interview, one of them declared that she ‘actually did not mind at
all’, for
‘[…] he had stopped drinking, smoking, going out, and he started to see
people. And we made visits to people. I started to visit people and meet
women and I enjoyed that. For this was something entirely different from
visiting his family or my parents where he was not welcome.’
This attitude is typical of many women in our population of actors, who fol-
lowed in their husbands’ wake and adopted a cooperative, albeit cautiously
cooperative, attitude in this context. They started to support the jihadi views;
allowed themselves to be used as covers; adopted a hospitable and coopera-
tive attitude towards extremists; accompanied their partners during trips; or
fled together with them when they were on the run from agencies combating
terrorism. In these subordinate capacities, they sometimes cooperated in
facilitating acts, such as drugs trafficking, fund-raising, or the trafficking of
human beings. They did this, for instance, by making their passport available
for abuse or forgery.
Women who participated in the jihadi movement in such indirect ways often
appeared to be well informed, usually not so much so about all kinds of tacti-
cal and operational details, but more so about the overall intentions, contact
persons, and activities of their husbands. Many of them also made each
other’s acquaintances this way, and subsequently exchanged information
among themselves. A good example of this is the story of three women who
travelled with their men to jihadi centres and training camps in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In local guest houses, among other places where they lived tem-
porarily separated from their husbands, they gossiped a lot and this way they
would pass on much of the information they had come to know to one
another. One woman, for instance, told another there that her husband
would fulfil a ‘secret mission’ in Europe.
In a few cooperations, the ‘women of’ therefore created their own parallel
groups. These often served as a place where they could vent their family-rela-
ted issues or simply for collective enjoyment. But sometimes, the things that
took place in such women’s clubs were also a less action-oriented reflection
of the ‘male practice’. Inspired by their partners, the women studied religious
writings or extremist propaganda together. Sporadically, large clusters origi-
nated as a result of these types of meetings, in which one or more enthusias-
tic women would adopt a key role or do pioneering work, give lessons and
lectures, or organise meetings. Such social constellations were also attractive
to friends and acquaintances from outside the family circles who were still
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‘seeking’ within the Islamic faith. Women who frequently met on account of
their affinity with religious radicalism and jihadism also judged one another
constantly. In this way, informal control mechanisms also developed in these
types of groups. Apart from this, statements stirring up hatred also repeatedly
contribute to the social cohesion of these groups. The following ‘good wishes’
spoken by a woman at the kitchen tea of an Islamic-activist bride are illustra-
tive of the inflammatory language among radicalising women:
‘[…] I wish you all the luck in the world, and that you may build many
bombs, and that you may send all Jews to hell, hallelujah.’
Only a few women seemed to be motivated to such a degree that they were
actually prepared to go beyond radical talk and indirect involvement. These
women often – though usually in vain – aimed at having a more or less fulfill-
ing role in the jihadi man’s world. One of them, for instance, wanted to par-
ticipate in Afghanistan or Pakistan in a training camp for women that was yet
to be realised. According to a friend, she was longing to sacrifice her life for
the ‘good cause’. In another jihadi cluster, a young female convert together
with an older woman wanted to leave for the Palestine regions for the pur-
pose of the jihad. This plan soon went off the rails when the local authorities
there blocked her visa application. And an acquaintance of this duo, an
extremely radical Muslim woman, tried to get details about possible targets
for terrorist actions – presumably for her husband, among others. In later
criminal investigations, she entered the picture again because she had hel-
ped prepare attacks and had hidden several weapons.
A last notable aspect that deserves attention here is the relatively fast 
deradicalisation of radicalised women. In some of the cooperations studied
by us, the women – compared to men – realised after a relatively short period
of jihadi commitment that their extremist contacts and activities were wrong,
and that they had not done them much good. This applied both to many of
the wives of male actors, as well as to many of the ‘seeking’ women, who
turned away from the scene that used to intrigue them and from the ideology
that once gave them something to hold on to.
5.5 Recapitulation
The twelve criminal investigations revealed that a total of 113 different actors
had been active on Dutch territory in the research period. In this population
of actors we found people with various life stories and strongly different back-
grounds and motives. Although it is not possible to identify clear terrorist pro-
files, four groups of persons are conspicuous because of their circumstances
and motives. Firstly, illegal immigrants are amply represented in all jihadi
cooperations. Jihadi groups may provide illegal immigrants with essential
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necessities of life or other needs, such as accommodation, forged or genuine
documents, employment, social assistance, respect, social status and a pur-
pose in life. Secondly, many of the actors participating in the population we
analysed were former or current addicts and people with criminal records,
who have given their lives a new direction by embracing jihadism and the
strong and clear Salafist doctrine which is regarded as pure. Thirdly, the
jihadi groups are attractive to individuals who are seekers with existential or
identity issues because these jihadi groups meet their personal desire to find
meaning in life, and provide social ties, a sense of structure in daily life, and a
positive self-image. And, fourthly, we distinguish idealists and political activ-
ists, for whom social discontent is the most important motivation for their




This report gives a picture of the way in which the phenomenon of jihadi ter-
rorism has manifested itself in the Netherlands in the period between 2001
and 2005, based on an analysis of twelve closed criminal investigations into
jihadi activities that were performed in the Netherlands during this period.
A first general finding is that the same names, places, and actors regularly
occurred in the selected criminal investigations into case groups that had
been active in the Netherlands. Actors from different cases visited the same
mosques, obtained propaganda material and other material and documents
from the same suppliers, met one another in person during lectures and
meetings or at the homes of sympathisers, and met each other ‘virtually’ in
on-line chat rooms or on websites. Partly because of the interrelatedness, but
also in order to keep our analysis as systematic and neutral as possible, we
chose to ignore the structures of the original criminal investigations and to
consider the raw investigation material in its entirety.
In these concluding observations we will provide a synthesis of several signif-
icant research findings in a more theoretical framework. The specific findings
on the basis of the empirical source material have already been described by
chapter in the summary of this report.
Section 6.1 will focus on a number of general characteristics of the phenom-
enon of jihadi terrorism that manifested itself in this country in the period
between 2001 and 2005, and will deal with the question of whether this mani-
festation is (or was) typically Dutch. In the next section (6.2), the more or less
pan-ideological body of thought that inspired or guided actors is central. In
this section, we will examine how this internationally-oriented Salafist-jihadi
body of thought originated. We will be seeking explanations for the fact that
throughout the world this doctrine has exerted a strong force of attraction on
some Muslims, and for the fact that adherents to this doctrine may actually
carry out jihadi actions. We will subsequently deal with the question of which
actors may be receptive to this philosophy (Section 6.3) and we will discuss
how jihadi cooperations are able to function (Section 6.4).
Before focusing on the findings from this research, we repeat the note regard-
ing our methodology, which we made at the beginning of the report. We have
based this research on police files of criminal investigations that were per-
formed in the Netherlands in the period between 2001 and 2005. Although
these files contained much information about jihadi activities that were car-
ried out on Dutch soil in this period, this research also entails considerable
restrictions. Firstly, not all jihadi activities come to the knowledge of the
police, and the police do not initiate criminal investigations into all jihadi
activities which come to their knowledge. Secondly, we only selected and
studied a limited number of the cases investigated in the aforementioned
period. This selection may have influenced our perception of the phenom-
enon. Thirdly, we based our research on the information collected by the
investigation teams for the purpose of reconstructing terrorist crimes and
submitting these to the court, substantiated by evidence. This focus of the
investigation teams, their investigation hypotheses and the associated selec-
tion and interpretation of information also influenced our perception. The
picture we outline of the phenomenon of jihadi terrorism must therefore be
seen in this light.
6.1 Dutch or international jihad?
The image of jihadi terrorism sketched by public authorities, researchers, and
journalists in the Netherlands in the past few years was strongly coloured by
the attack of 2 November 2004 on writer, director, and television producer
Theo van Gogh. Unlike the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States,
this attack was said to involve ‘home-grown fighters’ (Buijs et al., 2006);
‘inside, home-grown, self-financed, self-trained terrorists’ (Sageman, 2008);
or networks with an ‘amorphous structure and lack of ties with international
networks’ (Vidino, 2007). Various scientists have used this Dutch case to
emphasise that jihadi terrorism evolved in the period between 2001 and 2005
from relatively strictly organised and centrally directed terrorist cells that ori-
ginated in Muslim countries and moved to the West, to small groups of young
people who were raised in the West and who are fighting their own holy war.
But has so much actually changed in this period? Our analyses of jihadi net-
works that had been active on Dutch soil in this period of time reveal a more
refined picture of the situation. A general picture that emerged from our
analyses is that the jihadi cooperations studied had much more in common
than that they differed from each other. Whether we look at their elementary
orientation, their composition, the way in which these cooperations func-
tion, their national and international contacts, or the activities developed by
actors within the cooperations: in all cases, it is the evidence of this common
ground in particular, that stands out. The cooperations studied were always
relatively heterogeneous, consisting of individuals with different socio-cul-
tural backgrounds and profiles, who were well connected with actors and
networks in both the Netherlands and abroad. The actors demonstrated an
all-encompassing orientation towards the worldwide struggle in the name of
Islam, and they all seemed to be part of the same broader jihadi movement.
Their cooperations were both locally and internationally active, and engaged
in many different activities – in various combinations of actors and groups –
for the purpose of the international Salafist jihad. In addition, the coopera-
tions evolved and functioned through corresponding interactions between
guiding ‘heartland-oriented’ actors – extremists from the traditionally Islamic
countries, whose convictions and actions were based on experiences in and
connections with the Islamic ‘heartland’ – and the more differentiated
groups of individuals who – for whatever reason – proved to be receptive to
their message.
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Even if we look very specifically at a network with a relatively large number of
actors who were raised in the Netherlands, the ‘home-grown’ actors were still
a minority, and the many international connections were conspicuous. Only
the female actors, who operated in the ‘grey’ external zones of this network,
stand out in the sense that they were notably often raised in the West. Only if
we include these women’s clusters in the equation would the percentage of
home-grown actors increase.
International orientation
In the context of their activities, the actors in the jihadi clusters studied by us
did not seem to make a fundamental distinction between enemies or targets
in the Netherlands or abroad. Their orientation was worldwide, and their
activities were always in the service of the international jihad. Their enemies
might be anywhere in the world. Occasionally, the actors aimed directly at
the Netherlands for their activities. They were, however, more often involved
in supporting or performing cross-border activities aimed at targets and per-
ceived enemies abroad.
The activities that were developed during the period studied, for the purpose
of the international jihad in the Netherlands, appeared neither to be typically
Dutch nor to be specifically tailored to the possibilities or opportunities pro-
vided by the infrastructure in this country. The choice for specific activities
was, however, influenced by more or less accidental opportunities that pre-
sented themselves within jihadi networks. On the basis of the police data
analysed, we may conclude that personal qualities, preferences and motives,
available means and connections, trigger events, the chance of success, time,
geographical proximity, and – in particular also – symbolism may have been
of overriding importance in the choices made for specific collective jihadi
activities.
Jihadi projects often seemed to proceed with much improvisation and last-
minute decision-making.84 Partly as a result of this, the jihadi activities
undertaken in the Netherlands in the period between 2001 and 2005 were
extremely diverse. But whether it concerned theft, an act of violence, drugs
trafficking, passport and identity fraud, credit card fraud, stirring up the fight
in the Middle East, recruitment, training and dispatching fighters, or carrying
out an attack with the aim to punish a generic group of unbelievers for the
crimes committed against Muslims: in all these cases it concerned activities
which served the international jihad in the opinion of the actors. It is espe-
cially this conviction of acting in the service of the holy war, or in the service
of God, that provided actors with a legitimisation for their actions.
84 A similar picture emerged from the information on the German ‘Sauerlandgroep’ which reached us through
the media. In this case, a jihadi suspect stated in court that it did not really matter for him and his friends with
which group they linked up, and whether they would carry out an attack in Iraq, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or
Europe: ‘it really did not make any difference where, we just wanted to participate in the jihad’, were his exact
words. (See Haegens, 2009.)
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We assume that what happened in the Netherlands during the period studied
is reasonably comparable to what happened in other West European coun-
tries at the time. But in order to obtain more insight into this issue, further
research – with an internationally comparative scope – should be conducted.
Which characteristics make a country such as the Netherlands attractive to
jihadi activities is another relevant question. On the basis of our research, we
may conclude that the availability of accessible connections (key figures) and
ports of call was of crucial importance in this respect. For guiding individuals
who had emigrated from Islamic countries to the Netherlands, the long-
established social contacts seemed to have been the main motive to come to
or to stay in this country. Factors such as having acquaintances, internation-
ally-oriented key figures, and meeting places that provided opportunities to
build new cooperations were essential to them. Through existing contacts,
heartland-oriented actors had access to housing, documents, and a pool of
would-be volunteers: receptive individuals who could fulfil many functions
within the broad palette of activities undertaken in jihadi cooperations.
6.2 Struggle against evil and against injustice
But what is actually the aim of the jihadis in the population of actors studied?
And what do the cooperations they belong to, with their extremely varied
membership, want to achieve? The most important factor that the jihadi
actors in the selected investigation files have in common is the general con-
viction that a worldwide struggle must be waged between good and evil,
between justice and injustice, between truth and lies, and between true Mus-
lims and enemies of Islam. This orientation towards the international strug-
gle was far more prominent with the jihadi cooperations analysed than the
final political-religious goal they pretended to want to achieve with this
struggle. In other words, the actors seemed not to have formed a specific idea
of the ideal Islamic state that they – in theory – have in mind. The interesting
point is that their focus on the worldwide struggle is actually an ideology-
exceeding orientation, which binds actors who have become involved in the
jihadi movement from different ideological backgrounds, or from an incoher-
ent (copy-paste) ideology. Dogmatic differences between actors, which
sometimes cause violent rows in the countries of origin, appeared to play an
insignificant role in the West in the cooperations studied by us. Our analyses
show that the actors involved in international jihadism, who had back-
grounds that were otherwise sometimes difficult to reconcile, cooperated
with one another remarkably well, and that they also tended to seek coopera-
tion with people who should actually be seen as belonging to a prohibited
out-group according to the group ideology preached internally. The orienta-
tion towards the joint worldwide struggle is apparently an important goal
that exceeds the groups’ own interests, and is able to diminish inter-group
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conflicts. But this shared orientation is not the only aspect that causes ideo-
logical flexibility among jihadis. The actors studied seemed to justify their
more or less opportunistic behaviour with the argument that in the end it is
the holy struggle in the name of God that counts, and that God will approve
of everything that serves this struggle.
Ideology of the ‘suppressed’
So, how did this pan-ideological orientation on the worldwide struggle
between Muslims and the enemies of Islam originate? And why do some
present-day Muslims feel attracted to it? Salafist jihadism initially arose in
Islamic countries, primarily fed by a sense of injustice. The primary goal of
this ideology was to overthrow the Establishment and to return to a com-
munity that was based on the pure principles of Islam: an ideal state in which
all existing power structures would be broken, in which only the power of
God was accepted, and in which everyone would live in accordance with
God’s laws. Originally, the monarchies and oligarchies in Muslim countries
– which proved to be incapable of spreading prosperity equally among the
people – were the target of this struggle. In the course of years, however, the
causes of the injustice felt have changed. Nowadays, Salafist-jihadis not only
regard the failing Muslim regimes as targets of the struggle, but also ‘Western
society’, ‘all renegades and unbelievers’, or even ‘everyone who does not
obey the pure rules of Islam’. In their present-day view of the world, an ideal
Islamic state could only be established if everyone were to live in accordance
with the rules and laws of God. As a result of this idea, all people who do not
obey these laws and rules have become guilty of injustice.
Shift in the concept of ‘the enemy’
This shift in the concept of who the enemy is – and as a result of this also a
shift in the perception of who belongs to the in-group and who to the out-
group – is an interesting, but also complicated, phenomenon that requires
further explanation. With respect to many actors in the case files studied dur-
ing our research, it applied that feelings of injustice and suppression were not
based on personal experiences, but mainly on perceptions. Large quantities of
television images, audio tapes, videos, websites, sermons, and stories have
given these actors the idea that the group with which they identify – the Mus-
lims in general – are under worldwide pressure through the agency of unbe-
lievers and renegades. Perceptions of worldwide injustice have subsequently
paved the way to the jihadi body of thought they currently adhere to, and to
the preparedness to engage in jihadi activities. The ideology they are cur-
rently led by has turned against a large portion of the group for which the
actors claim they are making a stand, and against the people for whom they
are fighting. After all, according to this ideology, only people who adhere to
the pure doctrine from the initial period of Islam are regarded as true Mus-
lims; the rest – non-Muslims and Muslims who are unsound in the faith – is a
Concluding observations 153
hostile group. This paradox may only be understood if we also analyse the
actors’ feelings of injustice and suppression further.
Relative deprivation and realistic suppression or symbolic threat?
It is not only the jihadi concept of the enemy that has changed in the course
of years; the struggle is also no longer always waged only by the suppressed
themselves. In his latest work, Sageman (2008), however, assumes that the
theme of global injustice against Muslims often resonates with personal
experience. According to him, their actual personal experiences with relative
deprivation and discrimination has a catalytic effect on the view that the
group with which they identify is suppressed and wronged all over the world.
On the basis of the Dutch investigation data, however, we cannot substanti-
ate Sageman’s thesis. As stated above, the injustice that was felt by the actors
studied by us, who had been active in the Netherlands in the period between
2001 and 2005, was based more on perception than on direct personal experi-
ence of injustice and discrimination (cf: Van den Bos, Loseman & Doosje,
2009). Nevertheless, in this process other and more complicated processes
have probably played a role; these are processes that are not so much related
to realistic threats and actual injustice, but more in particular to symbolic
threats.
If groups are afraid that other groups will interfere with their existence, this
may give rise to a threat that is felt collectively. This threat may, of course, be
realistic in nature, but also symbolic (see Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009; Riek,
Mania & Gaertner, 2006). Symbolic threats are often the result of conflicting
standards, values, and views. If such moral issues are included in a conflict,
this arouses powerful emotions, such as anger, contempt, aversion, and even
hate. The fact is that adopting a moralising attitude towards issues often
results in less tolerance and a greater alienation from people with different
opinions (see Cole Wright, Cullum & Schwab, 2008).
According to Slootman and Tillie (2006), many Muslims experience a gap
between the Western and Islamic way of living. Some of them have the idea
that the West is deliberately focused on the suppression of Islam, others fear
that their faith will be overshadowed by Western standards and values (see
also Berger, 1999, 2008). To many Muslims, this last notion particularly is a
source of symbolic threat. Their existence is not physically threatened, in a
literal sense, but their identity is in danger. It is therefore not surprising that a
portion of these Muslims turns to a body of thought in which the Muslim
identity in its pure form is central.
For the small group of Salafist-jihadi Muslims, it is not only Western societ-
ies, unbelievers, and renegades who are perceived as a threat. Fellow Mus-
lims who have adopted those Western standards and Western morals to an
unacceptable degree may also be seen as a threat to their identity. And thus
the situation comes full circle: the ideologies of those jihadis who are actually
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being suppressed and of those threatened symbolically go together very well.
As a converted jihadi stated in a farewell letter quoted above:
‘We are living in an age in which the Muslim community is being attacked
from all sides, both physically and ideologically by the army of unbelief
and corruption … .’
International Salafist jihadism is consequently – in this respect as well – a
denominator for actors with different backgrounds, motives, and goals. The
jihad veterans from Muslim countries who operate in the West sometimes
feel physically threatened; the Muslims who are afraid of being overshad-
owed by Western standards feel symbolically threatened. Together they are
struggling against the secular Western society.
Terrorism as moral duty
A significant observation in this light is the prominent role played by the
active stirring of a latent feeling of threat and the moralising attitude that is
adopted in the cooperations studied. The collective feelings of threat and
suppression in these cooperations were continually fed by images of injustice
done to Muslims. It is such images – primarily from the Middle East – from
which the actors repeatedly derived confirmation that the group with which
they feel a bond is suffering injustice. Injustice towards a group with which
they identify may create strong feelings of anger, contempt, and rage (Van
der Pligt & Koomen, 2009). And these emotions may in turn be accompanied
by an increasing preparedness to take action to do something about this
unjust situation.
In the jihadi cooperations analysed, such images that intensify emotions
were often observed in a collective context, as a result of which the group
cohesion was enhanced and the collective feeling of rage and the prepared-
ness to take action may be stirred up even further. A collectively felt group
threat will in any case always have an enhancing effect on group identity and
group cohesion, a phenomenon that has much in common with ‘rallying
around the flag’. This, in turn, increases the alienation between the group
that feels driven into a corner and the community that is regarded as a threat
or an enemy by this group: in this case Western society (see also Van der Pligt
& Koomen, 2009).
This is a fascinating process. Increasing one’s alienation towards the society
in which one lives, as well as stirring up the rage and feelings of revenge
against that society, may result in actions that are meant to eliminate, or
avenge, the perceived injustice. According to Silke (2008), revenge may be
seen as a key motivation of terrorists or would-be terrorists because revenge
serves to rectify perceived injustice, to restore the dignity of the revengeful
person, and to deter future injustice (see also Cota-McKinley, Woody & Bell,
2001; Van der Pligt & Koomen, 2009).
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Revengeful people can be prepared to do anything. Research conducted by
Cota-McKinley et al. (2001) revealed that men are usually more bent on
revenge than women, and that young people are more so than older people.
This may be one of the reasons that more male than female actors participat-
ed in the jihadi cooperations and that the women often operated more in the
peripheral social zones of these clusters. In addition, their research revealed
that people who see God as master and judge have a relatively positive view
on revenge (in this research, it concerned people who interpreted the Old
Testament very literally). On the basis of this finding, Van der Pligt and Koo-
men (2009) suggested that there is possibly a connection between religious
fundamentalism in general – and consequently also Islamic fundamentalism
– and accepting or admitting feelings of revenge. Religious fundamentalists
are more likely to consider revenge a moral duty, and will be more likely to
undertake action to rectify any injustice felt.
Cognitive processes
Van der Pligt and Koomen furthermore pointed to another process that may
make activists more prepared to fight out of anger and rage. Anger causes
tension which influences the processing of information. Anger promotes a
situation in which negative actions undertaken by the group that has turned
against them are exaggerated, whereby information is processed superficially
and with a minimum of systematics. This emotion also results in the fact that
people are less prepared or less capable of considering the broader situation
in a neutral, down to earth manner, and of regarding it as co-responsible for
the negative actions of the other group, or of trying to see things from the
point of view of that other group in order to understand their actions. In
addition, anger results in risky behaviour. Stirring up anger and feelings of
revenge may therefore have an escalating effect. This is also the reason why it
is disquieting to observe that actors in jihadi cooperations spent a large part
of their time stirring up such emotions.
6.3 Receptivity to jihadi ideology
Proceeding from the selected police files, we also sought answers to ques-
tions such as: which people are receptive to a jihadi ideology; to the solidarity
of a jihadi group; to the shared identity that is connected with this group
membership; or to other advantages offered by such groups? In brief, what
kind of person becomes involved in jihadi cooperations? Firstly, our data file
showed a mixed population of actors from different countries of origin and
with different backgrounds. On closer consideration, however, a characteris-
tic emerged that was shared by many of the actors: individuals who were
active in the jihadi clusters studied felt hardly connected, if at all, to the secu-
lar society in which they were living or staying temporarily, which caused
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them to be receptive to the jihadi ideology. In addition, the jihadi coopera-
tions were able to fulfil specific, more concrete, needs.
Absence of ties with the secular society
Our research showed that most actors who emerged in the investigation files
had hardly any ties with the society they lived in. The majority of them never
even actually felt a bond with Western society. These actors had not been
raised in the West, had lived there for a short period of time, and were part of
a migrant culture. Out of the total of 93 male actors studied, nearly half of
them did not have legal residence status in the Netherlands or in another
West European country. These individuals had come to live in the Nether-
lands or in another West European country on average three years before
being arrested. Eleven men had been born in the Netherlands, out of whom
ten men had been raised here. In addition to this, two men had come to live
in the Netherlands at a young age. All other male actors had either been born
or raised abroad, and a large number of them had only taken up residence in
the Netherlands recently.
The actors who originated from the Middle East had on average been residing
in the Netherlands for 4.5 years at the time they came to the attention of the
police; the actors from North Africa on average 3.6 years; and the actors from
East Europe and the Northern Caucasus on average 4 years. As a result of the
fact that these individuals had lived in a secular Western society for a rela-
tively short period of time, they probably felt poorly connected to this society.
We presume that this absence of social ties, among other things, made them
receptive to guiding actors who communicated a clear ideology, but that they
were also receptive to the solidarity of a jihadi group, to the shared identity
that is connected with this group membership, and to other advantages such
groups may offer them.
A smaller number of actors had presumably felt connected with our society
at one time, but had lost this sense of belonging for different reasons. A num-
ber of them had ended up in the margin of society due to problems of addic-
tion, because they had ended up in crime, or for other personal reasons. It
also applies to these actors that their receptivity to guiding actors and key fig-
ures – who held out the prospect of another life – resulted from their vulnera-
ble position and their lack of social ties. Influenced by these actors, they
made the decision to place their lives in the service of the holy war.
Other actors, also a minority in the total population of actors, did not loose
their social ties until they embraced jihadism. Because the gap with society is
deliberately increased in jihadi cooperations, and – in particular – feelings of
anger and rage were created and stirred up, these actors experienced an ever-
increasing alienation from society. Among these actors, we identified ideal-
ists, political activists, seekers, as well as individuals who had come into con-
tact with the jihadi ideology through friends or acquaintances and who had
started to believe in it for various reasons. A remarkably large number of
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these individuals are Muslim women. Many of the women who fulfilled roles
in the clusters studied by us had been born and bred in Western Europe; a
few of them only converted to Islam at an advanced age. Some of them had
ended up in such clusters because they had sexual relationships with jihadi
partners. Because these women subsequently started to identify with these
clusters, or because they had started to believe what was preached in those
clusters, they had loosened – or had explicitly broken off – their ties with the
West European or Dutch society. Some Muslim women from the clusters
analysed, however, continued to maintain contact with the Dutch society
despite their interest in the jihadi body of thought. They attended regular
educational courses or training courses, and also maintained relationships
outside the jihadi circles.
The idealists and political activists in the population of actors had become
receptive to the stimuli from the jihadi movement as a result of their deeply
rooted social dissatisfaction. Indignation about political, economic, and cul-
tural injustice in the world stirred up their preparedness to take action. Those
who we characterised as ‘seekers in this report, were presumably mainly
receptive to the Salafist-jihadi views from the need for existential security,
meaning in life, and structure.
Concrete needs
In addition to the absence of social ties, which probably caused the actors to
be receptive to jihadi ideologies and communities, the jihadi clusters identi-
fied by us seemed also attractive because they could fulfil a variety of needs
and necessities of life. Actors often not only joined such groups because of
their receptivity to the dominant views and activities of these groups, but
sometimes also because of the social advantages such groups may offer
them. Most people seek some degree of social solidarity, motivated by a need
for security, safety, structure (Meertens et al., 2006), status, meaning in life,
and identity. Militant religious groups are able to satisfy such needs. Espe-
cially young adults and illegal actors appeared to attach importance to these
types of advantages.
For the large groups of illegal foreigners and asylum seekers who were active
in the jihadi clusters analysed, specific material needs also appeared to play a
role in the process that connected them to these groups. Such cooperations
often included actors or key figures who were in the position to provide work,
accommodation, contacts (criminal or otherwise), identity papers, and other
useful necessities of life. These figures could sometimes also provide com-
pletely different advantages or rewards, such as privileges or positions that
increased their status within a cooperation.
The jihadi cooperations were probably appealing to addicts, former addicts
and criminal actors for other advantages. By exerting themselves for their
faith within such a group, they attempted to straighten things out for them-
selves after a life of sin. Jihadi clusters offered many possibilities to this end.
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Moreover, guiding actors often suggested that they could mediate a place in
paradise, provided that those chosen conformed to the criteria of good jihad-
ism prescribed by such actors.
6.4 Dynamics of the cooperations
The group of receptive people was consequently extremely varied. But what
about the guiding actors? And how did the cooperations led by them evolve
and function in practice? In each of the cooperations studied, the presence of
individuals who possessed an ideological or militant frame of reference
based on experiences in the Islamic world appeared to be crucial to the for-
mation and consolidation of jihadi clusters. These actors appeared to be
remarkably capable of attracting and mobilising people. In a Western con-
text, these heartland-oriented actors actually had a relatively strong ability to
sell a coherent jihadi narrative. They were regarded by receptive actors as
authoritative representatives of a movement that had revived in the Islamic
world, and they had characteristics that gave them credibility and status,
such as knowledge of the Qur’an and of classic Arabic, experiences in com-
bat, contacts with other charismatic key figures, and/or verbal (or physical)
power of persuasion. Due to these characteristics they functioned relatively
often as role models. The relationships between guiding individuals and
receptive people in the clusters identified and studied by us had a relative
nature. Individuals who were capable of giving direction to specific groups of
actors often appeared to be receptive themselves to the direction of other
actors at home or abroad who in turn took advantage of their commitment.
And people who became involved in jihadi clusters could develop to such a
degree that they were able to take leading roles themselves in time, for exam-
ple to new followers or recruits.
Self-selection
When guiding actors, with their clearly articulated ideology and relative cred-
ibility, come into contact with individuals or groups of individuals who, for
whatever reason, prove to be receptive to their message or to other advan-
tages that these actors – or their networks – have to offer, processes of radi-
calisation are stimulated. These processes may subsequently develop further
within existing groups. In this process, we observed a form of self-selection.
Those who were receptive – and remained receptive – to guiding heartland-
oriented actors or individuals associated with them – continued to radicalise
collectively. Others chose to distance themselves on their own initiative. In
each case, it was a dynamic process. Actors who came to consider their envi-
ronment to be too radical left the group. Other individuals who proved to be
receptive – either to the jihadi ideology or to other advantages offered by the
cooperations – joined the group.
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Extremists from the traditional Islamic world usually played a contributory
role in the continued collective developments: in some cases because group
members took the initiative to actively seek teachers who could continue to
educate them in radical Islam, and in other cases because teachers continued
to present themselves actively to them.
Informal and fluid relationships
In the jihadi cooperations studied, we observed series of informally linked
dependence-receptivity relationships. Actors who relied on the commitment
and abilities of others gave direction to individuals who showed themselves
to be receptive to them. Guiding actors often appeared to be receptive them-
selves to the direction of other actors who took advantage of their commit-
ment. Due to the complex and dynamic nature of these interactions, we did
not notice any formal, strictly organised, hierarchical relationships. The rela-
tionships were always informal, fluid and strongly decentralised, with the
actors relatively free to improvise when carrying out their tasks. The linked
series of social dependence-receptivity relationships was able to compensate
for the absence of formal hierarchical relationships within jihadi coopera-
tions.
Within the margins of this overall picture, it is obvious that the one coopera-
tion has slightly more or different organisational substance than the other.
The degree and way in which this developed in each cooperation appeared to
be determined in particular by the nature of the activities organised within
these cooperations. Specific activities simply required more coordination
and a stricter allocation of tasks than other activities. As a result of the large
diversity of the activities that were usually organised in most cooperations,
the roles and functions of the individuals often changed by the moment.
6.5 In conclusion
If only the world was simple. Preferably as simple as the most enthusiastic of
the actors from the criminal investigations analysed by us presented it, in
their vision of a universalistic black-and white version of the world. Policy
makers and field workers who are engaged in counterterrorism would have
considerably less trouble countering jihadi terrorism, and scientists would
have less trouble understanding and explaining the phenomenon. However,
our findings mainly show the complexity and ambiguity in which the phe-
nomenon of jihadi terrorism presented itself in Netherlands during the
period studied. We are dealing with extremely fluid and informal coopera-
tions, which are part of a broader movement by their mutual and transna-
tional interrelatedness as decentralised clusters. In addition, the jihadi coop-
erations studied by us engaged in a wide range of activities. Usually, these
activities were by no means always equally threatening. Whereas direct pre-
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paratory acts for attacks may set the alarm bells ringing, the broader jihadi
movement is supported and sustained by more subtle activities, such as
fund-raising, document fraud or other forms of facilitating crimes. Jihadi
activities aimed at providing protection for the cooperations and their actors
are often as varied as the other activities, and are performed systematically.
At an individual level, as well, the situation appears to be complex. The jihadi
cooperations derived their capacities from people with extremely divergent
backgrounds, origins, ages and motives. Because of their mixed and changing
socio-cultural compositions, the jihadi communities are hard to characterise.
Likewise, it is not possible to provide an unambiguous, clear-cut profile of a
jihadi individual. And although it is remarkably often migrants from the
Islamic heartland who provide direction and inspiration to actors, there
appears to be no connection at all between the socio-cultural background of
someone who participates in jihadi circles and the degree to which he poses
a direct physical danger to society. This seems to be connected to individual
emotional involvement or motivation – factors that are far more difficult to
establish, and which may sometimes not be established until after a drastic
terrorist act has taken place. In this respect, as well, those researchers who
have the relative luxury of analysing this phenomenon in detail, and in retro-
spect, have an easier job than authorities and organisations that have to com-
bat this terrorism as it takes place. This situation, however, makes the find-
ings described in this report even more valuable. Knowledge and under-
standing of the nature of jihadi terrorism are, after all, necessary: not only to
develop and test the scientific theories in this field, but also to develop practi-
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